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In referenda held in 2003, more than ninety percent of Lithuanians supported 
joining the European Union (EU), while fewer than two-thirds of Estonians did so.   
Why?  The small existing literature on cross-national differences in EU support has 
focused on political and cultural variables, such as party competition and the history of 
independent statehood.  Using survey data and content analysis of newspapers, however, 
I show that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU.  
Most Lithuanians hoped that joining the EU would help Lithuania to catch up with the 
West by increasing foreign investment and trade.  By contrast, many Estonians worried 
that the accession would make their country dependent on the West by driving domestic 
producers bankrupt and allowing foreigners to buy up local economic resources.   
Based on statistical data and press reports, I argue that these expectations 
reflected the two countries‘ strategies of economic reform.  Lithuania sold state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to their managers, imposed moderate tariffs on imports, and continued 
to trade heavily with Russia.  This strategy slowed down the development of services and 
modern industry.  By contrast, Estonia sold SOEs to foreign investors, abolished all 
tariffs, and reoriented its trade rapidly to the West.  This approach hurt agriculture and 
traditional industry.  As a result, both Lithuanians and Estonians were unhappy about 
their country‘s economic situation.  However, Lithuanians saw European integration as a 
solution to their country‘s problems, while Estonians considered it a cause thereof.   
I conclude by showing that my theory ―travels‖ to Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: BRINGING THE ECONOMY BACK IN 
Introduction 
In December 2002, the European Council invited eight post-Communist 
countries—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia—to join the European Union (EU) in 2004 and placed two more 
countries—Bulgaria and Romania—on the waiting list.  In many ways, this seemed like a 
dream come true for Eastern Europe.  Many candidate countries had close historical and 
cultural ties with Germany, Austria, or the Nordic countries.  Joining the EU would allow 
them to ―return to Europe.‖  After World War II, they had been occupied or otherwise 
dominated by the Soviet Union.  The EU would protect their independence from Russia.  
During the democratic revolutions of 1989-1991, they had overthrown corrupt 
Communist dictatorships.  The EU would show them on how to build democratic and 
trustworthy states.  Finally, they were much poorer than Western Europe.  The EU would 
help them to catch up by giving them economic aid and opening its markets to their 
products.   
Over the next few months—from March to September 2003—the prospective 
members held referenda on whether or not they should join the EU.  These were widely 
regarded as a formality: the EU and the applicant country governments signed the 
accession treaties in April 2003, when only Slovenia had voted.  However, the results of 
the referenda showed that popular support for EU membership varied significantly across 
Eastern Europe (see Column A of Table 1).  In some countries—Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Lithuania—the overwhelming majority of voters (90-94%) supported EU membership.  
In other countries, however, a significant minority of the electorate—16% in Hungary, 
23-24% in Poland and the Czech Republic, and 32-33% in Latvia and Estonia—opposed 
the accession.  Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 without holding a 
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referendum.  However, opinion polls showed that voters in these two countries supported 
the EU at least as strongly as their counterparts in Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania (see 
Column B of Table 1.1).   
Table 1.1: In or Out?  Support for Joining the European Union (EU), 2003  
 A) Referendum  B) Survey*  
 For (%) Against (%) For (%) Against (%) 
Bulgaria - - 74 4 
Czech Republic   77 23 58 18 
Estonia 67 33 41 31 
Hungary 84 16 71 11 
Latvia 67 32 49 27 
Lithuania 91 9 75 12 
Poland 77 23 70 14 
Romania - - 83 2 
Slovakia 94 6 70 10 
Slovenia 90 10 79 10 
* The remaining voters were unsure or said that they would not vote. 
Sources: Nugent (2004), 278-279 (Column A) and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 
2003.2 (May 2003), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cceb.en.htm (Column B). 
What explains cross-national differences in EU support in Eastern Europe?  As 
comparativists are wont to do, the existing literature focuses on political and cultural 
variables (Pontusson 1995).  Some scholars argue that countries with a short history of 
independent statehood are less supportive of the EU than long-established nation-states 
because they attach higher value to political sovereignty.  Others suggest that ethnically 
divided societies oppose European integration because ethnic majorities worry that the 
EU will force them to make concessions to the minorities or because ethnic minorities co-
blame the EU for their low status.  Still others find that democratization, elite divisions, 
and the presence of significant anti-EU parties encourage popular opposition to the EU.  
In democratic countries, people can agitate against EU membership without fearing 
arrest.  Elite divisions indicate that it is socially acceptable to be a Euroskeptic.  Powerful 
Euroskeptic parties will mobilize their supporters to vote against the EU.   
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This dissertation will develop an alternative, economic explanation of cross-
national differences in EU support by comparing the Baltic states of Lithuania and 
Estonia.  I will argue that the two countries pursued different strategies of economic 
reform.  Lithuania followed an insider-oriented strategy.  It maintained state ownership of 
infrastructure and sold other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their Soviet-era managers.  
It imposed moderate tariffs on imports and continued to trade heavily with Russia.  By 
contrast, Estonia adopted an outsider-oriented strategy.  It sold SOEs, including 
infrastructure enterprises, to foreign investors.  It abolished all import tariffs and re-
oriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West.  Neither strategy worked well, 
however.  The Lithuanian strategy slowed down the development of services and ―new‖ 
industry.  The Estonian strategy led to a decline of agriculture and ―old‖ industry.  
Neither approach could prevent the decline of infrastructure.  As a result, both 
Lithuanians and Estonians were dissatisfied with their (country’s) economic situation.  
However, Lithuanians saw European integration as a solution to their (country’s) 
problems, while Estonians considered it a cause of theirs.      
This introductory chapter is organized as follows.  The next section will review 
the existing literature on cross-national variation in EU support in Western and Eastern 
Europe.  (The literature on the West is relevant because much of the scholarship on the 
East is based on it.)  The following section will summarize my argument.  The conclusion 
will outline the rest of the dissertation.     
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Go West, Young Man: Literature Review 
Identity Crisis 
Since the 1980s, Eurobarometer surveys have found that some countries (e.g., 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Germany) are more supportive of the EU others (e.g., 
Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Austria) (Jolly 2007, chap. 6).
1
  To explain this 
pattern, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) suggest that small states, such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands, are more open to outside political and cultural influences than large 
countries, such as Britain and France.  Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel (1998 a, b) 
contend that countries that suffered heavy casualties in World War II (Germany, Italy and 
France) are more anxious to avoid another military conflict than those that suffered little 
(the Nordics).  Kalthenthaler and Anderson (2001) argue that countries with a long 
history of independent statehood (Britain and France) are more reluctant to give up power 
to supra-national institutions than countries that only became independent in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Ireland and Greece).  Finally, Vössing (2005) claims 
that some countries (Germany) have a more open national identity than others (Britain). 
There are also two qualitative studies that explore cross-national differences in 
EU support.  Diez Medrano (2003, chap. 2-3, 5-8) argues that country-specific historical 
experiences explain why Spain and Germany support European integration, while Britain 
opposes it.  Germany has a guilty conscience because it started two world wars.  
Moreover, after World War II, West German leaders realized that other European 
countries would not allow Germany to become reunified unless it was firmly anchored in 
European institutions.  Spain experienced economic and political decline from the 
seventeenth century to the 1970s.  From the richest country in Europe, it became one of 
the poorest.  Its political development was marked by authoritarian rule, frequent coups, 
                                                          
1
 Of course, attitudes toward the EU have also changed over time.  For example, Belgium and the 
Netherlands used to be strongly pro-European, but have now moved to(wards) the Euroskeptic camp.    
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and a civil war.  As a result, Spain sees EU membership as a way of developing its 
economy and democratizing its politics.  Unlike Germany and Spain, Britain has 
traditionally focused on maintaining its colonial empire and tried to stay aloof from 
European conflicts.  More recently, it has cultivated a special relationship with the US.
2
 
Gstöhl (2002, chap. 1, 2, 7) compares popular attitudes toward the EU in three 
traditionally Euroskeptic countries: Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway.  Specifically, she 
wants to explain why Sweden joined the EU in the 1990s, while Switzerland pursued 
partial integration (e.g., through economic agreements) and Norway stayed out.  She 
argues that Swedish national identity was based on a neutral foreign policy and an 
economic model of centralized collective bargaining and high social spending.  Once the 
Cold War ended and the Swedish economic model disintegrated, Sweden joined the EU 
in order to improve its access to EU markets.  Switzerland wants to keep both its neutral 
foreign policy and its federal, direct-democratic political system.  However, because of 
its role as one of Europe‘s banking centers, it is interested in closer economic ties with 
the EU.  Finally, Norway sees European integration as a threat to economic prosperity 
and political sovereignty.  Unlike Sweden and Switzerland, it has a long history of 
foreign rule—by Danes, Swedes and Germans—which it is anxious not to repeat.  It also 
has large stocks of oil and fish, which it is unwilling to share with other countries.
3
      
How well do these findings from Western Europe hold up in Eastern Europe?  
Like Gabel (1998 a, b) and Gabel and Palmer (1995), Allam and Goerres (2008) find that 
there is a strong correlation between World War II deaths and support for European 
integration: the more casualties a country suffered, the more likely it is to support 
adopting the common European currency, the euro.  They argue that the euro symbolizes 
peace and security in Europe.  This makes it attractive to countries that want to avoid 
                                                          
2
 Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) make the same argument about the origins of British Euroskepticism. 
 
3
 Gstöhl (2002, chap. 7) also notes that Norway depends less on EU markets than either Sweden or 
Switzerland. 
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conflict with their neighbors.  Like Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), they also find that 
small states are more supportive of the euro than large ones.  Small countries feel 
vulnerable to political pressure from big states.  Relative to their population, they are also 
over-represented in EU institutions, especially the European Parliament.  As a result, they  
support policies that strengthen the EU at the expense of national governments. 
Other cultural and historical findings from Western Europe, however, have been 
reversed in Eastern Europe.  In contrast to Anderson and Kaltenthaler (2001), Grabbe and 
Hughes (1998, chap. 6), Grabbe (2003), Ozolina (203) and Mikkel and Pridham (2004) 
find that opposition to the EU is stronger in countries with a short history of independent 
statehood, such as the Czech and Slovak republics and the Baltic states.  For centuries, 
these countries were dominated by foreign powers: Austria, Germany, Sweden, Poland, 
and Russia.  Now they want to enjoy their hard-won sovereignty instead of being bossed 
around by the EU.  Pettai (2005) and Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru (2006) argue that 
Estonian and Latvian Euroskepticism stems from their cultural peripherality.  Colonized 
by German crusaders in the thirteenth century, Estonians and Latvians did not develop a 
national consciousness until the nineteenth century.  By contrast, Lithuania was an 
independent grand duchy ruled by an indigenous nobility until it merged with Poland in 
the sixteenth century.  As a result, Estonians and Latvians define their national identity in 
opposition to Europe, while Lithuanians consider themselves part of Europe.   
Students of Baltic politics, home to the largest ethnic minorities in Eastern 
Europe, have explored the role of ethnicity in shaping popular attitudes toward the EU.  
Evans and Lipsmeyer (2001), Ozolina (2003), Mikkel and Pridham (2004), and Pettai 
(2005) argue that Estonia and Latvia are less supportive of the EU than Lithuania because 
they experienced a larger influx of Russian migrants during the Soviet rule.   After the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, Estonia and Latvia passed strict citizenship laws to 
minimize Russian political influence.  By contrast, Lithuania gave citizenship to all 
Russians who wanted it because there were so few of them.  Now Estonians and Latvians 
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worry that the EU will force them to change their citizenship policies, while Lithuanians 
know that their laws easily pass EU muster.   By contrast, Whitefield, Rohrschneider and 
Alisauskiene (2006) assert that it is the Estonian and Latvian Russians who oppose EU 
membership.  The EU pays lip service to the idea of equal rights, but accepts the Baltic 
view that Russians are migrants who must apply for citizenship.  As a result, the Russians 
look to the Russian state for help. 
Trust Me 
There is an interesting debate among West Europeanists on how the quality of 
political institutions affects support for European integration.  In a quantitative study, 
Delhey (2007) finds that citizens of more democratic countries—measured in terms of 
respect for political and civil liberties—trust other EU member states more than people 
living in less democratic societies.  He argues that participation in democratic politics 
makes people more tolerant and confident of their ability to influence the government.  
These attitudes, in turn, are conducive to international cooperation.  In his qualitative 
comparison of Britain, Germany and Spain, however, Diez Medrano (2003, chap. 5-8) 
comes to the opposite conclusion: it is the lack of democracy at home that makes people 
support European integration.  Spaniards and Germans support the EU because they see it 
as a guarantor of post-war democratic reforms.  Britons oppose the EU because they 
consider it a threat to representative government.   
On a related note, Delhey (2007) finds that corruption decreases people‘s trust in 
other European countries.  As with democracy, he argues that people‘s attitudes toward 
international politics reflect their experience with domestic politics: if the politicians they 
know are corrupt, they will expect the same of all politicians.  By contrast, Sánchez-
Cuenza (2000) finds that corruption increases support for European integration.  He 
reasons as follows.  European integration requires countries to give up part of their 
national sovereignty.  For example, the EU, rather than national governments, will be in 
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charge of issuing currency, distributing agricultural subsidies, and admitting immigrants.  
The costs of giving up sovereignty are high in countries where politicians and civil 
servants act in the public interest (little corruption) and low in countries where officials 
pursue their private interests (a lot of corruption).  This explains why south European 
countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece) are most supportive of the EU and the Nordic 
countries and Britain least so, while continental Europe falls in between.     
The most robust political finding about Western Europe, however, is that political 
elites shape popular attitudes toward the EU.  The elites in question are political parties.  
If most parties support European integration, so do most voters; if not, then not.  
There are two causal mechanisms at work: party identification and the political 
opportunity structure.  Many voters know and care little about the EU.  When they have 
to vote on issues like EU membership, the common currency, or the EU constitution, they 
follow cues from the party they vote for in national elections (Wessels 1995; Anderson 
1998; Van Kersbergen 2000; Steenbergen and Scott 2004).  More subtly, elite disunity 
encourages people to vote against European integration regardless of their party 
affiliation.  Euroskeptic parties make available negative information about the EU that 
pro-EU elites prefer to gloss over.  By speaking out against the EU, they also puncture 
the illusion that ―everybody‖ supports the EU.  This encourages EU opponents to turn out 
and vote (Ray 2003, 2004; Steenbergen and Scott 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2005).   
Moving on to Eastern Europe, most scholars come down on the side of Diez 
Medrano in the debate over whether democracy increases or decreases support for the 
EU.  Christin (2004), Vachudova (2005, chap. 6, 8) and Rohrscheider and Whitefield 
(2004, 2006) find that there is a negative correlation between democratization and 
support for EU membership.
4
  According to Christin (2004) and Vachudova (2005), 
citizens of less democratic countries (the Balkans and Slovakia) believe that joining the 
                                                          
4
 Rohrscheider and Whitefield (2004) also find that democracy encourages opposition to foreign 
ownership.   
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EU would strengthen democratic political institutions at home, while people living in 
more democratic countries (Central Europe and the Baltic states) feel that they do not 
need outside aid.  Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2004, 2006) argue that democracy 
allows political entrepreneurs to mobilize opposition to the EU and encourages public 
debate about the advantages and disadvantages of Western integration.  By contrast, 
undemocratic governments intimidate EU opponents and discourage public debate.   
Rohrschneider and Whitefield‘s (2004, 2006) point about public debate brings us 
to elite unity argument.  Szczerbiak and Taggart (2004 a, b) argue that the outcomes of 
the EU accession referenda in Eastern Europe depended on underlying public support for 
the EU (which they do not explain) and party positions on EU membership.  In Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia and Lithuania, all major political parties supported the accession, 
which marginalized Euroskeptic ideas in the public discourse and discouraged anti-EU 
voters from participating in the referendum.  In the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia and 
Latvia, however, significant parties opposed EU membership, which gave credibility to 
Euroskeptic ideas and encouraged anti-EU voters to turn out and vote.
5
  Similarly, 
Kopecký and Učen (2003) and Kopecký and van Holsteyn (2006) maintain that the 
Slovaks strongly supported the accession because all major political parties—including 
the populist Movement for Democratic Slovakia—called on their supporters to do so.  By 
contrast, many Czechs opposed the EU because the Czech conservatives criticized EU 
regulatory policies as socialist (although they supported the accession in principle), while 
the Communists opposed the EU as a Trojan horse of multinational capital.   
The Wealth of Nations  
There is a sizable literature on the economic determinants of cross-national 
differences in support for European integration in Western Europe.  Until recently, much 
                                                          
5
 In an earlier paper, however, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003) find that there is no correlation between 
popular and party-based Euroskepticism.   
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of this research focused on quantitative differences in the countries‘ macro-economic 
performance in terms of growth, employment, and inflation.  In a classic study, 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) show that support for EU membership is stronger in rich 
countries than in poor countries and in times of economic growth than during recessions.  
Their argument is straightforward.  From the founding of the European Coal and Steel 
Community in 1952 to the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, European elites have 
promoted European integration as a way of boosting economic growth.  A common 
market will allow countries to specialize in areas where they have a comparative 
advantage.  A common currency will reduce interest rates and stabilize prices.  As a 
result, European voters hold the EU responsible for domestic economic conditions. 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) find that there is a strong correlation between 
EU support and unemployment and inflation: when unemployment and inflation go up, 
support for the EU goes down.  Similarly, countries that joined the EU during the 
stagflation of the 1970s (Britain, Ireland and Denmark) are less pro-European than 
countries that joined in the 1950s, when unemployment and inflation were low (France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands).  Eichenberg and Dalton (2007), however, 
find that inflation affects EU support, but unemployment does not.  They reason as 
follows.  The EU has a common monetary policy (the European Monetary Union), but no 
comparable fiscal union.  Moreover, even EU fiscal policies—tariffs, agricultural 
subsidies, and value-added taxes—have a direct effect on prices, but only an indirect 
impact on employment.  As a result, voters blame the EU for inflation, but not 
unemployment.
6
     
Other scholars, however, have reached the opposite conclusion: it is economic 
failure, not success, that creates support for the EU.  Voters support European integration 
if they think that their own government is doing a bad job managing the economy and 
                                                          
6
 However, they find that the correlation between EU inflation and EU support has become weaker since 
the 1990s.   
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that the EU would do better.  Thus, Duch and Taylor (1997) find that citizens of poor 
countries (e.g., Ireland) are more likely to consider EU membership a good thing than 
voters in rich countries (e.g., the Nordics).  Mattli (1999, chap. 1, 3-4) argues that 
countries apply for EU membership after their growth rate has been below the EU 
average for a few years.  This, he says, explains why the UK, Ireland and Denmark 
applied to join the EU in the late 1960s, while Finland and Sweden did so in the early 
1990s.  Gärtner (1997) and Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) find that support for the 
euro is stronger in countries with a history of loose fiscal and monetary policy and high 
unemployment and inflation (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) than in countries that 
have successfully pursued tight economic policies (the UK and the Nordics).      
On the whole, then, the findings about the relationship between economic success 
and support for European integration are contradictory and depend heavily on the time 
period and countries analyzed.  This may explain why some scholars of West European 
politics have recently turned their attention to international economic relations and 
qualitative differences between European economies.  Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001), 
Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004), Brinegar and Jolly (2005), and Eichenberg and 
Dalton (2007) find that countries that are net recipients of money from the EU budget—
via agricultural subsidies and funds for infrastructure development—are more supportive 
of European integration than countries that are net contributors.  Clearly, the former 
benefit from EU membership, while the latter would be better off on their own.  By and 
large, this is a north-south divide: the poorer, agricultural economies of the south (Spain, 
Portugal and Greece) are more supportive of the EU than the rich, industrialized and 
service-oriented economies in the north (Britain and the Nordics). 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993 and 2007), Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001), 
Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004), and Brinegar and Jolly (2005) find that countries 
that trade more actively with other countries and/or conduct most of their trade with other 
EU nations (e.g., Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands) are more supportive of 
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the EU than countries that trade less actively and/or conduct a lot of their trade with non-
EU countries (e.g., Britain and Ireland).
7
  Ingebritsen (2000, chap. 1-2, 6) replicates this 
finding in her study of Nordic countries: Finland and Sweden, which trade mostly with 
the EU, are more pro-European (or less Euroskeptic) than Norway and Iceland, which 
trade mostly with the US and the UK.
8
  Two explanations are offered for these findings.  
First, trade increases the economic and political power of export-oriented industries, 
which will lobby the government to pursue policies (such as EU accession) that will 
improve their access to foreign markets.  Second, trade makes people more familiar with 
other countries and, hence, reduces their fears and prejudices about foreigners.     
Finally, some researchers have argued that ―varieties of capitalism‖ (Hall and 
Soskice 2001) explain cross-national differences in EU support.  Brinegar, Jolly and 
Kitschelt (2004) find that voters in countries with centralized wage bargaining (Austria 
and the Nordic countries) are less supportive of the EU than voters in countries with 
decentralized bargaining (the rest of the EU, except Britain which is both decentralized 
and anti-EU).
9
  They reason as follows.  Under centralized bargaining, unions have an 
incentive to moderate their wage demands in exchange for full employment.  National 
central banks reward such restraint by increasing money supply.  Under decentralized 
bargaining, unions have an incentive to bargain for as high wages as possible.  National 
central banks penalize such excess by cutting money supply.  With the introduction of the 
euro, however, this system of rewards and punishments breaks down.  Unions is 
decentralized countries will still bargain for large wage increases, which will increase 
prices in both decentralized and centralized countries.  In response, the European Central  
Bank will cut money supply, which will increase unemployment in all countries.   
                                                          
7 
However, Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) find that this relationship only holds until 1991. 
 
8
 Ingebritsen (1998, chap. 6) also argues that Norway and Iceland have large fishing industries that would 
lose government subsidies and be required to adopt stricter environmental regulations in the EU. 
 
9
 They leave out Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece whose wage-bargaining systems are still in flux.   
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Other analysts have argued that cross-national differences in EU support reflect 
quantitative or qualitative differences between welfare states.  Ray (2004) finds that 
voters in countries with high levels of social spending (northern Europe) worry  that 
European integration will lead to loss of social benefits, while voters in low-spending 
countries (southern Europe) do not.  Following Esping-Andersen (1990, chap. 1), 
Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004) distinguish between social democratic (universal 
coverage and high benefits), conservative (broad coverage and medium benefits), and 
liberal (restricted coverage and low benefits) welfare states.
10
  They find that opposition 
to the EU is strongest in social democratic welfare states (the Nordic countries), where 
voters have the most to lose from the convergence of social policy toward the EU mean.     
This logic, of course, would imply that voters in liberal welfare states would 
support the EU most strongly because they would have the most to gain from a common 
European social policy.  However, this is not the case: voters in liberal Britain and 
Ireland are less supportive of the EU than voters in conservative continental Europe (e.g., 
Germany, France and Italy).  Brinegar and Jolly (2005) argue that this is because people 
are risk-averse: they are afraid that changes to the current system, whatever it is, will 
create problems.  For example, imposing the conservative welfare state on liberal 
economies might initially lead to higher unemployment and inflation.  As a result, 
popular support for the EU is strongest in countries with the dominant—i.e., the 
conservative—welfare model because they would have to make the least changes if the 
EU adopted a common social policy. 
Unlike with Western Europe, the literature on the economic determinants of 
cross-national differences in EU support in Eastern Europe is very small, consisting of 
four studies.
11
  Like the older literature on Western Europe, three of the four papers focus 
                                                          
10
 For a recent discussion of European welfare states, see Pontusson (2005), chap. 2, 8. 
 
11
 As I will discuss in chapter 4, there is a sizable literature on the economic determinants of individual-
level variance in support for European integration.  For example, Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) and 
Tverdova and Anderson (2004) find that subjective winners of economic reforms (people who believe that 
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on the relationship between macro-economic outcomes and EU support.  Caplanova, 
Orviska and Hudson (2004) find that support the EU is strongest in countries whose 
GDP has grown the most during the transition to capitalism, while opposition to the EU 
is strongest in countries whose GDP has grown the least.  They make the following 
argument.  East European countries have made a transition from socialism to capitalism.  
This transition has involved economic integration with the West through foreign 
investment and trade.  As a result, East Europeans view EU accession as a continuation 
(or completion) of the post-Communist transition. 
By contrast, Christin (2005) finds that support for the EU is strongest in countries 
that are doing poorly economically (have high growth and low inflation), while 
opposition to the EU is strongest in countries that are doing well (have low growth and 
high inflation).  He argues that voters support or oppose the EU depending on whether 
they think that their country is economically self-sufficient or not.  In high-growth, low-
inflation countries, people believe that their country can succeed without EU help.  In 
low-growth, high-inflation countries, however, people believe that their country needs to 
join the EU in order to stabilize its economy and receive EU aid.  In an unpublished 
paper, Herzog and Tucker (2008) conclude that both Caplanova et al and Christin are 
right: while growth increases support for the EU, inflation reduces it, as does 
unemployment.  However, all relationships are relatively weak.  Finally, in another 
unpublished paper, Allam and Goerres (2008) argue that small countries are more 
supportive of the euro than big countries because they suffer more from price fluctuations 
in international markets and, hence, would benefit from a fixed exchange rate.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
their financial situation is improving and/or support the market economy) are more supportive of the EU 
than subjective losers (those who believe that their financial situation is worsening and/or oppose the 
market economy).  However, they do not explore the implications of their argument for cross-national 
variance in EU support.  That‘s unfortunate because the their data show that (a) the relationship between 
perceived financial situation and EU support does not hold in Poland and Slovakia (Tucker, Pacek and 
Berinsky, 562) and that (b) compared with Latvia, support for the EU is significantly stronger in Bulgaria 
and Slovakia and weaker in Estonia, even controlling for attitudes toward the market (Tverdova and 
Anderson, 200, 204). 
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Familiarity Breeds Contempt: My Argument in Brief 
To test the existing explanations of cross-national differences in EU support, and 
to develop my own, I will compare two ―most similar systems‖ (Bunce 1999, chap. 1; 
Przeworski and Teune 1970, chap. 1-2; Tarrow 2010): the Baltic states of Lithuania and 
Estonia.  As Table 1.2 shows, both are small countries in the northeastern periphery of 
Europe (for inspiration, see Lim 2007, 37).  Both have a short history of political 
independence in the modern era, although Lithuania was an independent grand duchy in 
the Middle Ages.  Both suffered large population losses during World War II through 
Soviet deportations of the former elites to Siberia, Nazi massacres of Jews and 
Communists, and the conscription of soldiers to Soviet and German armies.  Under the 
Soviet rule of 1944-1991, both countries (but Estonia more so than Lithuania) 
experienced a large influx of Russian migrants, who settled in self-contained 
communities and whom the locals saw as a threat to their language and culture (Kiaupa et 
al 2002, chap. V, VI; Misiunas and Taagepera 1993, chap. 2-3; Lieven 1993, chap. 3-4).    
Since the collapse of Communism, Lithuania and Estonia have built reasonably 
liberal, democratic, and effective states.  People can express their opinions, join political 
groups, and participate in demonstrations without fearing arrest.  Both countries hold 
regular elections, which governments often lose (www.freedomhouse.org).  The one 
blemish on Estonia‘s record is that many of its ethnic Russian residents lack citizenship, 
largely because they have failed to pass the (rather tough) language and civics test.
12
  
However, under EU pressure, Estonia has granted citizenship to all children born in 
Estonia since the breakup of the Soviet Union (Pettai 2003; Budryte 2005, chap. 3).  Both 
countries have relatively high levels of administrative corruption: to ―get things done,‖ 
individuals and firms often bribe government officials.  However, because of frequent 
turnover in government, systemic corruption is low: it is hard to purchase favorable  
                                                          
12
 However, both countries passed strict language laws that require civil servants to speak the titular 
language.   
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legislation (Karklins 2005, chap. 3; World Bank 2000, chap. 1; www.transparency.org). 
Economically, however, both countries have struggled since breakup of the Soviet 
Union.  In the first half of the 1990s, their real GDP declined by more than a third while 
employment fell by a quarter as central planning collapsed.  Since then, they have 
experienced some economic growth as they have ―built capitalism‖ (Aslund 2002).  
However, at the time of the EU referendum in 2003, Lithuania‘s per capita GDP was a 
still smaller than it had been in 1990, while Estonia‘s was slightly bigger.  Both countries 
also employed about 20% fewer people than they did under Communism, a change that 
was only partly reflected in the official unemployment rates of 10-12% (OECD 2000, 
chap. I; OECD 2003, chap. I, II; http://publications.worldbank/WDI/).  Finally, both 
countries have adopted ―liberal‖ welfare systems characterized by limited coverage and 
low social spending (Bohle and Greskovits 2008; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu).  As a 
result, Estonia and, to a lesser extent, Lithuania have experienced a large increase in 
income inequality (Milanovic 1998, chap. 4; http://publications. worldbank/WDI/).     
For all these similarities, however, Lithuanians and Estonians have very different 
views on European integration: a large majority of Lithuanians supported joining the EU, 
while a significant minority of Estonians opposed the accession.  To explain why, I will 
use a ―mixed‖ research design (Putnam 1993, chap. 1; Tarrow 1995).  I will begin by 
conducting a qualitative content analysis of interviews with voters in Lithuanian and 
Estonian newspapers.  I will show that most Lithuanians hoped that joining the EU would 
help Lithuania develop economically by increasing foreign investment and trade and 
making Lithuania eligible for EU subsidies.  By contrast, many Estonians worried that 
the accession would make Estonia dependent on the West by driving domestic producers 
bankrupt and allowing foreigners to buy up local resources.  I will also show that most 
Lithuanians saw European integration as an alternative to the economic policies pursued 
by their government, while most Estonians saw it as a continuation of such policies.   
  
Table 1.2: Spot the Difference: Lithuania and Estonia in 2003 (unless otherwise noted) 
Variable Lithuania Estonia Similar or 
Different? 
EU support (effect) 
 
High: 91% in referendum; 73% in 
Eurobarometer survey 
Low: 66% in referendum; 41% in 
Eurobarometer survey 
Different 
Economic strategy in 
1992-2003 (cause) 
Insider-oriented: manager-owners; moderate 
tariffs; trade with Russia 
Outsider-oriented: foreign owners; no tariffs; 
trade with the EU 
Different 
Structure of economy 
(link) 
Large agriculture and ―old‖ industry; small 
service sector and ―new‖ industry 
Small agriculture and ―old‖ industry; large 
service sector and ―new‖ industry 
Different 
Size (population and 
territory)  
Small: 3.6 million people; 65,000 km
2
       
                   
Small: 1.4 million people; 45,000 km
2
  Similar 
Distance of capital 
from Brussels 
Far: 1470 km; but close to Warsaw (393 km) Far: 1601 km; but close to Helsinki (83 km) 
and Stockholm (378 km) 
Similar 
History of independent 
statehood  
Short in the modern era: 1920-1940; but 
independent grand duchy in 1236?-1569 
Short: 1920-1940 only; German colonization 
beginning in 1208 
Different  
Deaths during World 
War II 
High (9%): Soviet deportations; Nazi 
Holocaust; guerrilla war 
High (8%): Soviet deportations; Nazi and 
Soviet conscription; bombings 
Similar 
Size and treatment of 
Slavic minority 
Medium size: 17%; OK treatment: full 
citizenship, but strict language law 
Large size: 32%; Bad treatment: limits on 
both citizenship and language 
Different  
Political rights (a) and 
civil liberties (b) 
Free: Freedom House scores of 1(a) and 2 (b) 
on 1-7 scale  
Free: Freedom House score of 1 (a) and 2 (b) 
on 1-7 scale 
Similar  
Corruption 
 
Moderate: Transparency International score of 
5.5 on 1-10 scale 
Moderate: Transparency International score of 
4.7 on 1-10 scale 
Similar 
Support for Euroskeptic 
parties 
Low: 18% for Liberal Democrats and 
Agrarians in 2004 election 
High: 38% for Center Party and People‘s 
Union in 2003 election 
Different  
Economic performance 
in 1990-2003 
Bad: per capita GDP down from $12,566 to 
$12,000; unemployment up from n/a to 12% 
Semi-bad: per capita GDP up from $10,194 to 
$13,906; unemployment up from 1% to 10%  
Similar 
Social performance in 
1988-2003 
Bad: Gini index of income inequality up from 
0.22 to 0.32 
Very bad: Gini index up from 0.23 to 0.37 Similar 
Welfare state  Liberal: limited coverage and low spending 
(15% of GDP)  
Liberal: limited coverage and low spending 
(14% of GDP) 
Similar 
Sources: Table 1.1; Statistics Lithuania, www.std.lt; Statistical Office of Estonia, www.stat.ee; Nordregio 2000, 64-65; www.geobytes.com; Kiaupa et 
al 2002, S. II-V; Misiunas and Taagepera 1993, 356; www.freedomhouse.org; www.transparency.org; Central Electoral Committee of Lithuania, 
www.vrk.lt; National Election Commission of Estonia, www.vvk.ee; http://publications.worldbank/WDI/; http://epp.eurostat.ec. europa.eu.   
   1
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I will then test these hypotheses with data from the Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer, the most comprehensive survey of public opinion on European 
integration.  I will show that most Lithuanians believed that joining the EU would 
increase economic growth, reduce unemployment, and improve the standard of living for 
ordinary people.  By contrast, most Estonians felt that the accession would increase 
prices and unemployment and make life more difficult for vulnerable groups like the 
elderly, farmers, small businessmen, and the unemployed.  I will also show that  
most Lithuanians supported EU membership regardless of how they were doing 
economically and what they thought of their current economic situation.  In Estonia, by 
contrast, the rich and people who were happy with their economic situation supported EU 
accession, while the poor and the unhappy opposed it.   
To explain the results, I will compare the economic development of Lithuania and 
Estonia since the breakup of the Soviet Union (for inspiration, see George and Bennet 
2005, chap. 1, 9).  Using secondary literature and statistical data from the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, I will show that Lithuania and Estonia pursued 
different strategies of economic reform.  Lithuania followed an insider-oriented strategy.  
It maintained state ownership of basic infrastructure (e.g., railways and power plants) and 
sold non-infrastructure enterprises to their Soviet-era managers.  It imposed moderate 
tariffs on imports, particularly of agricultural goods, and continued to trade heavily with 
Russia.  By contrast, Estonia adopted an outsider-oriented strategy.  It sold large state-
owned firms, including infrastructure enterprises, to Nordic and American investors.  It 
abolished all import tariffs and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West.  This 
explains why Lithuanians saw EU accession as an alternative to current economic 
policies, while Estonians considered it a continuation of such policies.   
Based on newspaper accounts and statistical data from the World Bank and the 
Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, however, I will argue that neither 
strategy worked very well.  The Lithuanian strategy slowed down the development of 
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services—especially complex services like finance and communications—and ―new‖ 
industry (e.g., electronics), which lacked access to Western capital and technology.  It 
also failed to stop the decline of infrastructure (e.g., railways) since the state did not have 
money for capital investments.  The Estonian strategy hurt agriculture and ―old‖ industry 
(e.g., food processing), which did not receive enough FDI to compensate for the loss of 
government subsidies and whose exports were subject to high tariffs in both Eastern and 
Western markets.  It also led to a rapid decline of infrastructure, whose foreign owners 
used their monopoly power to increase prices and cut services while reneging on their 
investment promises.  This explains why both Lithuanians and Estonians were 
dissatisfied with their country’s economic situation.     
I will also test the two most compelling alternative hypotheses to my economic 
theory.  The first one posits that Estonians are more Euroskeptic than Lithuanians 
because they have a) a shorter history of independent statehood and b) a larger Russian 
minority (Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru 2006; Pettai 2005; Mikkel and Pridham 2005; 
Evans and Lipsmeyer 2001).  Lithuania was an independent state from the thirteenth to 
the sixteenth century, when it was incorporated into Poland and, later, Russia.  Estonia 
was colonized by the German crusaders in the thirteenth century.  Until the Russian 
revolution of 1917, the Germans constituted the ruling class in Estonia, regardless of 
which power—the Teutonic Order, Sweden, or Russia—claimed sovereignty over its 
territory.  Estonia also experienced a larger inflow of Slavic (mostly Russian) migrants 
under the Soviet rule: the Slavs make up 17% of the population in Lithuania, but 32% in 
Estonia.  Since they came in large numbers, many Estonian Russians lived in closed 
ethnic enclaves and never learned the local language.  As a result, Estonians are more 
touchy about their political independence and cultural identity than Lithuanians.      
Using content analysis and survey data, I will show that there is some evidence 
for the nationalism hypothesis.  Compared with Lithuanians, Estonians were less likely to 
believe that their country was historically part of Europe and more likely to worry that 
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they would lose their political independence and cultural identity in the EU.  However, at 
the individual level, there was no consistent relationship between nationalist values and 
EU support in either country.  Thus, people who identified themselves with their nation 
(rather than Europe) opposed EU membership, but people who were proud of their nation 
supported the accession.  Moreover, at the aggregate level, opposition to the EU in 
Estonia (but not in Lithuania) increased significantly in 1992-2003—something that 
would be difficult to explain in terms of national identity alone.  Instead, it seems that 
Estonians‘ negative experience with foreign investment and trade made them worry about 
losing their sovereignty and identity, while Lithuanians‘ lack of foreign experience 
quieted such concerns.             
Another serious causal rival to my theory would focus on political factors, namely 
a) party preferences (Maţylis and Unikaitė 2004; Mikkel and Pridham 2004; Duvold and 
Jurkynas 2006; Sikk 2006) and b) the political opportunity structure (Szszerbiak and 
Taggart 2004 a, b; Mikkel and Kasekamp 2005).  In Lithuania, all major parties, 
including the governing post-Communist Social Democrats, supported EU membership 
as a way of modernizing the Lithuanian economy and increasing living standards.  
Foreign investment and aid would improve Lithuanian infrastructure and create new, 
high-paying jobs.  Better access to EU markets would allow Lithuanian farmers to 
compete with European producers on equal term.  By contrast, the largest party in 
Estonia, the left-populist Centrists, opposed EU accession on current terms because it 
would hurt domestic producers and the poor.  EU sanitary and quality standards would 
drive farmers and small businesses bankrupt.  EU-mandated environmental surcharges 
and consumption taxes would increase the price of food, gasoline, and electricity, not to 
mention alcohol and cigarettes.   
I will demonstrate that there is some support for both hypotheses.  At the 
aggregate level, Euroskeptic parties clearly enjoyed more popular support (measured by 
their vote share in the most recent general election) in Estonia than in Lithuania (see 
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Table 1.3).  At the individual level, party preferences influenced voters‘ attitudes toward 
the EU in Estonia, but not in Lithuania.  However, Estonians who did not have a party 
preference also tended to oppose EU membership.  This suggests that political 
opportunities had stronger impact on EU support than party preferences per se (for the 
difference between the two, see Tarrow 1998, chap. 5).  By joining the other parties in 
advocating EU membership, Lithuanian Social Democrats helped to create the 
impression that ―everybody‖ supported the EU.  By criticizing the terms of the accession, 
Estonian Centrists broke the ―spiral of silence‖ and encouraged latent Euroskeptics—
their own supporters and people who did not have a party preference—to vote against the 
EU (Noelle-Neumann 1991, chap. 1, 3, 17, 26).    
Table 1.3: Enthusiasts and Skeptics: Political Parties and the EU in Lithuania and 
Estonia in 2003-2004 
Lithuania Estonia 
Party EU  
(1-20)* 
Vote 
(%)** 
Party EU  
(1-20)* 
Vote 
(%)** 
Labor Party
a  
- 28    
Liberal Democrats  14 11 Center Party  10 25 
Agrarians  11 7 People‘s Union 14 13 
Social Democrats 17 21    
Social Liberals
b 
16 - Moderates  19 7 
Liberal/Center Union 19 9 Reform Party  17 18 
Homeland Union 19 15 Fatherland  17 7 
   Res Publica  19 25 
* Position on a scale from 1 (opposes joining the EU) to 20 (supports joining the EU). 
** Share of the vote in the most recent (2003 or 2004) general election. 
a  
New party. 
b  
Joint list with Social Democrats.   
Sources: Expert survey by Benoit and Laver (2006), http://www.tcd.ie/Political_ 
Science/ppmd; Central Electoral Committee of Lithuania, www.vrk.lt;  National 
Election Committee of Estonia, www.vvk.ee. 
However, I will argue that (lack of) elite conflict over EU accession itself was, in 
part, a product of the strategies of economic reform.  In the 1990s, Lithuania‘s post-
Communists advocated ―national capitalism,‖ including voucher-based privatization and 
protectionist trade policies.  In the 2000s, however, they came to support European 
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integration because their financial backers among the insider-owners wanted to have 
better access to European markets, while their working-class and rural voters felt that 
insider-oriented reforms had only benefited the former Communist nomenklatura.  The 
Centrists followed a different trajectory.  Heirs to the anti-Communist (but vaguely social 
democratic) Popular Front, they did not have a clear position on the EU (or anything else) 
in the 1990s.  In the 2000s, however, they adopted Euroskeptic themes to appeal to 
domestic capitalists, who wanted to do business with Russia, and workers, farmers  
and pensioners, who blamed foreigners for the hardships they had endured. 
The Road to the Referendum: Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 will use content analysis of a) interviews with voters and b) letters to 
the editor in Lithuanian and Estonian newspapers to develop hypotheses about why most 
Lithuanians supported joining the EU, while many Estonians did not.  I will show that 
most Lithuanians believed that joining the EU would help their country to catch up with 
the West by making it eligible for EU subsidies and encouraging foreign investment and 
trade.  They also hoped to take advantage of the accession individually by working and 
studying abroad.  In any case, they argued, life was so bad that it could not possibly get 
worse.  By contrast, many Estonian respondents worried that joining the EU would make 
their country dependent on the West by driving domestic producers out of business and 
allowing foreigners to buy up local resources.  They also believed that they would be 
personally worse off in the EU because prices would increase and jobs would disappear.  
Asked to explain why they thought so, they said that all previous economic reforms had 
made their life worse.          
Chapter 3 will test the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 with survey data from 
the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB).  I will show that both at the beginning 
and the end of the EU accession process, Lithuanians and Estonians thought of the EU 
mainly in economic terms.  In 1992, both Lithuanians and Estonians strongly supported 
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EU membership so that their countries could get EU aid and gain access to European 
markets.  They were less interested in the political benefits of the accession, such as help 
with building democracy and protecting peace and security in Europe.  In 2003, most 
Lithuanians still supported joining the EU, in part because they believed that Lithuania 
was historically part of Europe, but mostly because they hoped that it would improve 
their standard of living.  By contrast, over a third of Estonian voters now opposed EU 
membership because they worried that it would undermine their political independence 
and cultural identity and, above all, increase prices, destroy jobs, and hurt farmers,  
pensioners, and other vulnerable groups.  
Chapter 4 will use the 2003 CCEB to explore the micro-foundations of these 
macro-level differences.  I will show that, in both countries, people who trusted the 
government were more supportive of EU membership than those who did not.  Clearly, 
EU referenda were, to some extent, votes of (non-) confidence in the political elites. 
However, the differences between the two countries were at least as important as the 
similarities.  Knowledge about the EU increased support for the EU in Lithuania, but not 
in Estonia, perhaps because Lithuania negotiated a more favorable accession treaty.  
Party preferences affected EU support in Estonia, where the largest party opposed the 
accession on current terms, but not in Lithuania, where all major parties supported EU 
membership.  Finally, the strongest predictors of EU support in Estonia were income and 
satisfaction with one‘s economic situation, neither of which had any impact on EU 
support in Lithuania.  Clearly, Estonians saw EU accession as a continuation of current 
economic policies, while Lithuanians did not.  
Chapter 5 will compare Lithuanian and Estonian strategies of economic reforms 
to explain why most Lithuanians supported EU membership, while many Estonians 
(particularly the poor and the disgruntled) opposed it.  Lithuania followed an insider-
oriented strategy.  It maintained state ownership of basic infrastructure (e.g., railways) 
and sold other state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their Soviet-era managers.  It imposed 
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moderate tariffs on imports and continued to trade heavily with Russia.  Estonia pursued 
an outsider-oriented strategy.  It sold SOEs, including infrastructure enterprises, to 
foreign investors.  It abolished all import tariffs and quickly reoriented its trade from 
Russia to the EU.  Neither strategy worked particularly well.  The Lithuanian strategy 
slowed down the development of services and ―new‖ industry (e.g., electronics).  The 
Estonian strategy led to a rapid decline of agriculture and ―old‖ industry (e.g., food 
processing).  Neither strategy could prevent the decline of infrastructure (e.g., railways).  
As a result, both Lithuanians and Estonians were unhappy about their country‘s economic 
situation, but Lithuanians saw European integration as a solution to their country‘s 
problems, while Estonians considered it the cause of theirs.       
Chapter 6 will summarize the main findings of the dissertation and explore two 
more issues.  First, I will explain why Lithuania and Estonia adopted different strategies 
of economic reform.  The immediate explanation is simple.  In Lithuania, the post-
Communist Democratic Labor Party, with close personal and financial ties with Soviet-
era managers, won the first independence-era parliamentary election.  In Estonia, the 
conservative Fatherland, backed by the German Christian Democrats, Estonian émigrés, 
and export-import businesses, emerged victorious.  However, I will argue that Lithuania 
and Estonia would have probably pursued different economic policies regardless of 
which party came to power.  Historically, Lithuania‘s best friend—and worst enemy—
had been Poland, another poor East European country.  Estonia had close ties with 
Germany, Sweden and Finland, rich West European nations.  As a result, Estonia could 
expect to receive more Western investment than Lithuania.  The two countries also had 
different economic structures.  Lithuania had a larger agriculture and heavy industry.  
Estonia had a bigger service sector and light industry.  Therefore, Estonia could more 
easily withstand the loss of the Russian market and raw materials. 
Second, using the example of the former Czechoslovakia, I will show that my 
argument ―travels‖ to Central Europe (see Bunce 1999, chap. 1, 6 for a similar move).  
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Like Lithuania, Slovakia pursued an insider-oriented strategy of reforms.  It sold SOEs to 
their managers and provided cheap loans to firms undergoing privatization.  It imposed 
high tariffs on Western imports and continued to trade heavily with Russia and Eastern 
Europe.  This policy slowed down the development of skill-intensive services and ―new‖ 
industry (e.g., cars), which lacked access to Western capital, technology, and markets.  In 
the EU accession referendum, 94% of Slovaks supported EU membership, more than in 
any other Central European country.  By contrast, the Czech Republic pursued an 
outsider-oriented strategy similar to Estonia‘s.  It sold large SOEs to Western (mostly 
German) capitalists and provided subsidies to foreign ―greenfield‖ investors.  It exempted 
most EU goods from import tariffs and reoriented its exports to the EU.  These policies 
undermined agriculture and ―old‖ industry (e.g., steel and mining), which received little 
foreign investment and were subject to EU tariffs.  In the EU referendum, only 76% of 
Czechs supported the accession, less than in any other Central European country. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEVELOPMENT OR DEPENDENCY?  CONTENT ANALYSIS OF 
LITHUANIAN AND ESTONIAN NEWPAPERS 
Introduction 
Why did Lithuanians strongly support EU membership, while Estonians came 
close to rejecting the accession?  To answer this question, scholars have focused on 
history and culture.  Grabbe and Hughes (1998, chap. 6), Grabbe (2003), Ozolina (2003), 
and Mikkel and Pridham (2004) argue that Estonian and Latvian Euroskepticism reflects 
their short history of independent statehood.  Lithuania was an independent grand duchy 
in the Middle Ages.  By contrast, Estonia and Latvia only became independent states 
after World War I.  As a result, Estonians and Latvians are more suspicious of all kinds 
of unions than Lithuanians.  Pettai (2005) and Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru (2006) claim 
that Estonians and Latvians have a less secure national identity than Lithuanians.  
Medieval Lithuania was ruled by an indigenous aristocracy.  Estonia and Latvia were 
colonized by German crusaders and only developed a national consciousness in the 
nineteenth century.  As a result, Estonians resent the Europeans, while Lithuanians 
consider themselves their equals. 
Analysts have also debated the role of ethnicity in shaping popular attitudes 
toward the EU in the Baltics.  Evans and Lipsmeyer (2001), Ozolina (2003), and Pettai 
(2005) argue that Estonia and Latvia experienced a larger influx of Russian migrants 
during the Soviet rule than Lithuania.  After the breakup of the Soviet Union, they 
adopted a strict citizenship law in order to limit Russian political influence.  By contrast, 
Lithuania gave citizenship to all Russians who wanted it.  Now Estonians are worried that 
the EU will force them to change their citizenship laws, while Lithuanians are confident 
that their policies will pass EU muster.  However, Whitefield, Rohrshneider and 
Alisauskiene (2006) maintain that it is the ethnic Russians who oppose EU membership 
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in the Baltics.  The EU agrees with the Balts that the Baltic Russians are migrants who 
must learn the local language and apply for citizenship.  It also put pressure on Russia to 
withdraw its troops from the Baltics.  Estonia and Latvia are more Euroskeptic than 
Lithuania simply because they have more Russians.     
Using qualitative content analysis of Lithuanian and Estonian newspapers, 
however, this chapter shows that Lithuanians and Estonians also had different economic 
expectations about the EU.  Most Lithuanians hoped that joining the EU would help their 
country to develop economically by making it eligible for EU subsidies and encouraging 
foreign investment and trade.  They also planned to take advantage of the accession 
individually by working, studying and/or permanently settling in the West.  By contrast, 
many Estonians worried the accession would make Estonia dependent on the West by 
driving domestic producers out of business and allowing rich foreigners to buy up 
Estonian economic resources.  They also thought that they would be personally worse off 
in the EU because prices would increase and jobs would disappear.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.  The next section will discuss the 
methodology of content analysis.  The following section will compare popular attitudes 
toward the EU in Lithuania and Estonia using CA of Lithuanian and Estonian 
newspapers.  The conclusion will sum up my findings.    
(Dis)content Analysis: Turning Words Into Numbers (and Back)  
To analyze popular attitudes towards European integration in Estonia, I used 
ethnographic content analysis (ECA) of Lithuanian and Estonian newspapers.  ECA has a 
lot in common with its better-known cousin, quantitative content analysis (QCA).  Both 
reduce the content of a text to a set of categories (e.g., themes) through systematic 
coding.  Both then compare the frequencies of these categories to assess their importance 
(Neuendorf 2002, chap. 1, 3; Weber 1990, chap. 1-2).  However, EQA differs from QCA 
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in two ways.  First, QCA uses theoretically predetermined categories to analyze data.  By 
contrast, EQA approaches data with certain theoretical expectations (for example, I 
expected economic issues to be more important for Baltic voters than previous research 
had suggested), but allows the categories to emerge out of the data.  Second, QCA 
typically uses ―manifest coding,‖ which means that the coder counts specific words or 
phrases in the text.  By contrast, EQA involves ―latent coding,‖ whereby the coder looks 
for ideas and concepts underlying particular verbal expressions (Altheide 1987; Altheide 
1996, chap. 1-4, 6).  This makes EQA a better tool for generating new hypotheses. 
Ms. Ieva Šriupšaitė, a graduate student in the Department of Communications at 
the Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, conducted the CA of Lithuanian newspapers.  
I analyzed Estonian papers.  Our sample included a) the English-language weekly Baltic 
Times; b) the national quality dailies; c) the national tabloids; d) the national weeklies; e) 
the rural newspaper; f) the main Russian-language newspapers; and g) the main 
newspaper in each region (county) of Lithuania and Estonia.  (For a brief description of 
the papers, see Table 2.1).
13
  We analyzed all issues of these newspapers from the month 
of the EU referendum (May 2003 in Lithuania and September 2003 in Estonia).  Our 
sample included 1) letters to the editor and 2) articles that directly quoted voters, 
including a) ―question of the day‖ interviews with ―(wo)men in the street‖ before the 
referendum; b) investigative reports on attitudes toward the EU in particular regions; and 
c) ―exit‖ interviews with voters on the referendum day.  We excluded 1) opinion pieces 
and 2) longer interviews with elites, such as politicians, businessmen, and academics.  
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 Aukše Balcytienė, ―Lithuanian Media – A Question of Change,‖ in Baltic Media in Transition, ed. Peeter 
Vihalemm (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2002), 103-134; Aukše Balcytienė and Rūta Marcinkevičienė, 
―Lithuania: Print is Dead… Long Live Print,‖ in Print and Online Newspapers in Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis of 16 countries, ed. Richard van der Wulff and Edmund Lauf  (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2005), 
187-200; Halliki Harro-Loit, ―Estonia: Examining Newspaper Change,‖ in Print and Online Newspapers in 
Europe, ed. van der Wulff and Lauf, 105-116; and Kertu Saks, ―From Soviet to Market-Oriented: 
Organisational and Product Changes in Estonian Newspapers, 1988-2001,‖ in Baltic Media in Transition, 
ed. Vihalemm, 187-206. 
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Table 2.1: Meet the Press: Lithuanian and Estonian Newspapers in 2003 
                   Lithuania                                         Estonia 
Title Description Title Description 
A) Baltic and National Papers A) Baltic and National Papers 
Baltic Times Weekly Baltic Times Weekly 
Kauno diena Daily Eesti Päevaleht Daily 
Lietuvos rytas  Daily  Postimees Daily 
Lietuvos ţinios Daily SL Õhtuleht Daily tabloid 
Obzor Russian weekly Estoniia Russian daily 
Respublika Bilingual daily Molodezh Estonii Russian daily 
Vakaro ţinios  Daily tabloid Maaleht Rural weekly 
Valstiečių laikraštis Rural semiweekly   
Veidas Weekly   
B) Regional papers B) Regional papers 
Alytaus naujienos Daily Hiiu Leht Semiweekly 
Kalvotoji Ţemaitija 3 x per week Järva Teataja Daily 
Klaipėda Daily Koit 3 x per week 
Panevėţio rytas 3 x per week Lääne Elu 3 x per week 
Šiaulių kraštas Daily Meie Maa Daily 
Suvalkietis 3 x per week Pärnu Postimees Daily 
Tauragės kurjeris Daily Sakala Daily 
Utenis 3 x per week Severnoe Poberezhe Russian daily 
  Valgamaalane Daily 
  Virumaa Teataja Daily 
  Vooremaa 3 x per week 
  Võrumaa Teataja 3 x per week 
Note: The Lithuanian weekly Ekstra, the Estonian weekly Eesti Ekspress and the 
Estonian regional paper Raplamaa had no articles that met our selection criteria.   
Our unit of coding was a theme: some positive or negative aspect of EU 
membership.  The themes were developed by a) inspecting the various reasons people 
gave for their vote choice and b) grouping them together under a common denominator.  
(For examples, see the next two paragraphs.)  Some people gave more than one reason 
for why they supported or opposed the EU, although few respondents mentioned more 
than two or three reasons.  These were all coded separately, provided that they fell under 
separate themes.  Some people were not sure how they would vote because they liked 
some things about the EU and disliked others.  The issues they mentioned were also 
coded separately.  Naturally, people brought up various reasons—economic, political, 
and cultural—to explain why they supported or opposed the EU.  In this chapter, 
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however, I will concentrate on economic issues because they a) have been largely ignored 
in the existing literature and b) made up about two thirds of all references to the EU in 
Lithuania and about 60% in Estonia. 
In explaining why they supported or opposed the EU, most people focused on 
what they thought the consequences of joining the EU would be.  EU supporters believed 
that the accession would increase economic growth, while EU opponents believed that it 
would destabilize the economy (Growth v. Instability).  EU supporters thought that the 
EU would provide subsidies to farmers, while EU opponents thought that it would 
impose unreasonable regulations on farmers (Subsidies v. Regulations).  EU supporters 
argued that the accession would create jobs and increase wages, while EU opponents 
argued that it would destroy jobs and increase prices (Higher Living Standard v. Lower 
Living Standard).  Finally, EU supporters hoped to work and study abroad, while EU 
opponents worried that foreigners would drive domestic producers bankrupt and buy up 
local economic resources (Opportunities in the West v. Exploitation by the West).  As 
Table 2.2 shows, most Lithuanians believed that joining the EU would help their country 
develop economically, while many Estonians feared that it would impoverish their 
country and make it dependent on the West. 
However, some respondents also explained why they believed that EU 
membership would make life better or worse.  Some EU supporters said that joining the 
EU would allow their country to continue its successful economic policies, such as 
privatization and free trade, while some EU opponents said that the accession threatened 
their country‘s achievements, such as rapid economic growth  (Continuation of Success v. 
Threat to Success).  For the most part, however, both EU supporters and opponents were 
unhappy about their country‘s current economic situation, especially widespread poverty 
and unemployment.  However, EU supporters (most Lithuanians) hoped that EU 
accession would solve these problems, while EU opponents (many Estonians) feared that 
it would make them worse (Remedy to Failure v. Continuation of Failure.)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 2.2: Stairway to Heaven or Road to Hell?  Lithuanian and Estonian Attitudes toward the EU in 2003 
Positive Themes        Number of references Negative Themes        Number of references 
 Lithuania Estonia  Lithuania Estonia 
A) WHAT? A) WHAT? 
Growth  31 30 Instability 6 25 
Subsides 14 17 Regulations 5 24 
Higher Standard of Living 25 23 Lower Standard of Living 8 33 
Opportunities in the West 26 17 Exploitation by the West 7 29 
B) WHY? B) WHY? 
Continuation of Success 3 8 Threat to Success 1 6 
Remedy to Failure 19 9 Continuation of Failure 11 19 
Source: Content analysis of Lithuanian and Estonian newspapers in Table 2.1 from May (Lithuania) and September (Estonia) 
2003. 
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Lithuania: The EU as Development 
Lithuania needs to catch up and the straightest way to success is the EU 
Most Lithuanians hoped that joining the EU would help their country to develop 
economically by encouraging foreign investment and trade. 
Lithuania needs to catch up, and the straightest way to success is the EU.  
Frontiers will open, financial help will come, and the number of investors will 
increase. 
The EU is progress.  Lithuanian businessmen will be able to sell their 
goods in other countries more easily; it will be easier for people to move around; 
maybe there will be more work for young people.   
But wouldn‘t EU membership would subject Lithuania to more intense foreign 
competition?  Many people said that they welcomed competition because it would force 
Lithuanian producers to become more efficient and allow Lithuanian workers to show 
how diligent they were.     
After we join the EU, we will be forced to compete with other countries.  This 
will help our country to make progress: Lithuania will no longer be a secluded 
province of Europe.  That‘s why it is a good idea to vote ‗yes‘ in the referendum. 
I would like as many people as possible to vote for the EU.  Lithuanians 
are very diligent.  This quality will be appreciated in EU member states and will 
become the basis for the prosperity of our country.   
By contrast, staying outside the EU would lead to an economic catastrophe.  Lithuania 
was too small to survive on its own.  The only alternative to EU accession was to become 
like Belarus—an isolated and impoverished country in the Russian periphery.   
I am just afraid what will happen if we vote ‗no.‘  If we don‘t become part of 
Europe, what other model do we have?  Belarus?  Kaliningrad?  People there have 
absolutely no hope at all.  As difficult as things are here now, joining the EU will 
give us some sort of hope. 
There is no question about how to vote—I will vote for the EU.  I cannot 
even imagine where we would find ourselves if we stayed outside Europe.  Could 
we be alone?  Like Switzerland?  But are we such a strong and powerful country?  
Alone by ourselves we would not have any chance.  Could we live closed like 
Belarus?  Neither a person nor a country can close themselves off. 
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For Lithuanian farmers EU help is like a life-buoy 
Besides foreign investment and trade, Lithuanian EU supporters argued, another 
big advantage of EU membership was that it would make Lithuania eligible for EU aid.  
In particular, Lithuanian farmers would begin to receive EU subsidies, which would 
increase their pitifully low incomes and allow them to compete on equal footing with 
West European agribusinesses.     
The situation of farmers cannot become worse - only better.  In EU countries 
agriculture is subsidized and Lithuania is not rich enough to be able to subsidize 
its own farmers sufficiently.  For Lithuanian farmers EU help is like a life buoy.   
Joining the EU will enable our farmers to get the support that farmers in 
European countries are getting.  I will vote for EU membership, and I invite all 
rural people to do so.  I think that after we join the EU, much fairer relations 
[between Lithuania and Europe] will develop and support for farmers will be real, 
not declarative. 
More broadly, EU subsidies would help rural areas to develop.  Towns and villages could 
build new roads; farms and food processing plants could purchase new equipment.  
Computers and internet would connect rural Lithuania to the wider world. 
[O]ur villages and agriculture will definitely have to be modernized.  Over the 
next few years, a lot of EU resources will be allocated for that.  There will be 
money to renovate buildings, equip factories, buy machinery, support young 
farmers, improve roads, plant forests, energize rural communities, etc.  These 
projects will be funded from 60% [of the total cost] to 100%.  If these funds are 
used as intended, maybe our villages will recover.  
Computers, e-mail, internet are still just a dream for most villagers.  I hope 
that after Lithuania becomes a member of the EU, all these twenty-first century 
information technologies will be available even in the remotest corners of the 
countryside and allow everybody to communicate with the rest of the world. 
Some Lithuanians even worried that EU support for farmers would be so generous that 
they would stop working hard.  Instead of relying on EU aid, they argued, people should 
take advantage of the economic opportunities created by EU accession. 
It‘s important to know some language of the EU and not to be lazy waiting for 
someone to put a plate full of offers in front of your nose.     
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With financial support and subsidies, farmers were encouraged to approve 
of EU accession.  I and all other students who voted affirmatively in the 
referendum expect from Europe not subsidies or pity, but opportunities to live 
differently.    
I hope for a different, easier life, better salaries for everybody 
Whether they placed their hopes in subsidies or the free market, however, most 
Lithuanians believed that EU membership would improve their standard of living.  
Economic growth and closer ties with foreign countries would create new jobs.   
It is a good day for Lithuania.  When we join the EU, the economy will get better 
and people will have more jobs.  Maybe then young people will have a reason to 
stay here instead of going abroad. 
I think that after we join the EU, my services as a translator will be also 
needed in Lithuania.  I heard that the demand for such specialists would 
constantly increase. 
Growing competition for workers would put pressure on domestic capitalists to raise 
wages.  
I hope for a different, easier life, better salaries for everybody.  It will be easier to 
go and work abroad, and when there are fewer good workers left, businessmen 
will have to increase salaries. 
I will vote for the EU because I hope that after Lithuania becomes a 
member of the EU there will be more jobs and salaries will increase—people will 
be richer.   
Wage increases, in turn, would boost tax revenues and allow the government to spend 
more on social programs, such as pensions.   
Isolation has never brought use to anyone.  After we join the EU, better conditions 
for business will be established.  Production will expand.  Even ordinary people 
will begin to live better because more taxes will be levied.  These [taxes] will also 
be used to improve social conditions.    
Maybe then our pensions will increase slightly and [natural] gas will 
become cheaper because now I spend all my money on medicines and heating.   
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The freedom of migration: isn’t that what the Lithuanians want? 
Finally, many Lithuanians hoped that joining the EU would make it easier for 
them to travel, study, work and/or settle permanently in Western Europe.  People could 
travel in Europe without the hassle and humiliation of passport controls and customs 
inspections.   
A young and energetic person with plenty of unrealized ideas will definitely  
say ‗yes‘: ‗yes‘—to united Europe, ‗yes‘—to open borders, ‗yes‘—to the whole 
world under my feet. 
Don‘t Lithuanian citizens want millions of euros to flow into Lithuania, 
don‘t we want to travel in Europe like normal people and not like second-class 
aborigines? … Do we really want to go through customs procedures that degrade 
out dignity, to be denied treatment at Western hospitals, to stand in lines in front 
of embassies, to drive old cars and to buy clothes for our children from second-
hand stores?  Awful.     
Young people could study abroad to broaden their horizons and learn new skills:   
Borders with European countries will open; there will be more opportunities to 
study and work in foreign countries.   
It will be easier for young people to study abroad, to improve themselves, 
to experience a new culture, to broaden their understanding, and to come back to 
Lithuania with more knowledge. 
It would also become easier for Lithuanians to work abroad.  Work visas would no longer 
be required of Lithuanian citizens.  Lithuanians who work in Europe illegally would 
receive legal status.    
I clearly understand the advantages of Lithuanian membership in the EU.  
Lithuanians in Ireland will feel it the next day.  They will no longer need work 
permits and even those who are working here illegally will become legal workers 
at once.  The Lithuanian driver‘s license will also become valid immediately.   
I voted ‗for‘ [the EU] because I hope to find a job in Europe.  I would like 
to go to Denmark for at least a month; I could pick strawberries there.  But 
farmers there do not want us because they have to do additional paperwork for 
workers from non-EU countries.  From now on everything will be better. 
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Finally, EU membership would allow Lithuanians to settle permanently in Europe where 
the standard of living would remain higher than in Lithuania for a long time.    
The freedom of migration allows us to choose the best place to live and work. 
Isn‘t that what Lithuanians want? 
I am happy in advance for our young people who will now have totally 
different opportunities to choose a European country where they would like to 
live and work.  It is still impossible to have a European standard of living in our 
country, and I do not believe that this will become possible any time soon. 
How long can we be beggars?  
Thus far, I have focused on what the Lithuanian Euro-enthusiasts expected from 
the EU, from financial aid to the opportunity to work abroad.  However, the CA also 
offers some insights into why most Lithuanians held positive views about the EU.  Some 
(very few) people said that joining the EU would continue the policies that had already 
made life better for ordinary Lithuanians.  
I gladly voted for EU membership.  I trust European states and I am very happy 
that Lithuania will become part of united Europe.  And my children, young 
farmers, believe in their future.  They live on the land and are satisfied; we have 
enough of everything thus far.   
I decided to vote ‗for‘ [the EU] a long time ago.  People in Lithuania 
already have a good standard of living, but I hope that there will be more order.  
I do not know any Russian woman who will vote ‗against.‘     
However, most Lithuanians said that they supported the EU because life could not get 
any worse.  Unemployment was high; pensions were low; there was no money for nice 
things in life; young people were leaving the country.   
I will vote like everyone else—for Europe.  How long can we be beggars?  I 
believe that life will get better in Europe.  It cannot get worse than it is now:  
the youth is running away from Lithuania, there is no work, and how do the 
pensioners live?  The referendum is our hope for a better life. 
It is a matter of material things—I want to travel, to go to Egypt, Turkey.  
But as it is now, after I pay my rent and utilities and buy some food, I do not even 
have extra money left to go to a café and buy a coffee.  A person needs some of 
the nice things in life, too. 
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Some Lithuanians specifically blamed Lithuania‘s problems on their corrupt government 
and exploitative capitalists. 
I support joining the EU because I know that it cannot get any worse than it was 
under the rule of Russians and [the post-Communist prime minister Algirdas] 
Brazauskas.  Now there is no truth, no justice, no order left in Lithuania.  I hope 
that my son and my grandchildren will live in a different Lithuania.   
When Lithuania joins the EU, borders will open and those who are 
exploiting cheap labor, or illegally exporting workers to Western countries, will 
lose their earnings.  Besides, employers will have to raise wages, at least for the 
most professional workers.  Otherwise they will go where they can get better paid. 
The EU offered Lithuania a way out of its economic difficulties.  People could earn a 
decent living and the quality of life would improve.     
I will vote ‗for‘ [the EU].  My motive is simple: I am young, I need to create a 
family and bear children.  I believe that my family will be better off with the EU 
than without.  It cannot get any worse than it is now and I believe that it will get 
better.  If you do not believe in anything, maybe you should go to Ireland to clean 
fish?  I do not want to do that.  I want to live in my country and to work normally.    
Let us nor be afraid of the current EU states because life cannot get any 
worse.  I hope that in a few years we can see smiles more often in the streets of 
Lithuanian towns.  And maybe someday Paul McCartney himself will come and 
sing his joyful protest ballad, ‗Let‘s give Ireland to the Irish.‘ 
Estonia: The EU as Dependency 
Why do we need another transition period, new instability? 
If Lithuanians looked forward to the economic changes that EU membership 
might bring, Estonians said that they were tired of changes.  After more than ten years of 
strenuous economic reforms, they felt, Estonia had achieved a modicum of stability.  
Joining the EU would upset this.   
Let everything stay as it is.  There have been so many changes recently that we 
would now like to have some peace.   
Things have just got settled; we have been working our way towards 
stability for twelve years.  Why do we need another transition period, new 
instability? 
 38 
 
More concretely, many Estonians argued that their country was economically unprepared 
for EU accession.  The Estonian economy was too weak to withstand European 
competition.  Estonian consumers would not be able to afford European prices.   
We are not developed enough to join the EU.  Let‘s wait a little and then compete 
like equals with Germany and other countries.   
I am against EU accession.  I think that the Estonian economy is not yet 
ready for it—in the sense that we have a very weak economy, but the EU has high 
prices.   
Finally, some people argued that Estonia should follow the example of Nordic countries 
that had gotten rich without joining the EU or adopting the euro.    
Why are they dragging us to the EU?  And why isn‘t prosperous Norway joining?  
Where are the economic calculations showing that I will be better off there?  
There are no such calculations, only talk.    
Against, against.  And why did the Swedes say ‗no‘ to the euro?  Because 
it is not good. 
If we cannot fish all year around, we will die of hunger 
Many Estonians feared that EU regulations would drive Estonian farmers out of 
business.  The EU would regulate every aspect of agricultural production, from raising 
animals to baking bread. 
On average, every day some official will come by to check up on me.  These  
guys are such a pain.  They say that chickens and cows cannot be [kept] together 
[in the same shed].  Damn it, this is disrespect for our culture. 
You are not allowed to use a wood basin to make bread, even though 
dough mixed in a steel basin does not taste the same.  
Fishermen, too, would be hurt by EU regulations.  The fishing season would be shortened 
and limits would be imposed on how much fish can be caught.   
  The EU built us a school that cost two million [Estonian crowns], but it also  
limits fishing and comes up with requirements that we cannot fulfill.  If we  
cannot fish all year around, we will die of hunger. 
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I think that people worry the most about the future of fishing—that the EU 
will impose strict quotas on fishing and that people will have nothing to live on. 
Finally, EU sanitary standards would bankrupt small businesses.  For example, stores and 
restaurants in the countryside would be required to install expensive new equipment or 
closed down.      
They say that there are laws in the EU about how many sinks a store must have.  
And ventilation and stuff.  And how many times you must write down the 
temperature in the refrigerators.  And all kinds of controls and stuff. 
Take, for example, the standards for school cafeteria.  I have nothing 
against them being renovated, but if some kids will not be able to eat because 
rural schools must have their food prepared elsewhere, then this makes no sense.   
Pensioners and the unemployed will have to eat porridge for a long time 
If Lithuanians believed that joining the EU would raise the standard of living for 
most people, Estonians thought that ordinary people would be worse off in the EU.  
Unemployment would increase.  Foreign investors would rather move production to  
Russia than raise wages for Estonian workers.  Family farms and small businesses would 
go bankrupt because of EU regulations.   
And these foreign firms that employ many people now—many of them will 
immediately go bankrupt in the union.  They are simply so greedy that they  
would rather let their businesses go under and set up shop in Russia than increase 
wages here. 
Like many people in rural areas, I am afraid of losing my job.  Without  
a job, there is no income.  What are people going to live on?  Small barns will  
be closed down.  
However, the biggest fear about EU accession in Estonia was that it would increase 
prices.  The EU would impose tariffs on imports from non-EU countries and increase 
consumption taxes.  This would increase the price of food, alcohol, gasoline and other 
basic necessities.     
 40 
 
I would not change course.  You won‘t be able to get a bottle [of beer] for less 
than a euro?  Where will I get this money from? 
Some people say that food prices will increase by half, others that they 
will go up 2.5 times.  One man said that the price of gasoline will increase 1.8 
times.  Everything will become more expensive.  My pockets will be emptier  
and my life more difficult. 
Inevitably, price increases would hit low-income groups (e.g., pensioners, the 
unemployed, and people who earn the minimum wage) the hardest.   
A big disadvantage of joining the EU is that prices will rise faster than wages and 
pensions. … The pensioner or the unemployed who could occasionally afford 
sausage before the accession will have to eat porridge for a long time after the 
accession.  
(Buys socks.)  I can afford to buy one pair for myself.  I think that we, 
poor people, who barely make the minimum wage, will not gain anything from it.  
They say that everything will become more expensive.  
Blacks and others will come in and privatize everything 
Most important, however, many Estonians believed that EU membership would 
subject their country to Western exploitation.  Competition from European agribusinesses 
would drive Estonian farmers bankrupt. 
Everything will become more expensive and stores will only sell European  
goods.  We work our asses off here, but who is going to buy our potatoes and 
onions now? 
When the borders open up, foreign foodstuffs will take over the market.  
All that remains in Estonia is the income tax on wage laborers.  The big shots  
of the republic said before the referendum that the EU promoted local and 
national agriculture.  But this does not exist in Estonia! 
Foreign capitalists would buy up Estonian economic resources.  This included both the 
remaining SOEs, such as the power plants, and natural resources, such as Lake Peipsi, the 
main source of livelihood for the fishermen living on its coast.   
Blacks and others will come in and privatize everything—factories and stuff.  
Power plants and stuff. 
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To tell you the truth, we are a very much afraid of the future.  One source 
of income for us is the lake; if some rich uncle comes and buys it up, we will lose 
our livelihood.  Most of our men earn their living by fishing and of course we are 
all dependent on it.   
Poor foreigners (―blacks,‖ ―Turks‖) would migrate to Estonia and take away jobs from 
local workers.    
When we join the EU, blacks will move in.  Why do we need them?  Our own 
people do not have enough work. 
Estonians are quite attached to their own country.  I do not think that our 
people would like to work and live in Turkey, for example, but people from there 
might want to come and live here. 
Finally, EU membership would cost Estonia more money than it would receive in return.  
Whatever subsidies it might receive in the first few years after the accession, it would 
have to pay them back once other, even poorer countries joined the EU. 
It‘s very simple: I do not like it.  They will take away money from the Republic of 
Estonia and that‘s all there is to it.  (Who will take away money?)  The EU!  (And 
we will have nothing left?)  Nothing!  What has agriculture got? 
Those who support the EU say nice things, but all these subsidies 
promised to farmers are temporary.  At some point we will have to start paying 
them back, perhaps when other countries will join the EU in a few years.  Then 
it‘s Estonia‘s turn to start supporting others.   
Life is hard and will get harder in the EU   
In explaining why they expected bad things from the EU, some Estonian 
Euroskeptics argued that Estonia did not need to join the EU because life had already 
gotten better since the breakup of the Soviet Union.  Joining the EU, they believed, might 
hurt Estonia‘s hard-won economic success.   
We have a future without the EU: our life has already gotten better. 
Yes, I will vote, but I will vote ‗against‘ [EU membership].  I do not see 
any point in this accession.  We have lived normally until now and we will 
continue to do so.  There is no point in going there.  
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Most Estonian Euroskeptics, however, believed that life had gotten worse during the 
transition to capitalism.  It was hard to find a job.  Pensions and social benefits were 
unacceptably low.  
In the Soviet era, I worked at a factory.  Now I do not know what to do.  I get 240 
kroon a month [in disability benefits].  What can I get for that money?  
I will vote against [the EU].  Let them put things in order at home and then 
we can vote for it.  The pension systems do not function as they should.  Damn it!  
I worked in a steel-casting plant for forty-one years and earned decent money.  
Now I must cut bread with a string. 
Some people specifically blamed Estonia‘s economic problems on the Western-oriented 
privatization and trade policies that successive Estonian governments had pursued since 
the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
They [the government] have made a lot of mistakes already.  Take, for example, 
the privatization of the railway and the monopolization of electric power.  That‘s 
why I think that many people will not vote because they no longer believe in 
anything. 
The path chosen by Estonian politicians could be briefly characterized  
as the shortest path to the destruction of the people.  This includes the sale of 
strategic enterprises belonging to the state and the unlimited inflow of foreign 
capital.  The deliberate worsening of economic ties with some of our neighbor 
states should also be mentioned.  I mean our eastern neighbor, among others.  
Joining the EU, the Euroskeptics felt, would make existing economic problems worse.   
Life is hard and will get harder in the EU. 
Everybody makes a decision based on their own level of development  
and experience.  We live badly under this government and we will live even 
worse under the next.  Actually, life is not that hard for retired people, who at 
least get a stable pension, but the young unemployed get no help whatsoever. 
Conclusion 
The existing literature has used political and cultural variables to explain why 
most Lithuanians supported joining the EU, while many Estonians did not.  However, my 
CA of newspapers showed that Lithuanians and Estonians were also concerned about the 
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economic consequences of EU accession.  Most Lithuanians believed that EU 
membership would help their country develop economically.  Western companies would 
invest more in Lithuania, while Lithuanian firms would gain a better access to the EU 
market.  The EU would also provide subsidies to the vulnerable sectors of the Lithuanian 
economy, such as agriculture. Together, economic growth and EU aid would reduce 
unemployment and increase wages.  This, in turn, would allow the government to collect 
more money in taxes and to increase social benefits.  Many Lithuanians also hoped that 
EU accession would allow them to better their lot individually by making it easier to 
work, study and settle in Western Europe.  In explaining why they expected the EU to 
make their life better, Lithuanians typically said that life was so bad (as indicated by 
widespread unemployment and poverty) that it could not get any worse. 
By contrast, many Estonians believed that EU membership would impoverish 
their country and make it economically dependent on the West.  Joining the EU would 
upset the fragile economic stability Estonia had achieved after more than a decade of 
strenuous economic reforms.  EU subsidies would be accompanied by stringent sanitary 
and environmental regulations, which would drive farmers, fishermen and small 
businessmen bankrupt.  EU-imposed consumption taxes and tariffs on non-EU imports 
would increase prices (e.g., of food and gasoline), which would make life harder for the 
poor.  Most important, EU accession would subject Estonia to Western economic 
exploitation.  Rich foreigners would buy up Estonian infrastructure and natural resources; 
poor foreigners would take away jobs from Estonian workers; Estonia would have to pay 
more towards the EU budget than it would get in return.  In explaining why they thought 
that EU membership would have such dire consequences, many Estonian Euroskeptics 
argued that prior Western-oriented economic reforms (e.g., free trade and the sale of 
SOEs to foreign investors) had destroyed Estonian industry and agriculture and reduced 
the quality of basic infrastructure (e.g., railways and power plants). 
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CHAPTER 3 
FOR RICHER OR POORER?  MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
Introduction 
The previous chapter used content analysis (CA) of letters to the editor and 
interviews with voters in Lithuanian and Estonian newspapers to develop hypotheses 
about the origins of Lithuanian Euroenthusiasm and Estonian Euroskepticism.  I found 
that Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the EU.  Most 
Lithuanians believed that EU membership would help their country to catch up with the 
West by making it eligible for EU subsidies and encouraging foreign investment and 
trade.  They also hoped to improve their lot individually by working or studying abroad.  
By contrast, many Estonians felt that joining the EU would make Estonia dependent on 
the West by driving domestic producers bankrupt and allowing foreigners to buy up local 
resources.  They also worried that their standard of living would decline because 
unemployment and prices would increase.  
This chapter will test this hypothesis with survey data from the Central and 
Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB) and its successor, the Candidate Countries 
Eurobarometer (CCEB), the main sources on public opinion on EU enlargement in 
Eastern Europe.  Compared with CA, survey research has two advantages for the purpose 
of testing hypotheses.  First, survey data are more representative than data collected 
through CA.  The voters whose responses I CAd may or may not have been typical of 
Lithuanian and Estonian voters.  The sampling methods used in survey research help to 
make sure that the results accurately describe the entire population (Fowler 2002, chap. 
3).  Second, surveys are more structured than CA.  People quoted in the last chapter gave 
all kinds of reasons for why they (dis)liked the EU.  It was not easy to categorize their 
responses and to tell which categories were more important than others.  Survey research 
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deals with this problem by asking all respondents the same questions and making them 
choose their answers from a closed list of alternatives (Fowler 1995, chap. 3-4). 
Survey data also provide two practical advantages for my project.  First, they 
allow me to compare the relative importance of economic and non-economic concerns 
for Baltic voters.  Because of time and financial limits, I could only conduct a CA of 
people‘s economic expectations about the EU.  The surveys I will use—the 1992 CEEB 
and the 2003 CCEB—dealt with political and cultural issues as well.  Second, surveys 
enable me to trace changes in Baltic attitudes over time.  Both CEEB and CCEB asked 
respondents how much they knew about the EU, whether they supported EU 
membership, what (dis)disadvantages the accession would have, and which social groups 
would benefit from it.  The two time points I chose mark the beginning and the end of the 
Baltic states‘ accession to the EU.  In 1992, Lithuania and Estonia held referenda on their 
new constitutions and their first post-Communist elections.  In 2003, the two countries 
held referenda on EU membership, in preparation for joining the EU a year later.      
I will show that in 1992, most Lithuanians and Estonians (80-90%) supported EU 
membership because they believed that it would promote trade with the West, increase 
Western financial aid, help to create a free market economy, and, ultimately, improve the 
standard of living for most people.  By contrast, they were uninterested in the political 
and security benefits of accession, such as help with building democracy and protecting 
peace in Europe.  In 2003, two-thirds of Lithuanians still supported EU membership, in 
part because they believed that Lithuania was historically part of Europe, but mostly 
because they hoped that the accession would make it easier for them to work abroad 
and/or increase their incomes if they stayed at home.  By contrast, fewer than half of 
Estonians now supported the accession because they thought that it would undermine 
their political independence and cultural identity and, above all, cost too much money, 
increase unemployment, and make life more difficult for farmers, pensioners and other 
vulnerable groups.     
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1992: “Permissive Consensus” 
Scholars have used the term ―permissive consensus‖—a combination of lack of 
knowledge and interest with a high level of support—to describe West European attitudes 
toward the EU in the 1960s and 1970s (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, chap. 1; Jolly 
2007, chap. 6).  This term also accurately describes Baltic attitudes toward European 
integration in 1992.  The respondents were first asked whether they a) had heard of and 
b) were interested in various European institutions.  As Table 3.1 shows, most people 
(about 80%) had heard of the EU.  However, only 20-30% of the respondents had heard 
of ―Europe Agreements‖ for closer economic, political and cultural ties with the EU.  
Slightly more people (30-40%) had heard of PHARE (the EU‘s main aid program for 
Eastern Europe) and European trade issues.  A similar picture obtains when we look at 
people‘s interest in European issues.  Between a quarter and third of the respondents were 
interested in the EU and the ―Europe Agreement,‖ while about 40% were interested in 
PHARE and trade, indicating that the Balts already saw the EU as an economic project. 
Table 3.1: Awareness of and Interest in European Issues in 1992 (%)* 
 Heard? Interested? 
European Union 
Lithuania 77 26 
Estonia 81 30 
Europe Agreement 
Lithuania 21 30 
Estonia 33 34 
PHARE
a 
Lithuania 32 41 
Estonia 38 37 
EU trade issues 
Lithuania 40 44 
Estonia 41 39 
* Only positive responses included. 
a 
Poland-Hungary: Aid for the Restructuring of Economies.   
Source: Own calculations from Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 1992 (CCEB 1992). 
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While they knew and cared little about the EU, however, the Balts generally 
supported European integration.  As Table 3.2 indicates, one half of Lithuanians and a 
third of Estonians had a positive image of the aims and activities of the EU.  This may 
not sound like a ringing endorsement until we note that only 1-2% of the respondents had 
a negative image of the EU.  (The remaining voters had a neutral image.)  About 80% of 
the Balts thought that their country should conclude a ―Europe Agreement‖ with the EU, 
while only 2-5% felt that it should not do so.  This is remarkable because, as we saw in 
the previous paragraph, only 20-30% of the people had heard of such agreements.  
Finally, between 80-90% of the voters supported joining the EU as a full member in the 
future, while only 4-5% opposed this idea.    
Table 3.2: Support for European Integration in 1992 and 2003 (%)* 
 YES MAYBE  NO  
 1992 2003 1992 2003 1992 2003 
Positive Image of EU? 
Lithuania 47 57 31 26 1 11 
Estonia 33 28 37 45 2 22 
EU Membership a Good Thing? 
Lithuania - 65 - 23 - 9 
Estonia - 31 - 42 - 17 
Support Europe Agreement?    
Estonia 76 - - - 2 - 
Lithuania 80 - - - 5 - 
Support EU Membership? 
Lithuania 88 70 - - 4 12 
Estonia 80 40 - - 5 31 
*DON‘T KNOWs not reported. 
Source: Own calculations from CEEB 1992 and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 
April 2003 (CCEB 2003.2). 
Why did most Balts support European integration?  The answer is that they 
believed that they personally and their country at large would benefit economically from 
closer ties with the EU.  The respondents were asked what they thought the main 
advantages of EU membership would be (see Table 3.3).  In both countries, the most 
popular choice (mentioned by 30-40% of the people) was the improvement of living 
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standards.  This was followed by increased trade and financial aid (about 20% of the 
sample).  Another 15% or so thought that EU membership would help to create a free 
market economy, facilitate European economic cooperation, and remove restrictions on 
travel to Western countries.  By contrast, very few people in either country were 
interested in the political or cultural aspects of EU membership.  Thus, fewer than 10% of 
the respondents thought that the advantages of EU accession included political 
cooperation with European countries, Western help with the development of democracy, 
or greater peace and stability within Europe.  (However, 12% of Estonians thought that 
joining the EU would improve national defense and security.) 
Table 3.3: Perceived Advantages of EU Membership in 1992 (%) 
 Lithuania Estonia 
1. Improve living standards 39 31 
2. Improve trade 20 20 
3. Financial and economic aid 20 16 
4. More European economic cooperation 16 16 
5. No travel restrictions 16 8 
6. Help create free market economy 15 15 
7. Shortages will disappear 11 6 
8. Help democracy 7 7 
9. More European political cooperation 6 7 
10. Improve security and defense 6 12 
11. Peace and stability within Europe 3 5 
13. NONE 2 2 
14. DON‘T KNOW 18 21 
Source: Own calculations from CEEB 1992. 
The respondents were also asked what they thought the main disadvantages of EU 
membership would be.  As Table 3.4 illustrates, most people—about 60% in both 
countries—could not think of any disadvantages of the accession: some 20% thought that 
there were no disadvantages and about 40% said that they did not know if there were any 
disadvantages.  However, 12-16% of Estonians thought joining the EU would subject 
their country to Western political and economic domination, respectively.  In Lithuania, 
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the biggest fears were unemployment and emigration (10%), followed by foreign 
economic domination and the loss of cultural identity (9%).  On the whole, however,  
a) there was broad but shallow support for joining the EU in both countries b) based on 
vague expectations of economic gain but c) to some extent tempered by fear of Western 
economic, political and cultural domination. 
Table 3.4: Perceived Disadvantages of EU Membership in 1992 (%) 
 Lithuania Estonia 
1. Unemployment 10 8 
2. Emigration  10 3 
3. Economic domination 9 16 
4. Loss of cultural identity 9 4 
5. Foreigners will come and buy up the country 8 8 
6. Increase in crime 5 3 
7. Political domination 4 12 
8. Economic inequality 4 3 
9. Fall in living standards 2 2 
10. Loss of political sovereignty 2 1 
12. NONE 21 21 
13. DON‘T KNOW 39 40 
Source: Own calculations from CEEB 1992. 
Partly contradicting this conclusion are data reported in Table 3.5, which suggest 
that the Balts already believed that some people would gain more from joining the EU 
than others.  Both Lithuanians and Estonians thought that high-status groups in the 
private sector (businessmen) were more likely to benefit from closer ties with the EU 
than low-status groups (manual workers and low-income groups) and the public sector 
(state-owned enterprises and civil servants).  Further, Estonians were already somewhat 
less hopeful about the EU than Lithuanians: they were up to ten percentage points less 
likely to believe that any given group would benefit from the accession.  However, 
among the top expected beneficiaries of EU membership in both countries were the state-
run health care and education systems, presumably because people hoped that the EU 
would help to finance them.  Moreover, both Lithuanians and Estonians believed that 
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most groups would be better off in the EU: when we subtract expected losses from 
expected gains, we get a positive balance for all groups in both countries.   
Table 3.5: Perceived Winners and Losers of EU Accession in 1992 (%)* 
 Lithuania Estonia 
 + - = + - = 
Health care system 72 7 65 67 3 64 
Private business 72 11 61 65 7 58 
Education system 66 6 60 42 4 38 
Farmers 57 23 34 45 20 25 
State-owned enterprises 51 28 23 41 21 20 
Manual workers 45 25 20 32 20 12 
Civil servants 38 27 11 30 20 10 
Low-income groups 31 33 -2 26 21 5 
Source: Own calculations from CEEB 1992. 
2003: “Constraining Dissensus” 
Fast forward to 2003, when Lithuania and Estonia received invitations to join the 
EU and held referenda on whether they should do so.  As Table 3.6 indicates, the Balts 
remained ignorant about EU history and institutions.  For example, fewer than a third of 
the respondents knew when the EU was established (after World War II), how members 
of the European Parliament were elected (directly by EU citizens), and whether there 
were borders between EU countries (yes, although the question is ambiguous).  However, 
the Balts had become quite knowledgeable about EU symbols, membership and location.  
Thus, 83% of Lithuanians and 81% of Estonians recognized the EU flag (blue with 
yellow stars).  A solid 65% of Lithuanians and 73% of Estonians knew that the EU 
consisted of fifteen member states.  Finally, 55% of Lithuanians and 69% of Estonians 
knew that EU headquarters were located in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, up 
from 15% and 27%, respectively, in 1992.  (This was the only factual question asked in 
1992.)  
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Table 3.6: Knowledge about the EU in 2003 (%)* 
 RIGHT ANSWER WRONG ANSWER  
1. The EU is made of fifteen member states (true) 
Lithuania 65 9 
Estonia 73 6 
2. The EU is headquartered in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg (true)
a
  
Lithuania 55 (15) 12 (12) 
Estonia 69 (27) 6 (13) 
3. The EU was created after World War I, in the late 1910s and early 1920s (false) 
Lithuania 19 28 
Estonia 27 25 
4. The European flag is blue with yellow stars (true) 
Lithuania 83 2 
Estonia 81 2 
5. There are fifteen stars on the European flag (false) 
Lithuania 23 45 
Estonia 8 64 
6. The EU has its own anthem (true) 
Lithuania 31 17 
Estonia 18 34 
7. The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by citizens (true) 
Estonia 23 22 
Lithuania 29 19 
8. There is a president of the EU directly elected by all citizens (false) 
Lithuania 33 18 
Estonia 38 14 
9. There are no borders between the countries of the European Union (false) 
Lithuania 15 15 
Estonia 32 44 
* DON‘T KNOWs not reported.  
a
 1992 data in brackets. 
Source: Own calculations from CCEB 2003.2. 
However, while knowledge about the EU had increased, support for EU 
membership had decreased (go back toTable 3.2).  In Lithuania, the decline was 
relatively modest.  Thus, 70% of Lithuanians planned vote for EU membership, down 
from 87% in 1992, while 12% planned to vote against the accession, up from 5%.  A 
majority of 57% of Lithuanians now had a positive image of the EU, up from 43% in 
1992, while 12% had a negative image, up from 1%.  Further, 60% of Lithuanians 
thought that EU membership would be a good thing, while 10% thought that it would be 
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a bad thing.  In Estonia, however, the ―permissive consensus‖ of 1992 had given way to a 
―constraining dissensus‖ (Hooghe and Marks 2008).  Only 40% of Estonians supported 
EU membership, down from 80%, while 31% opposed it, up from 5%.  While a third of 
Estonians still had a positive image of the EU, 25% now had a negative image, up from 
5% in 1992.  Finally, only 40% of Estonians believed that joining the EU would be a 
good thing, while 20% believed that it would be a bad thing.   
The still strong if diminished support for the EU in Lithuania and the widespread 
opposition to the union in Estonia were rooted in very different expectations about the 
impact of EU membership on a) the respondents personally and b) the country at large.  
As Table 3.7 shows, 69% of Lithuanians but only 42% of Estonians thought that their 
country would benefit from EU joining the EU.  Even more dramatically, 54% of 
Lithuanians but only 28% of Estonians believed that they would personally benefit from 
EU accession. 
Table 3.7: The Expected Impact of EU Membership in 2003 (%)* 
 YES NO 
… Country will benefit 
Lithuania 69 14 
Estonia 42 33 
… Will personally benefit 
Lithuania 54 17 
Estonia 28 33 
*DON‘T KNOWs not reported. 
Source: Own calculations from CCEB 2003.2. 
This, of course, raises the question of what kinds of benefits and costs people 
expected EU membership to entail.  The reader will recall that, in 1992, most Estonians 
and Lithuanians hoped that EU accession would improve their standard of living by 
increasing trade with and aid from the West.  Unfortunately, the 2003 survey did not 
specifically ask about the advantages of EU accession, so a direct comparison is not 
possible.  However, the respondents were asked about the meaning of EU citizenship.  As 
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Table 3.8 makes clear, both Lithuanians and Estonians were mainly interested in the 
economic rights associated with EU membership, such as the right to work, study, travel, 
or settle permanently in the EU.  By contrast, people were largely indifferent to the 
political rights they would acquire as EU citizens, such as the right to vote in European 
and local elections.  On both economic and political issues, however, Estonians were 
about twenty percentage points less likely than Lithuanians to associate EU citizenship 
with any rights.   
Table 3.8: The Meaning of EU Citizenship in 2003 (%)* 
 Lithuania Estonia 
1. The right to work in any EU country 80 61 
2. Being able to study in any EU county 75 54 
3. The right to move permanently to any EU country  66 51 
4. Access to social welfare in any EU country  55 41 
5. The right to vote in local elections in any EU country 33 11 
6. The right to vote in national elections in any EU country 30 10 
7. The right to vote in European elections in any EU country 30 11 
*Only positive responses reported. 
Source: Own calculations from CCEB 2003.2. 
Another question asked voters to agree or disagree with a number of statements 
about the EU.  As Table 3.9 illustrates, most Lithuanians and Estonians thought that their 
leaders were doing what was necessary to join the EU, although they doubted that their 
country had much to offer the EU or would have much say in European affairs.  There 
was also broad agreement that enlarging the EU would protect peace and security in 
Europe and make Europe culturally richer and politically more important.  However, 
Lithuanians and Estonians disagreed on a) how ―European‖ their country was and b) 
whether their country would benefit from EU membership economically.  Thus, 59% of 
Lithuanians but 48% of Estonians believed that their country‘s membership in the EU 
was historically and geographically justified.  As many as 66% of Lithuanians but only 
54% of Estonians thought that being a member of the EU would help their country‘s 
economy.  Most dramatically, 61% of Lithuanians but only 38% of Estonians believed 
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that joining the EU would lead to higher quality of life, while only 18% of Lithuanians 
but 42% of Estonians worried that EU accession would increase unemployment.   
Table 3.9: What Kind of Europe?  Images of the EU in 2003 (%)* 
 Lithuania Estonia 
YES NO YES NO 
1. [The country] has a lot to offer the EU 
 
33 46 19 65 
2. The more countries there will be in the EU, the 
more peace and security will be guaranteed in Europe 
68 16 62 21 
3. With the enlargement, [the country] would be able 
to have its voice heard more strongly in Europe  
53 20 51 31 
4. [The country‘s] leaders are doing what is needed to 
become a member of the EU  
72 9 80 7 
5. The more there will be countries in the EU, the 
more important it will be in the world 
64 13 69 12 
6. With more member countries, Europe will be 
culturally richer 
58 17 52 27 
7. [The country‘s] membership of the EU is 
historically and geographically natural, justified 
59 13 48 26 
8. Being a member of the EU would help [the 
country‘s] economy 
66 15 54 26 
9. [The country‘s] membership of the EU would lead 
to a higher quality of life 
61 14 38 36 
10.  With the enlargement, there would be more 
unemployment in [the country] 
19 49 42 41 
*DON‘T KNOWs not reported. 
Source: Own calculations from CCEB 2003.2. 
The survey also asked people what their biggest fears about the EU were.  As 
Table 3.10 shows, both Lithuanians (54%) and Estonians (67%) were most afraid of 
increasing crime and drug trafficking.  It is difficult for me to interpret this because I did 
not CA non-economic fears about the EU, nor has this issue received much attention in 
the literature.
14
  However, the Balts may have worried that joining the EU would make 
their countries a more attractive route for drug trafficking from Russia to Europe.  
Lithuanian and Estonian guards on the Russian border typically turn a blind eye to the 
                                                          
14
 Of course, Inglehart (1977, chap. 12; 1990, chap. 2, 4) argues that concerns over physical safety and 
economic security both reflect broader ―materialist‖ values.   
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drug trade, either because they have been bribed or because they are afraid of getting 
killed.  With EU accession, Baltic drug couriers could travel to Europe without a visa and 
with minimal customs inspections.  The Balts may have also thought that the EU was 
―soft on crime.‖  In the 1990s, Lithuania and Estonia abolished the death penalty in order 
to qualify for membership in the Council of Europe, a non-EU institution often confused 
with the European Council.  In the early 2000s, the EU required Lithuania and Estonia to 
build new prisons that would meet EU guidelines for the humane treatment of inmates.   
Table 3.10: Fears about the EU in 2003 (%)* 
 Lithuania Estonia 
1. An increase in drug trafficking and organized crime 54 67 
2. More difficulties for our farmers 46 54 
3. Joining the EU will cost our country too much money 44 57 
2. More difficulties for our farmers 46 54 
4. Our language being used less and less  33 53 
5. The end of litas or kroon (national currency) 34 52 
6. A loss of power for smaller members 24 52 
7. The transfer of jobs to countries with lower production costs 33 44 
8. The loss of our identity and culture  20 42 
9. The loss of social benefits  16 26 
10. Richer countries paying more than others  17 20 
*Only positive responses reported. 
Source: Own calculations from CCEB 2003.2. 
However, Estonians were more worried than Lithuanians about the consequences 
of EU accession for their political independence and cultural identity.  Thus, only 33% of 
Lithuanians but 53% of Estonians thought that their language would be used less after the 
accession; 24% of Lithuanians but 52% of Estonians—that small countries would lose 
power in the EU; and 20% of Lithuanians but 42% of Estonians—that they would lose 
their culture and identity in the EU.  These results provide some support for the historical 
and cultural interpretations of Baltic attitudes to the EU proposed by Pettai (2005) and 
Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru (2006).  For example, Estonians may place higher value on 
political independence than Lithuanians because they have almost no tradition of 
independent statehood.  Similarly, Estonians may be more attached to their national 
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culture because the line between elite (German or Polish) and peasant culture was 
traditionally sharper in Estonia than in Lithuania.   
However, the data also support the main results of my content analysis, namely 
that a) economic concerns were at least as important for Lithuanian and Estonian voters 
as political and cultural issues and that b) Estonians were more worried about the 
negative economic consequences of the accession than Lithuanians.  Above all, 46% of 
Lithuanians but 54% of Estonians believed that the accession would create problems for  
farmers; 44% of Lithuanians but 57% of Estonians—that joining the EU would cost too  
much money; and 34% of Lithuanians but 52% of Estonians—that the EU would do 
away with their national currency.  Less commonly, 33% of Lithuanians but 44% of 
Estonians thought that the accession would lead to the transfer of jobs to other countries; 
16% of Lithuanians but 26% of Estonians—that EU membership would reduce social 
benefits; and 17% of Lithuanians but 20% of Estonians—that it was unfair that rich 
countries paid more toward the EU budget than others.    
The CA conducted in the previous chapter helps us to make sense of these fears.  
EU production quotas would fix Estonian agricultural output at the level of the late 
1990s, the trough of the post-Communist agricultural depression, while EU regulations 
would require farmers to build separate sheds for different animals and to buy expensive 
new equipment.  EU-imposed tariffs and indirect taxes would increase the price of basic 
necessities like food, gasoline, and electricity.  Workers would respond to the rising cost 
of living by demanding higher wages.  As a result, domestic firms would go out of 
business, while foreign companies would relocate their production to Russia, where there 
are fewer regulations.  This, in turn, would reduce tax revenues and force the government 
to cut social benefits.  After ruining the domestic economy, the Estonian government 
would replace the kroon with the euro, confiscating people‘s savings in the process.  At 
the same time, the EU would rig its accounting rules so that Estonia would pay more 
toward the EU budget than it would receive in return.   
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Like the 1992 CEEB, the 2003 CCEB asked respondents which social groups 
were most likely to benefit from EU membership and which ones were most likely to 
lose.  As Table 3.11 indicates, both Lithuanians and Estonians expected a) big businesses, 
politicians, and civil servants; b) urban residents, professionals, and people who speak 
foreign languages; and c) children and young people to be the main beneficiaries of the 
accession.  The groups seen as least likely to benefit included a) farmers and small 
businessmen; b) rural residents, the unemployed, and people who do not speak foreign 
languages; and c) middle-aged and elderly people and pensioners.  In this sense, public 
opinion had changed little from 1992, when most Balts thought that private businesses 
were more likely to gain from EU membership than state-owned enterprises, manual 
workers, and low-income groups (go back to Table 3.5). 
Table 3.11: Perceived Winners and Losers of EU Accession in 2003 (%)* 
 Lithuania Estonia 
+ - = + - = 
1. Young people 82 3 79 66 3 63 
2. People who speak foreign languages 79 2 77 82 0 82 
3. Large businesses 75 2 73 69 2 67 
4. Politicians 75 3 72 83 1 82 
5. Professionals 63 4 59 61 2 59 
6. Children 59 4 55 44 6 38 
7. Civil servants 45 5 40 62 4 58 
8. Inhabitants of capital city 37 7 30 29 7 22 
18. The unemployed 41 16 25 22 33 -11 
20. Small and medium-sized businesses 37 18 19 12 30 -18 
19. Middle-aged people 28 16 12 12 28 -16 
21. Farmers 35 25 10 18 38 -20 
22. Pensioners 22 22 0 16 37 -21 
23. Inhabitants of rural areas 27 29 -2 14 44 -30 
24. Elderly people 20 24 -4 11 41 -30 
25. People who don‘t speak foreign languages   15 34 -19 4 60 -56 
*DON‘T KNOWs not reported. 
Source: Own calculations from CEEB 2003.2. 
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However, a clear difference a) from 1992 and b) between the two countries 
emerges when we calculate the expected net effect of EU accession on various groups—
i.e., when we subtract the percentage of respondents who expected a particular group to 
lose from the accession from the percentage of people who expected that group to win.  
Lithuanians still believed that, on balance, most groups would benefit from the accession.  
The only exceptions were people who do not speak foreign languages and, by a small 
margin, rural people and the elderly.  By contrast, Estonians now expected people without 
marketable resources to lose from the accession.  In ascending order, the net benefit 
scores were -19% for Lithuania (-56% for Estonia) for people who do not speak foreign 
languages; -4% (-30%) for the elderly; -2% (-30%) for the inhabitants of rural areas; 0% 
(-21%) for pensioners; +12% (-20%) for farmers; +12% (-16%) for middle-aged people; 
+19% (-18%) for small businesses; and +25% (-11%) for the unemployed.   
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to do two things: a) to compare the relative importance of 
economic and non-economic concerns about the EU for Baltic voters and b) to explore 
changes in Lithuanian and Estonian attitudes toward the EU over time.  The main results 
of my analysis can be summarized as follows.  In 1992, the overwhelming majority of 
Lithuanian and Estonian voters (80-90%) supported EU membership.  They did so 
mostly for economic reasons.  They hoped that joining the EU would improve trade with 
West European countries, increase foreign aid, help to create a free market economy, 
and, in the end, raise most people’s standard of living.  They also believed that all social 
groups—from public sector workers to private sector owners—would benefit from EU 
membership.  By contrast, both Lithuanians and Estonians were indifferent to the 
potential political benefits of EU accession, such as help with building democracy and 
protecting peace and security in Europe.  Few people thought that joining the EU would 
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have any negative consequences, although some Estonians worried that it would subject 
their country to foreign political and economic domination. 
By 2003, however, Lithuanian and Estonian attitudes toward the EU had diverged 
considerably.   About two thirds of Lithuanians still supported EU membership.  They 
believed that Lithuania was geographically and historically part of Europe.  They also 
hoped that joining the EU would make it easier for Lithuanians to work abroad and 
increase incomes for those who stayed at home.  By contrast, Estonian support for the 
EU had dropped to below half of the electorate.  This was in part because Estonians 
worried that joining the EU would undermine their political independence and cultural 
identity.  More importantly, however, Estonians believed that joining the EU would cost 
too much money, create difficulties for farmers, and increase unemployment.  They also 
thought that the accession would benefit people with marketable economic resources 
(young people, urban residents, large businessmen, and professionals) and hurt those who 
lacked such resources (old people, rural residents, small businessmen, and the 
unemployed).   
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CHAPTER 4 
CALCULATION, COMMUNITY, OR CUES?  MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF 
SURVEY DATA
15
 
Introduction 
Thus far, this dissertation has explored cross-national differences in EU support at 
the aggregate level.  Using content analysis of Lithuanian and Estonian newspapers and 
macro-level analysis of survey data, I have shown that both Lithuanians and Estonians 
thought of the EU mainly in economic terms, but that Lithuanians had more optimistic 
economic expectations about the EU than Estonians.  However, I have not yet considered 
the micro-foundations of these differences.  Which social groups (e.g., in terms of sex, 
ethnicity, income, and education) were more likely to support EU membership in 
Lithuania and Estonia?  What attitudes (and aptitudes)—―cognitive mobilization,‖ post-
materialism, nationalism, trust in government, or satisfaction with one‘s economic 
situation—distinguished EU supporters from EU opponents?  Finally, was the 
relationship between social structure and attitudes and EU support the same in Lithuania 
and Estonia?  For example, did the same groups (e.g., the rich and people who are 
satisfied with their economic situation) support the EU in the two countries?   
In this chapter, I will show that there were both similarities and differences in the 
social basis of EU support in Lithuania and Estonia.  In both countries, people who 
trusted the government were more likely to support EU membership than those who did 
not.  Clearly, the EU referenda were, to some extent, votes of (non-)confidence in 
political leaders.  Other similarities were negative, however.  Post-materialist values, 
which are a strong predictor of EU support in Western Europe, had no impact on EU 
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support in either country because almost all Lithuanians and Estonians turned out to be 
materialists.  More surprisingly, nationalism—a variable favored by students of East 
European politics—either increased or decreased EU support depending on how it was 
operationalized, presumably because Baltic nationalists disagreed among themselves on 
whether the EU was good or bad for the nation.  
However, the differences in the structural and attitudinal basis of EU support in 
the two countries were at least as important as the similarities.  Party preferences affected 
EU support in Estonia, where the largest party opposed the accession on current terms,  
but not in Lithuania, where almost all parties supported EU membership.  ―Cognitive 
mobilization‖ (operationalized as knowledge about the EU) increased support for the EU 
in Lithuania but not in Estonia, perhaps because Lithuania negotiated a more favorable 
accession treaty than Estonia.  Finally, the strongest predictors of EU support in Estonia 
were income, education, and satisfaction with one‘s economic situation, none of which 
had any influence at all on EU support in Lithuania.  Clearly, as my CA suggested, 
Estonians saw EU accession as a continuation of current economic policies, while 
Lithuanians did not.        
  The chapter is organized as follows.  The next section will review the literature on 
individual-level determinants of EU support in a) Western and b) Eastern Europe.  The 
following section will test the existing theories with survey data from Lithuania and 
Estonia.  The conclusion will sum up my findings.  Throughout the chapter, I will pay 
particular attention to two questions.  First, how well do theories developed in the West 
European context work in Eastern Europe?  Second, do the same theories explain EU 
support in Lithuania and Estonia?   
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Literature and Hypotheses 
Community: Cognitive Mobilization, Post-Materialism, and Nationalism 
Systematic research on popular attitudes toward European integration goes back 
to the work of Ronald Inglehart in the 1970s.  Inglehart (1970; 1977, chap 12) argues that 
public support for European depends of two factors: a) ―cognitive mobilization‖ (CM) 
and b) post-materialist values.  An individual is cognitively mobilized (CMd) if she has a 
good understanding of political issues.  She is also eager to express her opinions about 
politics and to persuade others, for example in discussions with family and friends.  
Inglehart argues that CM increases support for European integration in two ways.  First, 
CMd individuals are more likely to seek out information about the EU, which, in turn, 
will make European institutions look more familiar and less threatening.  Second, they 
have broader horizons: they are more likely to place their personal concerns in a national 
and global context.
16
  Most researchers have found strong support for the CM hypothesis 
in both Western and Eastern Europe (Jansson 1991; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; 
Anderson and Reichert 1996; Cichowski 2000). 
However, Inglehart (1977, chap. 12; 1990, chap. 2, 4) also argues that CM is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for EU support.  It also matters what kinds of 
values people hold.  Inglehart argues that since the 1960s, Western societies have 
experienced a gradual shift from materialist to post-materialist (PM) values.  Materialists 
are concerned about economic and physical security.  They give priority to issues like 
fighting crime, maintaining high rates of economic growth, and stabilizing prices.  By 
contrast, post-materialists (PMs) care about self-expression, political participation, and 
the quality of life.  They think that it is important to protect the freedom of speech, to 
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 Of course, an obvious criticism of the CM hypothesis would be that CM is simply a funny way of 
describing socio-economic status: after all, upper-status people are generally more articulate and more 
interested in politics than their lower-status peers.  This problem is particularly acute when education is 
used as a measure of CM, as in Inglehart (1970) and Cichowski (2000). 
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give people more say in government, and to take good care of our environment.  Inglehart 
argues that PMs are more likely to support European integration than materialists.  They 
are less preoccupied with making money, which leaves them more time for political and 
intellectual pursuits.  They are also more open to new things, including new political 
arrangements, such as the EU.   
Tests of the PM hypothesis have produced contradictory results, however.  
Inglehart and Reif (1991) find that PMs are significantly more supportive of the EU than 
materialists.  However, Jansson (1991) and Duchesne and Frognier (1995) find that, once 
we control for cognitive mobilization, the relationship between post-materialist values 
and EU support becomes weaker or disappears entirely.  They suggest that some 
materialists support European integration as a way of increasing economic efficiency, 
while some PMs oppose it as a bureaucratic monster.  Anderson and Reichert (1996) find 
that PMs support the EU in northern Europe, but oppose it southern Europe.  They argue 
that voters in rich countries associate European integration with non-economic values 
like peace and environmental protection, while voters in poor countries see the EU as an 
engine of economic development. 
More recently, scholars exploring popular attitudes toward the EU have turned 
their attention to another set of values: nationalism.  They argue that the EU has 
undergone significant changes in the past two decades.  It used to be a customs union, 
concerned about bringing down tariff barriers between European countries.  Nowadays, 
however, it increasingly impinges on the sovereignty of its member states in areas far 
removed from trade policy.  For example, the EU now has a central bank and a common 
currency, the euro.  The highest judicial body in the EU is the European Court of Justice, 
which promotes the rights of minorities against the claims of the nation-states.  With the 
adoption of the Schengen visa regime, EU countries are also moving towards a common 
immigration policy.  Many people believe that these changes are undermining their 
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country‘s political independence and cultural identity.  They express their frustration by 
voting against the expansion of EU powers and the admission of new members.       
In general, scholars working on Western Europe have found strong support for the 
nationalism hypothesis.  Carey (2002) and Risse (2002) find that, compared to EU 
supporters, EU opponents are more likely to be proud of their country, to think of 
themselves as citizens of their country rather than Europeans, and to worry that their 
language and culture will disappear in the EU.  McLaren (2002) and De Vreese and 
Boomgarden (2005) claim that anti-EU voters are distinguished by their hostility to 
immigrants: for example, they believe that immigrants take away jobs from local 
workers, abuse the welfare system, create trouble in schools, and follow offensive 
religious practices.  Sciarini and Listhaug (1997) argue that Swiss and Norwegian voters 
rejected EU membership in the 1994 referenda because they worried that it would 
compromise their national sovereignty and weaken democratic institutions.  Christin and 
Trechsler (2002) find that Swiss Euroskeptics believe that joining the EU would 
undermine their country‘s traditions of direct democracy and neutral foreign policy.   
Scholars working on Eastern Europe, however, have disagreed on whether 
nationalism increases or decreases support for European integration.  On the one hand, 
Grabbe and Hughes (1998, chap. 6), Grabbe (2003) and Ozolina (2003) argue that 
opposition to the EU is strongest in countries that have the shortest tradition of 
independent statehood, such as the former Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states.  Having 
just escaped from one union, why should they rush to join another?  Pettai (2005) and 
Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru (2006) maintain that Estonian and Latvian Euroskepticism 
reflects their cultural peripherality.  Both countries were colonized by Germans in the 
thirteenth century.  As a result, opposition to Europe (Germany) became the cornerstone 
of their cultural identity during the ―national awakenings‖ of the nineteenth century.  
Concretely, Vetik et al show that Estonian Euroskeptics believe that Estonia should 
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follow its own path of economic development and disregard EU rules if they hurt 
Estonian interests.
17
   
By contrast, Whitefield, Rohrscheider and Alisauskiene (2006) contend that, at 
least in the Baltic countries, nationalism strengthens support for EU membership because 
the alien and hostile ―other‖ for Baltic nationalists is not Europe, but Russia.   
Russia occupied the Baltic states during World War II.  In the ensuing decades, it redrew 
their borders, suppressed their cultures, and encouraged the in-migration of Slavic 
workers.  Although it grudgingly recognized Baltic independence in 1991, it did not 
remove its troops until 1994.  It has refused to ratify border treaties with Latvia and 
Estonia and continues to meddle in their affairs under the pretext of protecting minority 
rights.  As a result, many Balts believe that EU membership will serve as a ―soft‖ security 
guarantee against Russia.  (Conversely, many Slavs worry that joining the EU will reduce 
Russian influence in their country.)  To support their argument, Whitefield and his 
collaborators show that ethnic Balts and voters who feel proud of their nationality are 
more likely to support EU accession than ethnic Slavs and voters who lack national pride.  
Cues: Party Preferences and Trust in Government  
Another popular explanation for public support for European integration focuses 
on political factors, such as party preferences and trust in government.  Scholars working 
in this tradition assume that voters know little about the EU.  For example, Anderson 
(1998) finds that two thirds of EU citizens are poorly informed about EU history and 
institutions.  This is a product of rational ignorance: most voters lack the time and 
motivation to learn more about a seemingly distant and bureaucratic organization.  How, 
then, do people make decisions when they are asked to vote on issues like EU expansion 
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 This, of course, raises the question of whether Vetik and his collaborators actually measure economic, 
rather than cultural, nationalism.  Clearly, following one‘s own path of economic development is an 
economic issue.  EU rules, too, are controversial largely because they hurt farmers, fishermen, and small 
businessmen.  
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or closer integration?  Anderson argues that voters know a lot about domestic politics: 
they prefer one party to others; they trust the government or not.  When voting on 
European issues, they transfer their attitudes toward domestic politics to the EU.   
But what kinds of domestic political cues have the most influence on people‘s 
attitudes to the EU?  Some researchers argue that voters ―follow the party line‖: they 
adopt the position of the party that is closest to them on domestic issues (Van Kersbergen 
2000).  Inglehart and Reif (1991) and Wessels (1995) find that political conflict over 
European integration overlaps with the left-right cleavage: supporters of liberal and 
conservative parties are more supportive of the EU than socialist, Communist and Green 
voters.  Anderson (1998) finds that supporters of mainstream parties favor European 
integration, while voters of anti-establishment parties—the Communists and the far 
right—oppose it.  This is particularly true in countries where anti-establishment parties 
have made opposition to the EU an important part of their platform (e.g., Austria, France 
and Denmark).   
Studies of East European politics have generally confirmed the idea that a) parties 
differ in their views of European integration and that b) party preferences influence 
popular attitudes toward the EU.  Kopecký and Mudde (2002) and Beichelt (2004) argue 
that nationalist and unreformed Communist parties oppose EU membership, while other 
parties support it.  Cichowski (2000) and Anderson and Tverdova (2004) show that voters 
of pro-EU parties are more supportive of the EU than voters of anti-EU parties.  Sikk and 
Ehin (2005) and Sikk (2005) find that supporters of Estonia‘s left-populist Center Party 
were more likely to vote against EU membership than supporters of other parliamentary 
parties.  Reversing the causal arrow, Whitefield, Rohrschneider and Alisauskiene (2006) 
argue that EU supporters in the Baltic countries vote for liberal and conservative parties, 
while EU opponents vote for social democratic, populist, and ethnic (Russian) parties.   
Other scholars have argued, however, that voters may not know or care where 
parties stand on EU issues.  In Western Europe, many parties are internally divided on 
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European integration.  In Eastern Europe, party identification is weak.  However, we can 
reasonably make two assumptions.  First, most voters know whether they are satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the performance of the government.  For example, they either approve or 
do not approve of how the government handles the economy, crime, or some other issue 
that is important for them.  Second, voters believe that European integration is the 
government‘s project.  In candidate countries, governments negotiate with the European 
Commission about the terms of the accession.  In EU member states, governments 
formulate (through their participation in the European Council) and implement EU 
policies.  As a result, voters who are satisfied with the government‘s job performance will 
support European integration, while people who are dissatisfied will oppose it.   
Concretely, Franklin, Marsh and Welzien (1994) and Franklin, van der Eijk and 
Marsh (1995) claim that the Danish voters initially rejected the 1992 Maastricht treaty, 
which established the European economic and monetary union, because they wanted to 
punish their government for poor economic management.  They find that there was no 
significant decline in Danish popular support for European integration before the 
referenda.  However, many voters were deeply unhappy about rising unemployment and 
other economic woes.
18
  The ―Franklin thesis‖ has found an enthusiastic following in  
Estonia, a would-be Nordic country.  Ehin (2001), Vetik (2003) and Sikk and Ehin 
(2005) argue that most Estonians believed that they—and their country at large—would 
benefit membership.  However, many people still voted against the EU because they did 
not trust the politicians who were in charge of the accession negotiations.     
However, in Western Europe, the Franklin thesis has recently received a drubbing 
from Sánchez-Cuenza (2000), who finds that trust in government reduces support for the 
EU once we control for trust in European institutions.  He argues that European 
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 However, Svensson (2002) argues that Danish voters opposed the Maastricht treaty and subsequent 
measures to ―deepen‖ European integration on policy grounds.  In particular, most Danes opposed a 
common EU social policy, the single European currency, and the leveling of economic differences between 
EU member states.  
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integration presents European citizens with a choice between national sovereignty and 
supranational governance.  For example, should the national governments or the EU be in 
charge of monetary, agricultural, and immigration policy?  Voters who trust their 
government want to preserve as much national sovereignty as possible, while voters who 
mistrust the government prefer to be ruled from Brussels.  At the aggregate level, this 
translates into a north-south divide in EU support: north Europeans trust their government 
and mistrust the EU; south Europeans mistrust their government and trust the EU. 
Calculation: Economic Resources and Perceptions 
The third major family of theories about the sources of popular attitudes toward 
the EU focuses on economic factors.  Gabel and Palmer (1995), Gabel and Whitten 
(1997) and Gabel (1998 a, chap. 2-4; 1998 b) argue that voters support or oppose 
European integration based on economic cost-benefit calculations.  The EU is, above all, 
a common market for goods, labor, and capital.  EU states have abolished tariffs on each 
other‘s products and reduced non-tariff barriers, such as subsidies and preferential tax 
treatment.  They also recognize each other‘s diplomas and have banned nationality-based 
discrimination in hiring, except in the public sector.  Finally, they have removed controls 
on the movement of capital, including both direct and portfolio investment.   
These policies, Gabel and others argue, benefit individuals who possess 
marketable resources (white-collar jobs, higher education, and a lot of money) and hurt 
those who do not.  Free trade lowers the price of manufactured goods.  This benefits 
white-collar workers, who buy manufactured goods, but hurts blue-collar workers, who 
produce them.  Free movement of labor increases competition for jobs.  This benefits 
educated workers, who can move wherever they can make the most money, but hurts 
uneducated workers, who may lose their jobs.  Free movement of capital puts pressure on 
governments to cut taxes and spending.  This benefits the rich, who pay more in taxes 
than they get back in transfers, but hurts the poor, who depend on social welfare 
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programs to survive.  As a result, white-collar workers, the educated and the rich support 
European integration, while blue-collar workers, the uneducated and the poor oppose it.     
Gabel‘s theory has received strong support from most scholars who have tested it 
with West European data (Anderson and Reichert 1996; Anderson 1998; McLaren 2002).  
However, in a recent paper Brinegar and Jolly (2005) argue that the strength of 
relationship between skills (education) and EU support depends on a country‘s level of 
economic development (the average level of education).  While educated people are 
generally more supportive of the EU than their uneducated compatriots, this is more true 
in the developed (well-educated) countries of northern Europe than the less-developed 
(poorly educated) countries of southern Europe.  Developed countries have a surplus of 
highly-educated people who would benefit from the opportunity to work for foreign 
companies or to seek employment abroad.  By contrast, less-developed countries have 
few educated people, whose scarcity value and, hence, incomes would decline if the 
domestic labor market were opened to foreign competition.
19
    
In the same vein, Ray (2003, 2004) and Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004) argue 
that the relationship between economic values (self-identified leftism and support for the 
expansion of the welfare state) and EU support depends on the welfare state type.  They 
find that leftist/pro-welfare people support the EU in liberal welfare states (Britain), 
oppose it in Social Democratic welfare states (Scandinavia), and are equally likely to 
support and oppose it in Christian Democratic welfare states (continental Europe).
20
  
They explain this pattern as follows.  Most EU countries have Christian Democratic 
welfare states, so European integration is likely to lead to the convergence of social 
policy along Christian Democratic lines.  This is good news for the pro-welfare people in 
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 The reader will recognize that this is the logic of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory explaining why capitalists 
support free trade in capital-rich countries, but oppose it in capital-poor countries (Carbaugh 2004, chap. 4). 
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 For the typology of welfare states, see Esping-Andersen (1990, chap. 1).  For a recent discussion, see 
Pontusson (2005), chap. 2, 8. 
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liberal countries, where social spending would increase and benefits would become more 
equal and more broadly available, but scares the leftists in Social Democratic countries, 
where spending and coverage would shrink and benefits would become less equal.        
To what extent do either economic a) resources or b) attitudes explain individual-
level variance in EU support in Eastern Europe?  Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) and 
Herzog and Tucker (2008) argue that East Europeans support or oppose EU membership 
based on whether they consider themselves winners or losers of the transition to 
capitalism.  Their argument proceeds in two steps.  First, European countries have made 
a transition from socialism to capitalism.  It is too early to tell which social groups (for 
example, in terms of education and occupation) have benefited from, or been hurt by, the 
transition since East European economies continue to evolve.  However, the transition 
has clearly created subjective winners and losers.  Winners believe that their economic 
situation is improving and support the market economy.  Losers think that their economic 
situation is worsening and oppose the market.  
Second, Tucker et al argue that East Europeans view EU accession as a 
guarantee that their governments will continue economic reforms.  They do not explain 
why, but it is not difficult to think of possible reasons.  At the Copenhagen summit in 
1992, the EU adopted criteria that countries need to meet to qualify for EU membership.  
These included ―the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union‖ (European Council 
1993, 13).
21
  In 1997, the EU decided to start accession negotiations with some East 
European applicant countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovenia), but not (yet) with others (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia).  All 
countries in the first group met the economic criterion for membership; except Slovakia, 
none of the countries in the second group did (European Commission 1997, 1-57).  Over 
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 The other criteria were political (democracy and human rights) and administrative (ability to implement 
the EU law).   
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the next few years, the EU instructed the laggards to privatize the remaining SOEs, 
eliminate price controls and subsidies, open energy and agriculture to foreign 
competition, and reduce government spending (European Commission 2003, 1-45).      
 The evidence for the ―winners and losers‖ hypothesis is quite strong (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2004; Caplanova, Orviska and Hudson 2004; Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield 2004; Jacobs and Pollack 2006; Whitefield, Rohrschneider and Alisauskiene 
2006).  But do economic values and perceptions have the same impact on EU support in 
all countries?  And if not, why not?  These are the questions that intrigue Christin (2004).  
Like much of the existing literature, Christin finds that economically contented and pro-
market voters are more supportive of the EU than their discontented and anti-market 
peers.  However, he also finds that this relationship is stronger in countries that have high 
economic growth and low inflation than in countries that have low growth and high 
inflation.  He interprets this result as follows.  In countries that are doing well, the losers 
of reforms feel that they can vent their anger on the EU without hurting their country‘s 
long-term economic prospects.  In countries that are doing poorly, however, most people 
support EU membership as the only way of preventing economic collapse.   
While most scholars agree that subjective economic well-being affects support for 
EU membership, however, they disagree over whether objective socio-economic status 
does so.  On the one hand, Cichowski (2000), Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002), 
Anderson and Tverdova (2004), Jacobs and Pollack (2006), Herzog and Tucker (2008), 
Ehin (2001), Sikk and Ehin (2005), and Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru (2006) find that, 
controlling for attitudes, occupation, education and income have no impact on EU 
support.  On the other hand, Caplanova, Orviska and Hudson (2004), Doyle and Firdmuc 
(2006), Whitefield, Rohrschneider and Alisauskiene (2006), and Allam and Goerres 
(2008) find that, as Gabel predicts, white-collar workers, college graduates, and the rich 
are more supportive of EU accession than blue-collar workers, primary school graduates, 
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and the poor.  None of these scholars, however, consider the possibility that economic 
resources might be a better predictor of EU support in some countries than in others. 
Data and Analysis 
To test these hypotheses, I used the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) 
from May 2003, the most comprehensive such survey ever and the last one conducted 
before Lithuania and Estonia held referenda on EU accession in May and September, 
respectively.  Following Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt (2004), Brinegar and Jolly (2005) 
and Ray (2004), I specified the dependent variable—EU support—as a combination of a) 
the general perception of the EU and b) the intended vote in the referendum.  (See Table 
4.1 for a brief description of the variables.)  The general perception of the EU could be 
good (3), neither good nor bad (2), or bad (1).  The vote intention also falls into three 
categories: for (3), do not know or would not vote (2), or against (1).  The two individual 
variables were correlated at 0.73 in Lithuania and 0.77 in Estonia.  The combined 
variable (a scale from 2 to 6) is a more nuanced measure of EU support than either 
variable on its own because it has both an attitudinal (perception) and a behavioral (vote 
intention) component.  It also has a more normal distribution, which facilitates regression 
analysis (Dielman 1996, chap. 4-5; Foster, Barkus and Yavorsky 2006, chap. 3). 
The independent variables are the variables highlighted in the existing literature 
on EU support in Western and Eastern Europe: cognitive mobilization, post-materialism, 
nationalism, party preferences, trust in government, availability of economic resources, 
and subjective economic well-being.  Some variables were fairly easy to operationalize.  
Following Gabel (1998 a, chap. 3-4; 1998 b) and (Doyle and Firdmuc 2006), I 
operationalized economic resources by income (a scale from 1 to 10), education (a 
dummy variable with four categories based on the age when the respondent stopped 
studying: 16 or before, 19 or before, after 19, or still studying), and occupation (a dummy 
variable with three categories: white-collar, blue-collar, or not working).  Party 
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preferences are a dummy variable with three categories: pro-EU parties, anti-EU parties, 
and no party preference (Anderson 1998; Anderson and Tverdova 2004).
22
  Trust in 
government is a dummy variable with two values: trust or not (Franklin and collaborators 
1994, 1995; Ehin 2001).  The demographic control variables are sex, ethnicity (Baltic or 
Slavic), age, and type of community (urban or rural). 
  Table 4.1: Scales and Categories: Description of Variables  
Variable  Description 
A) ATTITUDES AND APTITUDES  
EU support Scale from 2 (no support for the EU) to 6 (full support) 
Cognitive mobilization Scale from 0 (no knowledge of the EU) to 9 (perfect knowledge) 
National pride Scale from 1 (not at all proud of the nation) to 4 (very proud) 
National identity Scale from 1 (identifies with Europe only) to 4 (nation only) 
Pro-EU party
a Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
Anti-EU party
a Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
Trust government  Categorical: yes=1, no=0 
Life got better
b Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
Life got worse
b Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
B) SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
Sex Categorical: male=1; female=0 
Age Scale in years 
Ethnicity Categorical: Balt=1; Slav=0 
Income Treated as scale from 1 (lowest 10%) to 10 (highest 10%) 
Up to 16
c Categorical: yes=1; no=0 (stopped studying at age 16 or earlier) 
20 or above
c Categorical: yes=1; no=0 (stopped studying at age 20 or later) 
Still studying
c Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
Blue-collar
d Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
White-collar
d Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
Rural
e Categorical: yes=1; no=0 
a ―Do not know‖ or ―would not vote‖ are the reference category. 
b‖Life has stayed about the same‖ is the reference category. 
c
 Stopped studying at age 17-19 is the reference category. 
d
 Not working is the reference category. 
e
 Urban is the reference category. 
Source: CCEB 2003.2 (May 2003). 
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 No significant party in either country opposed EU membership in principle.  Some parties, however, 
criticized the terms and timing of the accession.  These included the right-populist Liberal Democratic 
Party and the Union of Peasants and New Democracy in Lithuania and the left-populist Center Party and 
the agrarian People‘s Union in Estonia.  I classified these parties as ―anti-EU‖ and all other parties as ―pro-
EU.‖  See Duvold and Jurkynas (2006), 107-127 and Sikk (2006), 41-63.    
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Cognitive and cultural variables turned out to be more difficult to operationalize, 
however.  The CCEB does not include Inglehart‘s four-item index of post-materialism 
(PM).  As a substitute, I considered using a question that asked voters to choose two most 
important issues facing the country from a list that included the environment.  However, 
only 1% of voters in Lithuania and Estonia considered the environment an important 
issue and they were neither more nor less likely to support the EU than the remaining 
99% of voters.  This could either mean that a) concern for the environment is not a valid 
measure of PM that b) M/PM divide is not an important cleavage in the Baltics.  
Therefore, I decided to leave PM out of the analysis.
23
  To operationalize cognitive 
mobilization (CM), Inglehart (1977, chap. 12; 1990, chap. 10) creates an index that 
combines a) the frequency of discussing politics with others, b) the frequency of 
persuading others, and c) objective knowledge of the EU.  However, knowledge about the 
EU turned out to be much more strongly correlated with EU support than either 
persuading others or discussing politics.
24
  To give Inglehart the benefit of the doubt, I 
operationalized CM as knowledge, on a scale from 0 to 9.
25
 
As discussed above, the literature on Eastern Europe has generally used either 
national pride or national (as opposed to European) identity to operationalize nationalism 
(Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru 2006 v. Whitefield, Rohrschneider and Alisauskiene 2006).  
However, it is not obvious why one would be a better measure of nationalism than the 
other.  Following Carey (2002), I then considered operationalizing nationalism as a 
combination of national pride and national identity.  However, pre-regression correlation 
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 Including concern for the environment in the regression would not affect the regression results.    
 
24
 Knowledge was correlated with EU support at 0.29 in Lithuania and 0.16 in Estonia.  Persuading others 
was correlated with EU support at 0.1 in Lithuania and 0.13 in Estonia.  Discussing politics was correlated 
with EU support at 0.08 in Lithuania and uncorrelated in Estonia. 
 
25
 Aside from these practical considerations, I would argue that only knowledge about the EU directly 
measures ―cognitive mobilization,‖ while the frequency of discussing politics and persuading other people 
measure other things, such as interest in politics and strength of personality.    
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analysis showed that the two variables were unrelated in Lithuania and only moderately 
correlated in Estonia.
26
  Moreover, they had the opposite impact on EU support: in both 
countries, people who were proud to be part of their nation strongly supported the EU, 
while people who identified with the nation strongly opposed it.
27
  As a result, I decided 
to a) to break nationalism into two variables, national pride and national identity, both 
measured on a scale of 1-4, and b) to include both of them in the regression. 
Finally, I broke with Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky (2002) and the scholars who 
have followed them in defining the ―subjective‖ winners and losers of market reforms 
because I think that their definition is misleading.  Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky create an 
index of winners and losers by combining two variables: a) perceived changes in one‘s 
situation over the previous five years and b) expected changes in the next five years.  
However, only the first variable (changes in the previous five years) deals with one’s past 
experience with economic reforms, which is what we normally understand by being a 
winner or a loser.  By contrast, the second variable (changes in the next five years) 
involves expectations about the future and, if anything, distinguishes between optimists 
and pessimists, which is a different issue.  Therefore, I used only the first variable to 
define winners and losers: winners think that their personal situation has gotten better, 
while losers think that it has gotten worse.  (The largest group—stayed about the same—
is the reference category in the three-way dummy variable.)
28
  
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 4.2.  Variables are 
marked with one, two or three asterisks depending on whether they were significant at the 
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 The correlation coefficient was 0.16 in Estonia.   
 
27
 The correlation between national pride and EU support was 0.35 in Lithuania and 0.27 in Estonia.  The 
correlation between national identity and EU support was –0.29 in Lithuania and –0.27 in Estonia.   
 
28
 The question (Q2 in the May 2003 CCEB) reads as follows: ―If you compare your present personal 
situation with five years ago, would you say it has improved, stayed about the same, or got worse?‖  I 
realize that this question does not specifically address economic changes, but I assume that one‘s ―present 
personal situation‖ has a significant economic component.  Unfortunately, the survey does not have any 
questions about economic values. 
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10%, 5%, or 1% level.  I also estimate the substantive significance of the statistically 
significant variables by calculating how much the dependent variable (EU support) would 
change if we changed the value of the independent variable from its minimum to its 
maximum level.  For dummy variables (education, occupation, trust in government, party 
preferences, and subjective economic well-being), the substantive effect equals the 
regression coefficient.  For continuous variables (income, national pride, national 
identity, and CM), the substantive effect is calculated by multiplying the coefficient by 
the range of the variable, i.e., the minimum value subtracted from the maximum.  
Beginning with cognitive and cultural factors, Lithuanians who knew a lot about 
the EU were up to 73% more supportive of the EU than those who knew little.  By 
contrast, CM had no impact on EU support in Estonia.  The most likely explanation for 
this is that Lithuania negotiated a more favorable accession treaty than Estonia.  Thus, it 
was given a transition period for introducing EU sanitary and quality standards for farms, 
food-processing plants, and small businesses.  It also got biggerproduction quotas—and, 
hence, subsidies—for agriculture.  Finally, it received more financial aid for restructuring 
the energy sector, especially the Ignalina nuclear power plant.  Altogether, Lithuania 
received 643 euros of EU aid per capita in 2004-2006, while Estonia received 602  
euros.
 29
  As a result, knowledge should increase support for the EU in Lithuania, but not 
necessarily in Estonia, a possibility that Cichowski (2000) overlooks. 
By contrast, nationalism turned out to be useless as a predictor of EU support in 
both countries: people who identified with the nation opposed EU membership, while 
people who were proud of their nationality supported it.  Presumably Baltic nationalists 
disagreed on what the EU membership would mean for the nation.  Would it subordinate 
Lithuania and Estonia to their Polish and German masters of old or protect their newly-
gained independence from Russia?  Would it undermine their unique Baltic or Finno-
                                                          
29
 The calculations are based on Zeff (2004), 176, 280.  See also Auštrevičius (2007), 225-258 and 
Streimann (2007), 157-187.     
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Ugric culture or reinforce their European (non-Slavic) cultural identity?  Would it allow 
them to keep their strict language and citizenship laws or force them to liberalize these 
policies?  This would explain why prior researchers have come to different conclusions 
about the relationship between Baltic nationalism and EU support, depending on whether 
they have operationalized nationalism as national identity (Vetik, Nimmerfelt and Taru 
2006) or national pride (Whitefield, Rohrschneider and Alisauskiene 2006). 
 
Table 4.2: Cognition or Calculation? Regression Results 
 Unstandardized Coeffient 
(Standard Error) 
Substantive 
Significance 
Independent Variables Lithuania Estonia Lithuania Estonia 
A) ATTITUDES AND APTITUDES 
Cognitive mobilization 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.01 (0.03) 64% - 
National pride 0.31 (0.05)*** 0.29 (0.07)*** 93% 87% 
National identity -0.41 (0.06)*** -0.37 (0.07)*** -123% -111% 
Pro-EU party
a 
-0.12 (0.09) 0.24 (0.14)* - 24% 
Anti-EU party
a 
0.01 (0.14) -0.02 (0.14) - - 
Trust the government  0.25 (0.09)*** 0.38 (0.11)*** 25% 38% 
Personal situation got better
b 
0.07 (0.1) 0.08 (0.13) - - 
Personal situation got worse
b
 0.03 (0.1) -0.69 (0.13)*** - -69% 
B) SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
Sex -0.29 (0.08)*** 0.06 (0.11) -29% - 
Age 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) - - 
Ethnicity -0.6 (0.19)*** 0.03 (0.14) -60% - 
Income -0.01 (0.02) 0.07 (0.03)** - 63% 
Up to 16
c 
-0.12 (0.13) 0.12 (0.15) - - 
20 or above
c 
0.03 (0.1) 0.02 (0.14) - - 
Still studying
c 
0.03 (0.17) 0.55 (0.24)** - 55% 
Blue-collar
d
 0.08 (0.11) -0.03 (0.15) - - 
White-collar
d 
0.11 (0.12) 0.14 (0.17) - - 
Rural
e 
-0.12 (0.09) -0.02 (0.13) - - 
 R
2 
= 24% R
2 
= 26% N = 615 N = 630 
Note: I rounded up all coefficients and standard errors to the nearest percentage point.   
* Coefficient is significant at the 10% level (p  0.10). 
** Coefficient is significant at the 5% level (p  0.05). 
*** Coefficient is significant at the 1% level (p  0.01). 
a ―Do not know‖ or ―would not vote‖ are the reference category. 
b ―Life has stayed about the same‖ is the reference category. 
c
 Stopped studying at age 17-19 is the reference category. 
d
 Nor working is the reference category. 
e
 Urban is the reference category. 
Source: CCEB 2003.2 (May 2003). 
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Moving on to politics, Lithuanians and Estonians who trusted the government 
were more likely to support the EU than those who did not, as Franklin et al (1994, 1995) 
and Ehin (2001) predict.  This makes sense because the governments dominated the 
accession process in both countries.  They negotiated the EU accession agreements with 
minimal consultation with the parliament or interest groups (e.g., business and labor) 
(Raik 2004; Sissenich 2007, chap. 7).  They also ran active pro-EU ―information‖ 
campaigns, arguing that EU accession would increase economic growth and allow the 
state to spend more money on social programs (Auštrevičius 2005; Past and Palk 2005).  
However, the relationship between trust and EU support was stronger in Estonia (37%) 
than in Lithuania (25%), although more Estonians (54%) than Lithuanians (32%) trusted 
the government (see Table 4.3).  As I will argue in the next chapter, this may reflect the 
fact that Lithuania pursued an insider-oriented strategy of economic reform, while 
Estonia followed an outsider-oriented strategy. 
Party preferences, on the other hand, affected EU support in Estonia, where 
voters of pro-EU parties were 24% more like to support EU membership than people who 
did not have a party preference, but not in Lithuania.  This is what we would expect.  In 
Lithuania, all major parties, including the governing post-Communist Social Democrats, 
supported EU membership as a way of modernizing the Lithuanian economy and 
increasing living standards (Maţylis and Unikaitė 2004; Auštrevičius 2005; Duvold and 
Jurkynas 2006).  Foreign investment and EU financial aid would improve Lithuanian 
infrastructure and create new, high-paying jobs.  Better access to EU markets would 
allow Lithuanian farmers to compete with European producers.  By contrast, the largest 
party in Estonia, the left-populist Centrists, opposed EU accession on current terms 
because it would hurt domestic producers and the poor (Savisaar 1999, Part III; Mikkel 
and Kasekamp 2005; Sikk 2006).  EU sanitary standards and environmental regulations 
would bankrupt Estonian farmers, small businessmen, and the oil-shale-based energy 
industry.  EU-imposed tariffs and indirect taxes would increase prices. 
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 Table 4.3: Similar Structure, Different Attitudes: The Distribution of Variables 
Variable  Lithuania Estonia 
A) ATTITUDES AND APTITUDES 
Support the EU (5-6)* 76 45 
Undecided/Indifferent (4)* 11 20 
Oppose the EU (2-3)* 13 35 
Knows little about the EU (0-4)* 64 63 
Knows a lot about the EU (5-9)* 36 37 
Proud of nation (3-4)* 63 62 
Not proud of nation (1-2)* 37 38 
Identifies mainly with nation (3-4)*  86 83 
Identifies mainly with Europe (1-2)* 14 17 
Would vote for pro-EU party 38 30 
Would vote for anti-EU party 9 35 
Does not know or would not vote 53 35 
Trusts government 32 54 
Does not trust government  68 46 
Personal situation got better 25 31 
Personal situation stayed about the same 39 41 
Personal situation got worse 36 28 
B) SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
Male 47 45 
Female 53 55 
Young (15-29)* 26 26 
Middle-aged (30-59)* 50 48 
Old (60 and above)* 24 26 
Balt 93 72 
Slav  7 28 
Poor (1-3)* 40 33 
Middle-income (4-7)* 51 54 
Rich (8-10)* 9 13 
Stopped studying at age 16 22 21 
Stopped studying at age 17-19 31 40 
Stopped studying at age 20 or above 30 26 
Still studying
 
15 13 
Blue-collar
 
18 20 
White-collar 26 32 
Not working
 
56 47 
Rural
 
30 32 
Urban
 
70 68 
*The numbers in the brackets refer to the collapsed values of the continuous variables. 
Source: CCEB 2003.2 (May 2003). 
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Interestingly, however, Estonians who did not have a party preference were as 
likely to oppose the EU as those who supported anti-EU parties.  This suggests that while 
some Euroskeptics took their cues from anti-EU parties, as Cichowski (2000) and 
Anderson and Tverdova (2004) argue, others responded to a favorable political 
opportunity structure created by elite conflict over European integration (Tarrow 1998, 
chap. 5).  By criticizing the terms of the accession, the Centrists gave Euroskeptics 
intellectual ammunition.  Estonia‘s accession treaty with the EU consisted of 4,900 pages 
of dense, bureaucratic text.
30
  The Centrists took the parts that hurt Estonian interests 
(e.g., energy, agriculture, and indirect taxes) and popularized them.  The Centrists also 
helped to increase the social prestige of Euroskepticism.  At first, public opposition to the 
EU was limited to the extra-parliamentary Independence and Labor parties, which most 
people either a) had not heard of or b) considered extremist.  The Centrists showed that 
―reasonable‖ people could have doubts about the EU (Noelle-Neumann 1991, chap. 17).   
How much did economic resources perceptions influence EU support in Lithuania 
and Estonia?  In Lithuania, men were 29% more likely to vote for the EU than women, 
while ethnic Lithuanians were 60% more supportive of the accession than ethnic Slavs.  
On balance, men and Lithuanians probably stood to benefit more—or lose less—from EU 
accession than women and Slavs.  For example, men could go and work on Europe‘s 
farms and construction sites, while women would have to stay at home and take care of 
children.  Ethnic Lithuanians could visit their relatives in Europe and America, while 
ethnic Slavs would be cut off from their families in the former Soviet Union.  However, 
none of the most direct indicators of socio-economic status—e.g., income and 
education—had any impact on EU support in Lithuania.  By contrast, the Estonian case 
clearly supports Gabel‘s (1998 a, chap. 2; b) argument that economically competitive 
                                                          
30
 The accompanying acquis communautaire—the EU law—was about 80,000 pages long.   See Anna 
Grzymala-Busse and Abby Innes, ―Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East 
Central Europe,‖ East European Politics and Societies, 17, no. 3 (2003): 65. 
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individuals are more supportive of the EU than their non-competitive peers.  Thus, the 
rich were 69% more likely to support EU membership than the poor, while students were 
55% more likely to do so than non-students.   
This brings us to the most interesting result of my analysis, which concerns the 
relationship between subjective (economic) well-being and EU support.  In Lithuania, 
perceived (economic) changes in the previous five years had no impact on EU support.
31
  
In Estonia, by contrast, people who felt that their (economic) situation had worsened 
were 69% less likely to support EU accession than those who felt that their (economic) 
situation had stayed the same.  This is not because Estonians are a particularly 
discontented bunch: fewer Estonians (28%) than Lithuanians (36%) believed that their 
situation had worsened, while more Estonians (31%) than Lithuanians (25%) believed 
that their situation had improved.  Rather, the difference between Estonia and Lithuania 
is that unhappy Estonians blamed the EU for their misery, while unhappy Lithuanians did 
not, a possibility that the existing literature ignores (Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002; 
Herzog and Tucker 2008; but see Christin 2004 for a different contextual argument).   
Conclusion 
 This chapter has considered three sets of theories explaining why some people in 
Eastern (and Western) Europe are more supportive of European integration than others: 
cultural and cognitive, political, and economic.  The cognitive approach asserts that 
voters support European integration if they are ―cognitively mobilized‖: the more people 
know about the EU, the less likely they are to have irrational fears about joining the 
union.  Cultural theories contend that opposition to the EU is stronger among voters who 
hold nationalist and materialist values because they see European integration as a threat 
                                                          
31
 The reader is entitled to ask whether the results would be any different if I used Tucker, Pacek and 
Berinsky‘s (2002) index of winners and losers, which combines past and future (expected) economic 
changes.  The answer is that this variable would still have a much weaker, albeit statistically significant, 
effect on EU support in Lithuania than in Estonia.   
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to their country‘s political sovereignty, national identity, and traditional values.  Political 
explanations hold that voters are more likely to support EU accession if they trust the 
politicians who conduct the accession negotiations.  They also maintain that voters look 
to their favorite political party for cues on what to make of the EU. 
  Finally, economic theories argue that voters support the EU depending on either 
their a) objective socio-economic status or b) subjective economic well-being.  Scholars 
working on Western Europe have argued that economically competitive individuals (the 
rich, the educated, and white-collar workers) are more supportive of European integration 
than non-competitive individuals (the poor, the uneducated, and blue-collar workers) 
because they are more likely to benefit from increased mobility of labor and capital.  
Students of East European politics have suggested that the ―winners‖ of the transition to 
capitalism (people who believe that their economic situation is improving and who 
support the market economy) are more likely to support joining the EU than the ―losers‖ 
(people who think that their economic situation is worsening and who oppose the market) 
because they see EU accession as a continuation of market-oriented economic reforms. 
How well did these different theories work in Lithuania and Estonia?  Cultural 
theories did poorly.  Post-materialist values did not have any influence on EU support 
because almost all Lithuanians and Estonians turned out to be materialists (at least if 
concern for the environment is a valid measure of post-materialism.)  Surprisingly, 
nationalism was equally useless as a predictor of EU support because nationalist voters 
disagreed on whether the EU was good or bad for the nation.  Political theories fared 
better.  In both countries, people who trusted the government were more supportive of the 
EU than those who did not, presumably because governments dominated the EU 
accession process.  In Estonia, voters of pro-EU parties were more likely to support EU 
membership than voters of anti-EU parties and people who did not have a party 
preference.  However, this relationship did not hold in Lithuania where all major parties 
supported EU accession.     
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The most important and original contribution of this chapter, however, has been to 
show that the relationship between cognitive and economic variables and EU support 
depended on national context.  Knowledge about the EU increased support for EU 
membership in Lithuania, but not in Estonia.  Objective lack of economic resources (at 
least as defined by Gabel 1998 a, b) and subjective economic discontent reduced EU 
support in Estonia, but not in Lithuania.  These findings are consistent with some recent 
comparative studies on EU support in Western Europe, which argue that socio-economic 
status and support for economic redistribution more strongly in some countries than 
others (Brinegar, Jolly and Kitschelt 2004; Ray 2003, 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005).  
However, they challenge much of the existing literature on Eastern Europe, which has 
sought to establish universal causal patterns.  The next chapter will explain why national 
context matters, and how. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INSIDERS OR OUTSIDERS?  STRATEGIES OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN 
LITHUANIA AND ESTONIA 
Introduction 
This dissertation has compared Lithuanian and Estonian attitudes toward the EU 
using CA of newspapers and statistical analysis of survey data.  Two main results have 
emerged from my analysis.  First, at the time of the EU referendum, many Lithuanians 
and Estonians felt that their (country‘s) economic situation had worsened during the 
transition to capitalism.  Full employment had given way to high unemployment.  Real 
incomes had dropped.  Basic infrastructure (e.g., railways and power plants) was falling 
apart.  Second, Lithuanians and Estonians had different economic expectations about the 
EU.  Most Lithuanians believed that joining the EU would solve their (country‘s) 
economic problems by encouraging foreign investment and trade and allowing 
Lithuanians to work abroad.  By contrast, many Estonians believed that joining the EU 
would make their (country‘s) economic problems worse by driving domestic producers 
bankrupt and allowing foreigners to take control of Estonian local resources.   
Why did Lithuanians and Estonians have such different economic expectations 
about the EU even though they were both unhappy about their (country‘s) current 
economic situation?  The existing literature on cross-national differences in EU support is 
not very helpful in answering this question because it has paid more attention to politics 
and culture than economics.  The (very) few economically-minded works have focused 
on quantitative and macro-economic differences in the candidate countries‘ economic 
performance—and produced contradictory results.  Some authors have found that 
countries that are doing well economically (e.g., in terms of growth) are more supportive 
of the EU than countries that are doing badly, while others have come to the opposite 
conclusion.  In this chapter, however, I will argue that we need to analyze the qualitative 
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and micro-economic differences between East European economies to explain why some 
countries strongly supported EU membership, while others came close to rejecting the 
accession.    
Using statistical data, newspaper accounts, and secondary literature, I will show 
that Lithuania and Estonia pursued different strategies of economic reform.
 32 
 Lithuania 
followed an insider-oriented strategy.  It maintained public ownership of basic 
infrastructure (e.g., railways and power plants) and sold other state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) to their Soviet-era managers.  It imposed moderate tariffs on imports, especially 
of agricultural products, and continued to trade heavily with Russia until the 1998 
financial crisis.  By contrast, Estonia followed an outsider-oriented strategy.  It sold 
SOEs, including infrastructure enterprises, to foreign investors, especially Swedes, Finns, 
and Americans.  It abolished all import tariffs and rapidly reoriented its trade from Russia 
to the EU.  This explains why Lithuanians saw EU accession as an alternative to their 
country’s current economic policies, while Estonians saw the accession as a continuation 
of such policies.   
Neither strategy worked particularly well, however.  The Lithuanian strategy 
helped to protect output and employment in agriculture and ―old‖ industries (e.g., food 
processing and oil refining), which had been equipped with the latest Soviet technology 
and which benefited from continued access to the Russian market.  However, it slowed 
down the development of services and ―new‖ industry (e.g., electronics), where the 
existing equipment was obsolete.  The Estonian strategy led to the growth of the services 
and ―new‖ industry, which received a lot of foreign direct investment (FDI) and could 
export their products to the West duty-free.  However, it harmed agriculture and ―old‖ 
                                                          
32
 For a similar argument, see  Béla Greskovits and Dorothee Bohle, ―Development Paths on Europe‘s 
Periphery: Hungary‘s and Poland‘s Return to Europe Compared,‖ Polish Sociological Review 1, 33 (2001): 
3-27, who compare the ―foreign-led‖ transition in Hungary with the ―state-led transition‖ in Poland.  See 
also Lawrence P. King, ―Postcommunist Divergence: A Comparative Analysis of the Transition to 
Capitalism in Poland and Russia,‖ Studies in Comparative International Development 37, 3 (Fall 2002), 3-
34 and who compares ―capitalism from without‖ in Poland with ―capitalism from above‖ in Russia.  
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industry (e.g., food processing), which received little FDI and were subject to high tariffs 
in both Eastern and Western markets.  Neither strategy could prevent the decline of 
infrastructure, although the Lithuanian strategy slowed it down while the Estonian 
strategy sped it up.  As a result, both Lithuanians and Estonians were dissatisfied with 
their (country’s) economic situation.   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.  The next section will analyze 
Lithuania‘s insider-oriented reforms and their sectoral consequences.  The following 
section will discuss Estonia‘s outsider-oriented strategy.  The conclusion will conclude.    
Lithuania: Insider-Oriented Reforms 
Lithuania pursued an insider-oriented strategy of transition to capitalism.  In the 
1992 general election, the post-Communist Democratic Labor Party won a landslide 
victory by promising to manage the transition to the market economy more competently 
and compassionately than their conservative opponents.  A key element of their reform 
program was voucher privatization.  All residents of Lithuania received vouchers based 
on their age: older people got more vouchers.  The vouchers could be used to buy 
apartments, land, and—through investment funds set up by enterprise employees—shares  
in enterprises undergoing privatization.
33
  Enterprises where voucher privatization was 
impracticable—the Ignalina nuclear power plant, the Maţeikiu Nafta oil company, 
Lithuanian Gas, Lithuanian Railways, Lithuanian Airlines, the ports, the major banks, 
and Lithuanian Telecom—were excluded from privatization until 2000.34    
                                                          
33
 More controversially, they could also be sold for cash. 
 
34
 OECD, The Baltic States: A Regional Economic Assessment (Paris: OECD, 2000), 30-32; V. Stanley 
Vardys and Judith B. Sedaitis, Lithuania: The Rebel Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 197-
201; Thomas Lane, Lithuania: Stepping Westward (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 140-143, 
174-179; Albertas Šimėnas, ―Formation of the Market Economy in Lithuania,‖ in Lithuanian Economic 
Reforms: Practice and Perspectives, ed. Antanas Buračas, Dean M. Larson and Joseph P. Kairys (Vilnius: 
Margi Raštai, 1997), 17-62; Andres Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet 
Bloc (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 272-274; Ian Jeffries, The Countries 
of the Former Soviet Union at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century: The Baltic and European States in 
Transition (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 245-255.    
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In principle, foreigners were encouraged to participate in the privatization 
process: some firms (e.g., the Lietuva hotel in Vilnius, the Kaunas Confectionary, and  
Klaipėda Tobacco) were even set aside for hard-currency sales to the highest bidder.  In  
practice, however, foreign investors encountered numerous legal and bureaucratic 
obstacles.  In 1992-1994, three ministries were in charge of privatization: finance, 
economics, and a branch ministry (e.g., industry or commerce).  This slowed down 
privatization because potential investors had to get three different permissions.  Equally 
important, the Lithuanian constitution of 1992 prohibited foreigners from buying land.  
The constitution was amended in 1996 to allow foreign investors to purchase non-
agricultural land accompanying real estate, but they still had to apply for permission from 
the local (county) government to do so.
35
     
The privatization process was insider-oriented in another way as well: there were  
significant advantages for enterprise employees.  Workers and managers could purchase 
up to 50% of the shares in the firm where they worked at a special low rate before the 
bidding was opened to the general public.  The post-Communist government argued that 
this was the fairest method of privatization because it would turn workers, whose hard 
work had built up the enterprises, into owners.  In practice, however, the preference for 
insiders meant that most SOEs became the private property of enterprise managers, the 
main financial backers of the post-Communists.  Managers dominated the investment 
funds that company employees set up to purchase enterprises from the state.  Managers 
also bought up vouchers from impoverished workers—both at their own plant and at 
other SOEs—at a fraction of the their nominal value.36     
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Lane, Lithuania, 177-179; Albertas Šimėnas, ―Lithuania‘s Economy During the Period of Reforms,‖ in 
Lithuanian Economic Reforms, ed. Buračas, Larson and Kairys, 63-74; Valdas Samonis, ―Economic 
Reforms in the Baltics: The Case of Lithuania,‖ in Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Perspectives and Approaches, ed. Demetrius S. Iatridis and June Gary Hopps (Westport and London: 
Praeger, 1998), 73-84.  
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 OECD, The Baltic States, 30-32; Samonis, ―Economic Reforms,‖ 73-84; Šimėnas, ―Lithuania‘s 
Economy,‖ 63-74; Jeffries, Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 245-255. 
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The post-Communist government also pursued a modest industrial policy to help 
Lithuanian producers survive the transition from socialism to capitalism.  It tried to 
restructure enterprises slated for privatization by changing their profile, breaking them 
into smaller units, or establishing ―daughter companies.‖  It also wrote off their tax 
arrears and, in some cases, lent them money at below-market interest rates.  Finally, it 
passed a bankruptcy law that made it difficult for banks to take delinquent firms to court 
and gave regional authorities the right to ―review‖ (i.e., stop) bankruptcy proceedings 
against large employers.  The government also subsidized Lithuanian farmers.  It set a 
target price for most agricultural products and purchased the ―surplus‖ production from 
the farmers at that price.  It also provided export subsides to the most competitive 
branches of Lithuanian agriculture, dairy farming and livestock breeding.
37
    
Lithuanian trade policy under the post-Communists was moderately protectionist 
and oriented towards Russia.  While the average mean tariff was low (3% in the 1997), 
tariffs on agricultural goods were as high as 50-90%.  Lithuania also imposed quantitative 
restrictions on agricultural imports in areas where Lithuanian producers were not 
competitive (e.g., cereals).  Until the 1998 financial crisis, Lithuania continued to trade 
heavily with Russia.  This was, in part, because the Russian market remained open to 
Lithuania: in 1993, Russia and Lithuania granted each other most-favored-nation status.  
However, the nomenklatura owners of Lithuanian firms also preferred to sell their goods 
in Russia where they had prior contacts and which they considered a less demanding 
market.  Lithuania‘s approach to Western trade was cautious: its 1995 association 
agreement with the EU provided for a six-year transition period to free trade.
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In the 1996 general election, the conservative Homeland Union and the clerical 
Christian Democratic Union defeated the Laborites by promising to fight corruption, put 
an end to ―nomenklatura privatization,‖ and reorient Lithuanian trade to the West.  True 
to its election promises, the new government adopted more outsider-oriented economic 
policies.  The constitution was changed to allow foreign citizens to buy non-agricultural 
land.  Many remaining SOEs—mostly banks and semi-infrastructure firms like the 
Lithuanian Telecom, Lithuanian Shipping, and Lithuanian Gas—were sold to foreign—
mostly Nordic and German—investors.  (However, one third of Lithuanian Gas was sold 
to its main supplier, the Russian Gazprom.)  The country‘s largest firm, the Maţeikiu 
Nafta oil refinery, was sold to an American company.  A new bankruptcy law was passed 
that made it easier for creditors and suppliers to take delinquent firms to court.
39
     
However, the conservative government did not go all the way in liberalizing and  
Westernizing Lithuanian economic policy.  The most important infrastructure 
enterprises—the power plants and the railways—remained public property, although the 
conservatives considered privatizing the railway.  Several banks, too, stayed in state 
hands, including the Savings Bank, Lithuania‘s largest financial institution, and the 
Agricultural Bank, the main creditor of the country‘s farm industry.  The new bankruptcy 
law notwithstanding, the government rarely started bankruptcy proceedings against firms 
that owed the state back taxes.  Although foreign investors were allowed to buy land 
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accompanying real estate, the ban foreign ownership of agricultural land remained in 
place.  While industrial subsidies were cut, agricultural subsidies were increased.  
Lithuania also maintained tariffs on Western agricultural imports since Western countries 
declined to remove theirs.  As a result, as Table 5.1 indicates, Lithuania received little 
FDI and continued to trade heavily with Russia.
40
 
Table 5.1: Ties That Bind: Foreign Investment and Trade in Lithuania and Estonia 
in 2003 
 Lithuania Estonia 
Private sector share in GDP (%) 75 80 
Foreign direct investment per capita, 1989-2003 ($) 1067 2402 
Share of trade in GDP (%) 93 119 
Share of trade with non-transition countries (%) 64 72 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 2004 (London: EBRD, 2004), 45, 124 and 151. 
In the 2000 election, an alliance of post-Communists and ―historic‖ Social 
Democrats won a plurality of the vote by accusing the conservatives of selling off 
―strategic enterprises‖ to unscrupulous foreigners.  After a year of parliamentary 
infighting, the Social Democrats formed a coalition with the centrist Social Liberals.  For 
the most part, the new government continued the conservative policy of privatizing SOEs 
through direct sales to foreign investors.  Thus, it sold the Savings Bank to the Swedish 
Swedbank and the Agricultural Bank to the German Norddeutsche Landesbank.  
However, unlike the conservatives, it was willing to approve the resale of privatized 
SOEs to Russian investors.  For example, it allowed Russia‘s Konversbank to purchase 
Snoras Bankas from its Luxembourg-based owners and encouraged Williams to sell 
Maţeikiu Nafta to its main supplier of crude oil, the Russian Yukos.  It also sold the  
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national airline to a consortium consisting of domestic construction and electronics firms  
and a Turkish travel agency.
41
 
As Table 5.2 shows, Lithuania‘s insider-oriented strategy was not particularly 
successful in promoting growth and protecting jobs.  Lithuania‘s per capita GDP was 
smaller in 2003 ($12,000) than it had been in 1990 ($12,566), while unemployment had 
increased from essentially zero to 12%.  However, these aggregate figures conceal 
significant differences between sectors.  Lithuanian agriculture did quite well in terms of 
employment: relative employment in agriculture remained constant at 18-19% in 1990-
2003.  Import tariffs protected Lithuanian farmers against larger and more efficient 
Western agribusinesses.  Continued access to the Russian market allowed farmers to 
export goods that the small domestic market could not absorb.  However, agricultural 
output declined from 17-27% of the GDP in 1990-1991 to 6% in 2003.
42
  Many farmers 
could no longer afford to purchase agricultural inputs (e.g., gasoline, machinery, and 
fertilizers), whose price shot up to word market levels.  Farm exports to Russia fell 
significantly after the 1998 Russian financial crisis when Russia devalued its currency.
43
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Table 5.2: Muddling Through: Output and Employment in Lithuania and Estonia 
in 1990-2003 
 Lithuania Estonia 
 1990 2003 1990 2003 
A) Output 
GDP per capita at PPP (2005$) 12,566 12,000 10,194 13,906 
Composition of GDP (%) (1991 data in brackets) 
…Agriculture 27 (17) 6 17 (18) 4 
…Industry 31 (51) 32 50 (40) 29 
…Services 42 (33) 62 34 (42) 68 
B) Employment 
Unemployment rate (%) - 12 1 10 
Structure of employment (%) 
…Agriculture 19 18 21 6 
…Industry 41 28 37 32 
…Services 39 54 42 61 
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators Online, 
http://publications.worldbank/WDI/. 
Lithuanian industry did poorly in terms of both output, which declined from 31-
50% of the GDP to 32%, and employment, which dropped from 40-41% to 28% of the 
workforce (see Table 5.2).  However, as Table 5.3 shows, the decline was not uniform.  
Output and employment remained at Soviet-era levels (relative to total output and 
employment) in food processing, textiles, and oil refining.  Fitted out with the latest 
Soviet technology in the 1980s, these industries had a small quality gap with the West 
and benefited from continued access to the Russian.  By contrast, output and employment 
declined in the technologically most advanced sectors of Lithuanian industry, such 
machinery and electronics.  With a few exceptions (e.g., the refrigerator maker Snaigė), 
these industries had a large quality gap with the West.  As a result, they rapidly lost their 
market share in Russia (and Lithuania itself) when Western products became available.
44
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Table 5.3: Old and New: Manufacturing Output and Employment in Lithuania 
and Estonia in 1994-2003 (% of total) 
 Lithuania Estonia 
 1994 2003 1994 2003 
A) Output 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 31 21 36 18 
Textiles and textile products 12 13 9 11 
Leather and leather products 1 1 2 1 
Wood and wood products  3 7 5 16 
Pulp, paper, publishing and printing 4 5 6 8 
Petroleum products 25 19 0 0 
Chemical products and fibers 3 5 8 5 
Rubber and plastic products 1 5 2 4 
Other non-metallic mineral products 4 3 6 5 
Fabricated metal products  2 3 5 10 
Machinery and equipment n.e.s.* 5 3 2 3 
Electrical and optical equipment 6 9 6 8 
Transport equipment 1 2 5 5 
Manufacturing n.e.s.* 3 5 7 9 
B) Employment 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 19 20 21 15 
Textiles and textile products 22 23 20 19 
Leather and leather products 3 1 3 2 
Wood and wood products  6 11 8 14 
Pulp, paper, publishing and printing 3 5 5 6 
Petroleum products 1 2 0 0 
Chemical products and fibers 3 2 6 2 
Rubber and plastic products 1 3 1 3 
Other non-metallic mineral products 8 4 5 4 
Fabricated metal products  4 5 5 8 
Machinery and equipment n.e.s.* 10 4 6 4 
Electrical and optical equipment 13 8 7 8 
Transport equipment 4 3 5 4 
Manufacturing n.e.s.* 5 9 9 12 
*Not elsewhere specified. 
Source: Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (by request). 
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Unlike industry, Lithuania‘s service sector experienced significant development 
during the transition to capitalism: as Table 5.3 shows, the proportion of the workforce 
employed in services increased from 39-42% to 54% in 1990-2003, while the share of 
services in the GDP grew from 33-42% to 62%.  However, it would be a mistake to view 
this as evidence of the rapid modernization of the Lithuanian economy.  As Table 5.4 
makes clear, output and employment increased the most in relatively simple services, 
such as trade, where local entrepreneurs could earn a quick return on small amounts of 
capital.  For example, Lithuania‘s largest private employer at the time of the EU 
referendum was the domestically-owned VP Market retail chain.  By contrast, output and 
employment grew more slowly in complex services, such as finance and transportation 
and communications, which required large investments in technology and skills.
45
 
Table 5.4: Well Served: The Service Sector in Lithuania and Estonia in 2001 (% of 
total) 
 Gross Value Added Employment 
Type of Service Lithuania Estonia Lithuania Estonia 
Wholesale and retail trade 26 22 28 24 
Hotels and restaurants 2 2 3 5 
Real estate, renting, and business  14 17 7 11 
Transport and communications 21 25 10 15 
Financial intermediation 4 7 2 2 
Other services* 32 27 50 42 
*Health care, education, social services, and public administration. 
Source: Own calculations from OECD, Promoting Trade in Services: The Experience of 
the Baltic States (Paris: OECD, 2004), 17. 
As discussed above, an important element of Lithuania‘s insider-oriented reform 
strategy was state ownership of ―strategic‖ enterprises, such as power plants and 
railways.  At the time of the EU referendum, about 70% of Lithuania‘s electricity was 
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produced at the state-owned Ignalina nuclear power plant (INPP) in southeastern 
Lithuania.  To protect the competitiveness of Lithuanian firms and to prevent social 
unrest, the Lithuanian government kept the price of electricity low (at about the cost of 
production).  It also forbade the plant to cut off non-paying customers.  Some liberal 
economists argued that INPP should be allowed to operate like a normal, profit-oriented 
enterprise.  However, nobody suggested privatizing the plant because it had a monopoly 
position in the Lithuanian market.  Moreover, only the state had the qualified personnel 
(Russian-trained nuclear engineers and technicians) to operate the plant.
46
   
However, INPP became the most contentious issue in Lithuania‘s accession 
negotiations with the EU in 2000-2003.  The EU considered the plant unsafe and required 
Lithuania to close it down as a precondition for membership.  Some analysts predicted 
that this would lead to widespread social protest.  For two reasons, however, it did not.  
First, the Lithuanian public was divided on whether INPP should be kept open or not.  On 
the one hand, INPP produced the bulk of Lithuania‘s electricity and did so very cheaply.  
On the other hand, however, it was an RMBK facility—the same type that exploded at 
Chernobyl in 1986—prone to technical problems.47  Second, it seemed that Lithuania 
could afford to close INPP.  The EU allowed Lithuania to shut it down gradually, the first 
reactor in 2004 and the second in 2009.  This gave Lithuania time to modernize its 
existing gas-fueled power plants and to build new ones.  The EU also agreed to pay part  
of the cost of closing INPP, such as storing the nuclear waste and finding new jobs for the 
plants workers.  In this context, EU demands did not seem unreasonable.
48
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Lithuania also inherited from the Soviet Union a well-developed railway system, 
which handled the bulk of passenger and freight transportation within Lithuania and 
between Lithuania and other Soviet republics.  After the breakup of the Soviet Union,  
the number of passengers traveling by railway fell as many people bought used Western  
cars or switched to buses.  Hence, passenger rail service started losing money.  Freight 
transportation—especially the transit of Russian raw materials to Europe—should have 
been quite profitable given Lithuania‘s favorable geographical location between Russia, 
Poland, and Germany.  However, as with electricity, the state kept freight tariffs low and 
used the (small) profits from freight traffic to subsidize passenger transportation.  As a 
result, the railway could not afford to rebuild the track or buy new rolling stock.
49
     
To deal with these problems, the conservative government of 1996-2000 
considered a) splitting the railway into a track arm and a passenger arm and b) privatizing 
both of them, preferably to Western investors.  However, the Social Democrat-led 
government of 2001-2004 scrapped these plans.  On balance, this was probably the right  
decision.  Combining passenger and cargo services allowed the state to continue to 
provide passenger transportation in rural areas where roads are bad or non-existent.  Low 
prices helped Lithuania to increase its share in the transit of Russian raw materials to 
Europe even though Lithuanian ports were not originally designed for this purpose.  After 
Lithuania joined the EU, state ownership made the Lithuanian railway eligible for EU 
structural funds since the EU only subsidizes railroads where the state is the majority  
owner.  As a result, the Lithuanian railway is in relatively good shape.
50
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The one exception to Lithuania‘s policy of not privatizing basic infrastructure was 
the Maţeikiu Nafta (MN) oil company.  It includes an oil export terminal, an oil pipeline, 
and, most importantly, the largest oil refinery in the Baltic states in the town of Maţeikai 
in western Lithuania.  Fitted out with the latest Soviet technology in the 1980s, it was 
Lithuania‘s largest enterprise under Communism.  It purchased cheap crude oil from 
Russia and turned it into various oil products—gasoline, diesel, kerosene and jet fuel—
which it sold back to Russia at a handsome profit.  After the Soviet Union disintegrated, 
MN fell onto hard times.  The price of Russian oil increased, while Russian demand for 
refined oil products declined.  At the same time, Western markets remained closed to 
MN, whose products did not meet EU environmental standards and whose managers 
lacked connections in the West.  As a result, MN began losing money.
51
   
The conservative government of 1996-2000 decided that the only way to solve 
MN‘s problems was to find it a Western partner.  In 1999, it sold 33% of the stake in MN 
and the management rights to the Oklahoma-based Williams International.  It was not 
clear why this particular ―strategic investor‖ was chosen because no open bid was held.  
The sale price was a low $150 million for a company that produced 6% of Lithuania‘s 
GDP.  However, Williams promised to replace the Soviet-era equipment with American 
technology and to reorient MN‘s exports to Western Europe.  These hopes were soon 
disappointed.  In 1999-2002, Williams invested $58 million in MN, mostly to repair 
existing facilities.  At the same time, it borrowed $288 million from the state to cover 
MN‘s continuing losses caused by irregular oil supplies from Russia, weak sales in 
Russia and Europe, and the high salaries of American executives.
52
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The privatization of MN led to an anti-Western backlash.  After the parliament 
approved the contract with Williams, thousands of people gathered in front of the 
parliament to protest against the sell-off of the Lithuanian economy to greedy foreigners.  
Public support for EU membership dropped below 50%, the lowest ever.
53
  However, in 
2002, Williams resold its stake in MN to Yukos, its largest supplier of crude oil, which 
also purchased another 27% of the shares from the state, for a total of $235 million.  Like 
Williams, Yukos invested little in new technology and made no headway in the European 
market.  It also failed to pay back the loans that MN had received from the state under 
Williams‘ stewardship, although the Social Democrat-led government cut the interest rate 
from the standard 10% to 7%.  Finally, it ran into trouble with the Russian government, 
which threatened to seize its assets in lieu of unpaid taxes.  As a result, people‘s anger 
over the poor performance of MN turned from the Americans to the Russians and support 
for Western integration rebounded.
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Estonia: Outsider-Oriented Reforms   
Unlike Lithuania, Estonia pursued an outsider-oriented strategy of reforms from 
the start.  The winner in the 1992 parliamentary election was the conservative Fatherland, 
which promised to ―clean the house‖ and reorient the Estonian economy to the West. The 
conservatives adopted international tenders as the main method of privatizing large 
SOEs.
55
  The government advertised forthcoming sales of SOEs in domestic and 
international newspapers (e.g., Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Financial Times, and 
the Wall Street Journal).  Interested investors submitted confidential bids to the Estonian 
Privatization Agency, modeled after the German Treuhandanstalt.  After preliminary 
negotiations with the tenderers, the government selected the best bid.  There were almost 
no advantages for insiders or restrictions for foreigners in the process.  No shares were set 
aside for managers and workers.  Domestic buyers had to pay in cash, just like foreign 
investors, although they were allowed to pay in installments.
 56
 
In general, the conservative government tried to choose investors that would be a 
good match for the enterprises being privatized.  For example, price was not the only 
factor in choosing the best bid: prior experience in the industry and willingness to meet 
investment and employment targets were equally important.  This could be seen as 
industrial policy of sorts.  However, the government did not pursue the more traditional 
industrial policies followed by the Lithuanian government.  Thus, it made no attempt to 
restructure enterprises before selling them off.  With the exception of one large textile 
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plant in the Russian-dominated northeast, it abolished all industrial subsidies, including 
tax rebates.  Finally, it passed a strict bankruptcy law that made it easy for the state and 
the banks to take delinquent firms to court and to seize their assets.
57
   
 The conservative government also welcomed foreign ―greenfield‖ investors.  
Estonian law allowed foreign investors to do everything local firms could do.  For  
example, foreigners could buy non-agricultural land and invest in all sectors of the  
economy.  The government also concluded investment protection treaties with the EU, 
the Nordic countries, and the US.  Under these treaties, foreign companies could 
repatriate profits and pay the same (low) taxes as domestic firms.  Disputes between the 
Estonian state and foreign firms were to be settled by international arbitrage courts.  
Finally, the government advertised Estonia as pro-business country.  It summarized its 
economic philosophy as ―Give us trade, not aid.‖  With funding from the World Bank, it 
paid Newsweek to publish a special supplement on ―The Little Country That Could.‖  As 
Table 5.1 illustrates, these efforts paid off: in 1989-2003, Estonia attracted about twice as 
much FDI per capita as Lithuania.
 58
    
Finally, Estonia followed a more liberal and Western-oriented trade policy than 
Lithuania.  In 1993, it abolished all import tariffs and quotas, a policy that it reaffirmed in 
its 1994 trade agreement and 1995 association agreement with the EU.  The EU agreed to 
free trade in principle, but imposed tariffs on Estonian agricultural products, which  
remained in place until 2004.  Until 1998, the EU also maintained quotas on Estonian  
goods in ―sensitive‖ industrial sectors, such as textiles and chemicals.  Despite EU  
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protectionism, however, Estonia rapidly reoriented its trade from Russia to the West.  
This was partly a matter of necessity: in 1994, Russia imposed punitive tariffs (double the 
most-favored-nation rate) on Estonian goods.  However, Western owners of Estonian 
firms also preferred to sell their goods in the more stable and (for them) familiar 
European markets.  These developments are reflected in Table 5.1: in 2003, Estonia 
traded more actively with Western countries than Lithuania.
59
        
In the 1995 general election, Estonians voted the conservatives out of office in 
favor of two centrist parties representing the interests of former mid-level nomenklatura: 
the urban Coalition Party (CP) and the Country People‘s Party (CPP).  The new 
government tweaked with Estonia‘s outsider-oriented policies.  Thus, domestic investors 
could use vouchers to buy up to 50% of stake in SOEs.  Farmers received modest export 
subsidies.  However, there was no fundamental change in economic strategy.  Sales for 
cash to foreign capitalists remained the preferred method of privatizing large SOEs.  For 
example, Estonian Telecom was sold to the Finnish and Swedish consortium 
TeliaSonera, Estonian Shipping to a Norwegian and American consortium called ESCO 
Holdings, and Estonian Air to Scandinavian Airlines.  Estonia‘s trade policy also 
remained the most liberal in Europe: the urban CP vetoed the rural CPU‘s proposal to re-
introduce import tariffs.
60
    
The 1999 general election produced contradictory results.  On the one hand, it 
marked the electoral breakthrough—from about 10% in the previous elections to about 
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25% in this and the following elections—of the left-populist Center Party, which 
promised to keep ―strategic enterprises‖ under state control and to protect domestic 
producers from unfair foreign competition.  However, the three parties that formed the 
new government—the conservative Fatherland Alliance, the liberal Reform Party, and the 
nominally social-democratic Moderates—blamed the CP/CPP for stalling economic 
reforms.  In 2000-2002, the new government privatized—or attempted to privatize—
Estonia‘s basic infrastructure.  It broke the national railway into an infrastructure arm and 
a passenger carrier and sold them to American and British investors.  It also signed a 
preliminary contract for the sale of the power plants to the US firm NRG Energy.
61
   
What results?   As Table 5.2 shows, Estonia‘s per capita GDP increased from 
$10,194 to $13,906 in 1990-2003, while unemployment increased from 1% to 10%.  The 
biggest beneficiary of Estonia‘s outsider-oriented strategy was the service sector: the 
share of services in the GDP increased from 34-42% in 1990-91 to 68% in 2003, while 
the proportion of workers employed in services grew from 42% to 61%.
62
  Services grew 
faster than other sectors because they the bulk of the FDI in Estonia.  At the time of the 
EU referendum, Swedes and Finns owned the Tallinn stock exchange and most Estonian 
banks, phone companies, department stores, and supermarkets.  Americans, Dutch, 
Germans, Norwegians and Danes owned the railway infrastructure, the oil transit firms, 
the (natural) gas distribution network, the shipping company, the national airline, and the 
largest private security firm.  Finally, foreign tourists made up the bulk of the clientele of  
Estonian hotels and spas, many of which were also owned by Western companies.
63
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As Table 5.2 indicates, Estonian industry did not do as well as services: in 1990-
2003, industrial output declined from 40-50% to 29% of the GDP while industrial 
employment fell from 37% to 32% of the workforce.  Relative to industry as a whole, 
output and employment increased in wood-processing and electrical and optical 
equipment (see Table 5.3).  These industries used local energy and/or raw materials, 
received a lot of FDI, and could export their products to the EU duty-free.  Textiles and 
clothing occupy a middle position: they used imported cotton but local electricity and 
were subject to EU quotas but not tariffs.  This allowed them to attract some FDI.  
Finally, production and employment fell in food processing, chemicals, and machinery 
and equipment.  These industries depended heavily on imported Russian energy and raw 
materials (chemicals and machine-building), were subject to high EU tariffs (food 
processing), and received little FDI (all of the above).
64
   
If the performance of Estonian industry was uneven, Estonian agriculture largely 
collapsed during the transition to capitalism.  As Table 5.2 makes clear, agricultural 
output declined from 17-18% of the GDP in 1990-91 to 4% in 2003, while agricultural 
employment fell from 19-21% of the workforce to 6%.  This was partly due to 
―objective‖ factors.  The price of agricultural inputs (oil, machinery, and fertilizers) 
increased much faster than the price of agricultural products.  Russia, traditionally the 
most important market for Estonian foodstuffs, imposed punitive tariffs on Estonian 
exports.  However, Estonia‘s free trade policy also contributed to the decline of Estonian 
agriculture.  On the one hand, Estonian farmers and food processors faced tough 
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competition from EU-subsidized European agribusinesses at home because Estonia had 
no agricultural (or any other) tariffs.  On the other hand, Estonian producers found it hard 
to enter European markets because the EU imposed high tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
(e.g., quality and sanitary requirements) on Estonian agricultural goods.
65
    
The biggest failure of Estonia’s outsider-oriented reform policies, however, was 
the (attempted) sale of infrastructure monopolies—railways and power plants—to 
Western investors in 2000-2002.
66
  The Estonian railway faced the same problems as its 
Lithuanian counterpart: unprofitable passenger service and lack of money to invest in the  
track and the rolling stock.  In 2000, the government split the railway into a) a track and 
freight arm (Eesti Raudtee) and b) a passenger arm (Edelaraudtee).  It sold Edelaraudtee 
to the British firm GB Railways, the only serious bidder in an open tender, for a modest 
$600,000.  For reasons that remain unclear, however, the Brits soon resold the company 
to two Estonian businessmen. The new owners doubled Edelaraudtee‘s share capital from 
$6 million to $12 million.  However, they discontinued much of Estonia‘s passenger rail 
traffic as unprofitable and laid off half of the company‘s 800 workers.67   
The cuts in passenger rail traffic led to the first significant social protest among  
ethnic Estonians since the breakup of the Soviet Union.  In Tartu, the largest city in the  
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rural southeast, the area most affected by the loss of train transportation, 4,000 people 
signed an open letter to the parliament and the president demanding the resignation of the 
government.  In the small towns and villages of the southeast, hundreds of people lined 
the railway track with burning candles on the night when the last train made its way from 
Tartu to Orava on the Russian border.  In the following weeks, smaller crowds gathered 
front of local government offices and abandoned train stations to demand the resumption 
of rail traffic.  Popular protest had some impact: the government provided subsidies to the 
worst-hit municipalities to start bus service.  However, people generally found buses to 
be inferior to trains because they were more expensive, operated at inconvenient times, 
and did not run when the roads were muddy or icy.
68
      
The privatization of Eesti Raudtee turned out to be even more complicated.  
Unlike the rolling stock, the track is a natural monopoly: there is only one track.  The 
track was also quite valuable economically because Russian oil companies used it to 
transport crude oil and bitumen to Europe.  As a result, the government decided to hire a 
Western consulting firm to advise it during the privatization process.  The European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the East European ―window‖ of the World 
Bank, offered to pay half of the consulting fee.  An international tender was held.  The 
best bid was made by PricewaterhouseCoopers, one of the ―big six‖ accounting firms, 
which offered to do the job for $800,000.  Upon the insistence of the EBRD, however, 
the government awarded the contract to GIBB, a small British firm with no experience in 
infrastructure privatization, which charged $2.4 million for its services.
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Things went from bad to worse with the privatization of Eesti Raudtee itself.  
Again, an open tender was held.  Bids were submitted by Raudtee Erastamise Rahva 
Aktsiaselts (RER), a group of Estonian transit traders, the Baltic Rail Service (BRS), a 
consortium that included the Chicago-based firm Rail World and the British company 
Jarvis International, and Rail Estonia (RE), a consortium led by two Americans, Antonio 
Angotti and John Orrison.  Based on GIBB‘s advice, the government sold 66% of the 
stake in Eesti Raudtee to RE, which offered to pay more than any other bidder: $100 
million.  Orrison said that the money would come from a loan from Chase Manhattan and 
Deutsche Bank.  When RE failed to pay the required $10 million deposit, however, it 
emerged that Orrison had never contacted the two banks.  Angotti turned out to be a 
common criminal: he had had been sentenced to 42 months in prison for fraud and money  
laundering and was wanted by the FBI for jumping bail.  Shortly, both men left Estonia.
70
   
With the would-be investors fleeing the country, the government re-sold Eesti 
Raudtee to BRS, the other foreign bidder, for $60 million.  In many ways, BRS was an 
improvement over RE.  It was owned by two really-existing railway firms with some 
experience in operating private railways in the US, UK and New Zealand.  In 2001-2005, 
it invested about $200 million of its own money in the railway.  In other ways, however, 
BRS behaved more like a rent-seeker than a ―strategic‖ investor.  It spent most of the 
$200 million on purchasing used locomotives from Rail World (i.e., from itself), which 
turned out to be too heavy for the Soviet-made track.  At the same time, it invested very 
little in the railway track.  As a result, the condition of the track deteriorated to the point 
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where, in some places, it was unsafe for trains to move faster than 25 km/h.  It also laid 
off 2,500 of Eesti Raudtee‘s 4,000 workers, most of whom could not find new jobs.  In 
2006, the government, which now included the left-populist Center Party, bought back 
the railway from BRS for $188 million, three times the original sale price.
71
   
The government also attempted to privatize the Narva power plants, the largest 
infrastructure enterprise in Estonia.  The plants produce about 90% of Estonia‘s 
electricity using local oil-shale.  They also employ about 2,000 people and, indirectly, 
provide jobs for about 4,000 oil-shale miners and transportation workers.  However, they 
are nearing the end of their useful life: without capital repairs, they will stop working by 
2016.  They are also Estonia‘s largest producer of carbon dioxide and other ―greenhouse 
gases.‖  In 1996, CP-led government decided to privatize the plants and started 
negotiations with a would-be ―strategic investor,‖ the Minnesota-based NRG Energy.  
The talks languished for a while because the CP‘s coalition partner, the rural CPP, 
opposed the privatization of infrastructure.  In 2000, however, the new conservative-led 
government signed a preliminary contract with NRG.  In doing so, it was advised by the 
British investment bank Schroders, which received $3 million for its services.
72
       
As with the privatization of the railway, the contract was never made public: only 
members of the parliament were allowed to see it.  Based on information leaked to the  
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media, however, the government sold 49% of the shares in the power plants, combined  
with full management rights, to NRG for $71 million.  Indirectly, the contract  
also gave NRG control over Estonian oil-shale mines since the power-plants own 51% of  
the shares in the mines.  The contract required the government to buy 75% of NRG‘s 
output until 2005 and 50% until 2015.  The price of electricity sold by the power plants to 
the state was to increase from 2.6 to up to 3.8 cents per kWh beginning in 2000, a higher 
rate than in Finland and Sweden.  At the same time, the price of oil-shale sold by the oil-
shale mines to the power plants was fixed at the current rate of $10 per ton until 2010.  
For its part, NRG promised to modernize the plants, reduce carbon dioxide emissions, 
and to protect jobs, but made no specific commitments.
73
    
The sale was unpopular with the public from the beginning because it would have  
increased the price of electricity and given a foreign company control of Estonia‘s power 
supply.  The government and NRG defended the deal as a necessary step towards 
Estonia‘s membership in NATO and the EU.  In 2001, however, the media reported that 
NRG did not plan to invest any of its own money in the plants, but wanted to use 
Estonian oil shale mines as collateral to borrow money from a consortium of banks led by 
France‘s Société Générale.  This enraged voters who were already unhappy about how 
the privatization of the railway was turning out.  163,000 people—out of Estonia’s total 
population of 1.4 million—signed a petition against the privatization of the power plants 
(and, somewhat belatedly, the railway).  Under popular pressure, the government  
canceled the sale in 2002.
 
 NRG responded by suing Estonia for breach of contract in a 
British arbitrage court, where the case is still dragging out.
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Conclusion  
This chapter set out to develop an economic explanation for why Lithuanians 
were more supportive of EU membership than Estonians.  The small existing literature on 
economic causes of cross-national differences in EU support in Eastern Europe has 
focused on macro-economic indicators like growth and unemployment.  Some scholars 
have argued that support for the EU is stronger in countries that are doing well 
economically.  They argue that the transition to capitalism in Eastern Europe (e.g., 
privatization and liberalization) has involved close economic integration with the 
Western Europe (e.g., through foreign investment and trade).  As a result, people credit 
(or blame) the EU for their country‘s good (or bad) economic performance.  Other 
scholars, however, argue that EU support is stronger in countries that are experiencing 
economic difficulties.  Joining the EU, they argue, means giving up part of a nation‘s  
economic sovereignty.  People are willing to do that if their country needs EU help but  
not if it is doing fine on its own. 
However, Lithuania and Estonia pose a problem for these macro-economic 
explanations. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, both countries have experienced 
slow growth and a large increase in unemployment, yet most Lithuanians supported EU 
membership, while many Estonians did not.  To explain this puzzle, I decided to explore 
micro-economic changes in the two countries.  I found that Lithuania and Estonia 
pursued different strategies of economic reform.  Lithuania followed an insider-oriented 
strategy.  It maintained state ownership of infrastructure (e.g., railways) and sold other 
SOEs to their Soviet-era managers.  It imposed moderate tariffs on imports and continued 
to trade heavily with Russia.  By contrast, Estonia adopted an outsider-oriented strategy.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Euroliidust väljajäämisega,‖ Eesti Päevaleht, 18 December 2001; Vallo Toomet and Jaanus Piirsalu, ―Eesti 
Energia keeldus välispankade nõudmistest,‖ Eesti Päevaleht, 16 November 2001; Andres Reimer, 
―Elektrijaamade erastamine kukkus läbi,‖ Äripäev, 20 December 2002; Aivar Reinap, ―Eesti loobub Narva 
Elektrijaamade erastamise tehingust NRGle,‖ Postimees, 8 January 2002; Aleksei Gunter, ―NRG Files 
Lawsuit Over Sell-Off,‖ Baltic Times, 20 August 2002; ―NRG Energy nõuab Eesti Energialt 2,4 miljardit 
krooni,‖ Eesti Päevaleht, 23 August 2002. 
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It sold large SOEs, including infrastructure enterprises, to foreign investors.  It abolished 
all import tariffs and rapidly reoriented its trade from Russia to the West.  This explains 
why Lithuanians saw EU accession as an alternative to current economic policies, while 
Estonians considered it a continuation of such policies.    
Neither approach worked too well, however.  The Lithuania strategy helped to 
protect output and employment in agriculture and ―old‖ industries (e.g., food processing, 
and oil refining) which had been fitted out with the latest Soviet technology and which 
benefited from continued access to the undemanding Russian market.  However, it 
slowed down the development of services and ―new‖ industry (e.g., electronics), where 
the quality gap with the West was too large for Russian consumers.  The Estonian 
strategy led to a rapid development of services and ―new‖ industry, which received the 
bulk of FDI in Estonia and could export their products to the West duty-free.  At the same 
time, it hurt Estonian agriculture and ―old‖ industry, which received little foreign 
investment and were subject to high tariffs in both Western and Russian markets.  Neither 
strategy was able to prevent the decline of infrastructure (e.g., railways), although the 
Lithuanian approach slowed it down, while the Estonian policy sped it up.  As a result, 
both Lithuanians and Estonians were unhappy about their country‘s economic situation.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: FIRST CAUSES, SECOND CASES 
Introduction 
This dissertation has argued that Lithuanians and Estonians differed in their 
attitudes toward European integration because their governments pursued different 
strategies of economic reform.  Lithuania sold state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to their 
managers, imposed moderate tariffs on imports, and continued to trade heavily with 
Russia (an insider-oriented strategy).  Estonia sold SOEs to foreign investors, abolished 
all import tariffs, and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West (an outsider-
oriented strategy).  The Lithuanian strategy slowed down the development of services 
and ―new‖ industry (e.g., electronics).  The Estonian strategy led to the decline of 
agriculture and old industry (e.g., food processing).  As a result, most Lithuanians hoped 
that joining the EU would help their country overcome its economic backwardness and 
isolation.  By contrast, many Estonians thought that the accession would further 
impoverish their country and increase its economic dependency on the West. 
This argument raises two questions.  First, why did the two countries adopt 
different strategies of reform in the first place?  In this chapter, I will argue that the 
proximate cause of the choice of strategies was party politics (or, rather, party finance).  
In Lithuania, the post-Communist Democratic Labor Party won the first independence-
era parliamentary election.  The post-Communists had close personal ties with, and 
received financial support from, Soviet-era managers, who wanted to become owners of 
their enterprises and to protect their firms from Western competition.  In Estonia, the 
conservative Fatherland emerged victorious.  The main financial support for Fatherland 
came from three sources: the German Christian Democratic Party, Estonian émigrés in 
Western Europe and North America, and state-owned enterprises engaged in export-
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import trade.  These groups stood to benefit from outsider-oriented policies, such as the 
sale of SOEs to foreign investors, the liberalization of trade with the West, and the 
replacement of Soviet-era officials with émigrés in the government bureaucracy.     
However, I will also argue that, for historical, cultural, and, above all, economic 
reasons, Lithuania and Estonia would have probably adopted different economic policies 
regardless of which party was in power.  For centuries, Lithuania‘s best friend—and 
worst enemy—had been Poland, another poor East European country.  By contrast, 
Estonia had close cultural and historical ties with Finland, Sweden and Germany, rich 
West European countries.  Moreover, Lithuania‘s economy was dominated by agriculture 
and heavy industry (e.g., metal-working).  These sectors required large investments, 
depended on Soviet inputs, and were subject to EU tariffs.  As a result, Lithuania was 
unlikely to receive much foreign investment or to be able to sell its goods in Europe.   By 
contrast, Estonia had a large service sector (e.g., tourism) and light industry (e.g., wood 
processing).  These sectors required small investments, used local resources, and could 
export their goods (services) to the EU duty-free.  This made it easier for Estonia to 
attract foreign investment and to reorient its trade from Russia to the West.   
I will also tackle of question of whether my argument about the link between 
strategies of economic reform and EU support ―travels‖ to other EU candidate 
countries.  Using the case(s) of the former Czechoslovakia, I will argue that it does.
75
  
Like Lithuania, Slovakia followed an insider-oriented strategy of reform.  It sold SOEs to 
enterprise managers, imposed high tariffs on imports, and continued to trade heavily with 
Russia and Eastern Europe.  This strategy hindered development of new industry (e.g., 
motor vehicles), which lacked capital and access to rich-country markets.  As a result, 
most Slovaks supported EU accession as a way of modernizing their country‘s economy.  
By contrast, the Czech republic pursued an outsider-oriented strategy similar to Estonia‘s.  
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 Compared to Lithuania and Estonia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are ―most different systems‖ since 
they are richer and geographically and culturally closer to the Germanic and Gallic core of the EU.  
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It sold large SOEs to foreign (mostly German) investors, abolished tariffs on most EU 
imports, and reoriented its trade from Russia to the West.  These policies hurt ―old‖ 
industry (e.g., steel and mining) and agriculture, which received little FDI and which 
were subject to EU tariffs and quotas.  Hence, many Czechs opposed European 
integration as a threat to their traditional economy.   
          I will proceed as follows.  The next section will explain why Lithuania and Estonia 
pursued different strategies of reform.  The following section will show that my argument 
―travels‖ to the Slovak and Czech republics.  The conclusion will summarize the main 
findings of my dissertation. 
I Explaining the Explanation 
Lithuania: Heavy Metal 
As Fish (1998) and Bunce (1999) have argued, the first post-Communist elections 
strongly influenced the subsequent economic and political development of East European 
countries.  In Lithuania, the ex-Communist Democratic Labor Party won a landslide 
victory in the 1992 parliamentary election.
76
  Labor‘s economic program called for a 
gradual transition to capitalism that would maintain production and incomes, give 
Lithuanians control of the country‘s economic assets, and ensure social justice.  Strategic 
enterprises (power plants, railways, the Maţeikiu Nafta oil refinery) were to remain state 
property.  Non-infrastructure SOEs were to be privatized through vouchers issued to all 
Lithuanian citizens based on age.
77
  Enterprise employees were to be allowed to buy at 
least 50% of the shares in their own firm.  Large industrial enterprises should receive 
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 Besides the post-Communist Labor party, Lithuania also had a small Social Democratic party, which saw 
itself as a successor to the pre-war socialists.   The two parties merged in 2001.  The new Social 
Democratic Party is, nonetheless, dominated by ex-Communist politicians and businessmen. 
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 On this point, the Lithuanian conservatives agreed with the post-Communists.  However, they argued that 
no preference should be given to employees since this would allow Soviet-era managers to become owners.  
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subsidies from the state, as should farmers.  Lithuania‘s trade policy should protect their 
interests of Lithuanian producers.  Lithuania should impose moderate tariffs on imports, 
especially of agricultural goods, and continue to trade actively with Russia and other ex-
Soviet countries, where its products enjoyed a good reputation.
78
     
These policies reflected the economic interests of Soviet-era enterprise managers, 
who had close personal ties with the Social Democratic party and financed its election 
campaign.  Above all, managers wanted to become owners of their enterprises.  Voucher 
privatization—with preferences for enterprise employees—suited this purpose quite well.  
Workers would have to set up investment funds to pool their vouchers.  Managers would 
be the obvious candidates to lead these funds.  Moreover, the vouchers would be tradable.  
This would allow managers to buy up vouchers from impoverished workers.  Managers 
also wanted to protect their enterprises against Western competition since Lithuanian 
firms were generally less efficient than their Western counterparts.  (Agriculture and food 
processing were exceptions to this rule.  However, the EU subsidized its inefficient 
farmers and agriprocessors, which nullified whatever comparative advantage Lithuania 
may have had).  Finally, managers wanted to continue to trade with Russia, which was 
the biggest market for their products and the main source of Lithuania‘s energy and raw 
materials.
79
  
                                                          
78
 See, especially, Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to 
Independence (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), chap. 8-9; Niels Mygind, ―A 
Comparative Analysis of the Economic Transition in the Baltic Countries – Barriers, Strategies, 
Perspectives,‖ in The Transition to a Market Economy: Transformation and Reform in the Baltic States, 
Tarmo Haavisto, ed. (Cheltenham, UK and Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1997), 17-66; and Terry D. 
Clark and Robin M. Tucker, ―Lithuania Beyond the Return of the Left,‖ in Charles Bukowski and Barnabas 
Racz, The Return of the Left in Post-Communist States: Current Trends and Future Prospects 
(Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1999), 35-58.  See also Thomas Lane, Lithuania: 
Stepping Westward (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), Chs. 4-5; Diana Janusauskienė, ―The 
Metamorphosis of the Communist Party of Lithuania,‖ in The Communist Successor Parties of Central and 
Eastern Europe, ed. András Bozóki and John T. Ishiyama (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 224-
239; and Terry D. Clark and Jovita Pranevičiūte, ―Perspectives on Communist Successor Parties: The Case 
of Lithuania,‖ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41 (2008): 443-464. 
 
79
 Valdas Samonis, ―Economic Reforms in the Baltics: The Case of Lithuania,‖ in Privatization in Central 
and Eastern Europe: Perspectives and Approaches, ed. Demetrius S. Iatridis and June Gary Hopps, 
(Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1998), 73-84; Eugenijus Maldeikis and Gediminas Rainys, ―Estonia, 
 115 
 
However, this raises the question of whether Lithuania would have pursued 
different, more outsider-oriented policies if the conservative Homeland Union had won 
the founding election?  The answer is, probably not—at least not to the same extent as 
Estonia.  For one thing, Lithuania lacked an obvious patron in Western Europe.  
Historically, Lithuania‘s paths had crossed with Germany.  In the Middle Ages, the 
Teutonic Order made several attempts to conquer Lithuania under the pretext of 
christening the heathen.  However, unlike the stateless Estonia, the Lithuanian grand 
duchy successfully resisted the invaders.
80
  In the nineteenth century, Germany 
encouraged Lithuanian nationalism to weaken the Russian empire.  For example, it 
allowed Lithuanians to smuggle nationalist literature from East Prussia to Lithuania.  
When Lithuania declared itself an independent state during World War I, it first elected a 
German prince as its grand duke, although this agreement eventually came unstuck. 
81
 
In the 1920s, however, Lithuania‘s relations with Germany deteriorated.  Taking 
advantage of German weakness, Lithuania occupied the Klaipėda (Memel) territory in 
East Prussia, which had been part of the Lithuanian state in the Middle Ages.  Germany 
retaliated by banning the import of Lithuania goods.  In 1938, Germany re-annexed the 
region, cutting Lithuania off from the Baltic Sea.  The German occupation of Lithuania 
proper during World War II was harsh.  Most of Lithuania‘s 200,000 Jews (8% of the 
population) were killed.  Nationalist intellectuals, officers and clergy were put in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Latvia, Lithuania: The Way to Europe,‖ in Transformations of Post-Communist States, ed. Wojciech 
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concentration camps although some of them collaborated with the Germans in 
exterminating the Jews.  As a result, Lithuania developed both Communist and nationalist 
anti-German guerrilla movements.  When the Soviet troops entered Lithuania in 1944 and 
drove the Germans out of Klaipėda, some Lithuanians were, at first, glad to see them.82   
Instead of Germany, Lithuania‘s closest friend—and enemy—has for a long time 
been Poland.  Lithuania was baptized by Polish priests in the fourteenth century.  In the 
sixteenth century, Lithuania and Poland formed a political and military union 
(Rzeczpospolita), which conquered large areas of western Russia.
83
  The wheel of fortune 
turned in the eighteenth century, when Russia annexed Lithuania and eastern Poland.  
However, the Lithuanian nobility maintained Polish language and culture.  Relations 
between the two peoples soured with the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century.  
Lithuanian peasants refused to join the anti-Russian uprisings staged by Lithuania‘s 
Polonized nobles in 1831 and 1863.  When Lithuania and Poland became independent 
nation-states after the Russian revolution, Poland occupied the region around the ancient 
Lithuanian capital, Vilnius.  Lithuania got its revenge in 1939, when the Soviet Union 
and Germany divided up Poland and allowed Lithuania to re-occupy Vilnius.
84
   
Under Communism, relations between Poland and Lithuania improved, at least at 
the elite level: both now saw Russia as their main enemy.  Many Lithuanian intellectuals 
read the Polish press.  The Lithuanian Catholic church sent its seminarians to study in 
Poland.  Lithuanian dissidents made contact with Solidarity.  However, the Poles living in 
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Lithuania remained hostile to their host country: in 1991, most Poles voted against 
Lithuanian independence, while local governments in Polish-dominated municipalities 
supported the attempted military coup in Moscow.  After the Soviet Union broke up, 
Poland and Lithuania signed a border and friendship treaty whereby Poland relinquished 
its territorial claims to Lithuania and Lithuania promised to treat the Polish minority well.  
However, Poland was in no position to help Lithuania economically.  Like Lithuania, 
Poland was a poor post-Communist country in need of foreign investment.  Moreover, 
Poland and Lithuania had similar economies, dominated by heavy industry and 
agriculture.  As a result, they competed with each other for export markets.
85
   
This brings us to the most important reason for why Lithuania adopted an insider-
oriented reform strategy: the economic structure of Lithuania at the time of the breakup 
of the Soviet Union.  Much of the existing literature argues that economic factors cannot 
explain why Lithuania and Estonia adopted different foreign economic policies because 
their economies were very similar under Communism (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997, 
2002; Mattusch 1997; Fish 1998; Andersen 1999, Parts I, III; Maldeikis and Rainys 2000; 
Raun 2001; Feldmann and Sally 2002; Aslund 2002, chap. 1, 3, 9; Laar 2002, chap. 2-3; 
Arias-King 2003; Abdelal 2005, chap. 1, 3; Norkus 2006, 2007).  As Table 6.1 shows, 
however, Lithuania had a larger agriculture than Estonia, accounting for 27% of its GDP 
and 18% of its employment, compared with 20% and 13%, respectively, in Estonia.  As 
discussed in chapter 5, the EU imposed high tariffs on East European agricultural imports 
and provided large export subsidies to West European farmers and agriprocessors.  If its 
agriculture was going to survive, Lithuania had to a) impose tariffs on agricultural 
imports from the West and b) to continue to export its foodstuffs to Russia, where tariffs 
were lower and where Lithuanian products enjoyed prior name recognition.  
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Table 6.1: How Similar?  Lithuanian and Estonian Economies in 1989 
 Lithuania Estonia 
A) GDP (%) 
Agriculture and forestry 27 20 
Industry 35 36 
Construction 10 8 
Services 28 36 
B) Employment (%) 
Agriculture and forestry 18 13 
Industry 30 32 
Construction 12 10 
Services 40 45 
Source: The World Bank, Statistical Handbook 1993: States of the Former USSR 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993), 172, 182, 412, 422. 
Industry accounted for about the same share of GDP (35-36%) and employment 
(30-32%) in Lithuania and Estonia.  However, the structure of the industry differed in the 
two countries.
86
  First, as Table 6.2 indicates, Lithuania had a larger metal-working and 
machine-building industry (25% of total industrial output) than Estonia (16%).  This 
industry mostly produced machine tools and electric motors for the Soviet industry and 
military, although it also made some domestic machinery (e.g., refrigerators and TV 
sets).
87
  Second, more Lithuanian than Estonian firms reported directly to the Soviet 
central government.  Thus, all-union enterprises owned 62% of Lithuanian plant and 
equipment (59% in Estonia), employed 42% of its industrial labor (34%), and produced 
39% of its industrial output (28%).
88
  Finally, Lithuanian plants were somewhat bigger 
(840 workers on average) than Estonian factories (790 workers).
89
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Table 6.2: Asset or Liability?  Lithuanian and Estonian Industry in 1989 (% of 
industrial output)* 
 Lithuania Estonia 
Electricity and fuels 8 7 
Chemicals 3 8 
Machinery and metalworking 25 16 
Wood-working, pulp and paper  5 10 
Construction materials 5 4 
Textiles, clothing, and leather 20 22 
Food processing 22 25 
Source: World Bank, Statistical Handbook 1993: States of the Former USSR 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993), 208, 448. 
These figures reflected Lithuanian economic history.  With the exception of food-
processing, Lithuania only began to industrialize under the Soviet rule, in the 1940s and 
1950s. Based on the needs on the all-Union economy, the Soviet central planners 
emphasized the development of heavy industry, such as metalworking and machine-
building.
90
  However, the structure of the Lithuanian industry also affected the economic 
policies of the post-Soviet Lithuanian government by making an outsider-oriented 
strategy seem risky.  Foreign investors were unlikely to take much interest in Lithuania‘s 
machine-building enterprises, which needed large investments in plant and equipment, 
depended heavily on Russian energy (oil) and raw materials (steel), and were used to 
being told by Moscow what to produce and how.  Moreover, even if outside investors had 
been found, they would have probably moved aggressively to cut production and 
employment, a scary prospect given the large size of Lithuanian plants.
91
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Estonia: Light Wood 
In Estonia, the conservative Fatherland won the most votes in the 1992 election 
and formed a government with two other center-right parties.  Fatherland argued that 
Estonia needed to break the economic power of the former nomenklatura and detach its 
economy from Russia.  SOEs were to be privatized as quickly as possible to prevent 
Soviet managers from turning them into their private property or stripping off their assets.   
The main method of privatizing large enterprises was to be the sale of firms to foreign 
investors for cash.
92
  Trade was to be liberalized and rapidly reoriented from Russia to the 
West.  All export and import licenses, quotas, and tariffs were to be abolished.  Estonia 
was to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU and European Free Trade 
Association to allow Estonian firms to enter Western markets.  Finally, to ensure that this 
program was implemented, the state apparatus was to be purged of corrupt and 
incompetent Soviet-era cadres and replaced with people selected on the basis of their 
integrity and qualifications.
93
   
As with Lithuanian post-Communists, these policies reflected the economic 
interests of Fatherland‘s financial backers, including the German Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU), Estonian émigrés in Europe and North America, and state-owned export-
import businesses.
94
  The CDU provided the money to set up a conservative think tank 
and encouraged various conservative groups to form a party (Fatherland).  Not  
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coincidentally, the first head of the Estonian Privatization Agency was a German 
Estonian, while German businesses were the main beneficiaries of the first wave of 
privatization in 1992-3.
95
  Estonian émigrés financed Fatherland‘s 1992 election 
campaign.  In return, Fatherland promoted several of them to key positions in the 
Estonian government, including the ministers of defense, energy and finance.
 96
  State-
owned export-import businesses, such as Estonian Metal Export and the Port of Tallinn, 
made large financial donations to Fatherland when it was in power in 1992-1995.  They 
did so, in part, because their managers wanted to stay on the good side of the powers that 
be.  However, they also benefited from the conservatives‘ economic policies, such as the 
abolition of export and import tariffs.
97
 
However, it seems likely that any Estonian government—regardless of its 
ideology and the interests of its financial backers—would have adopted outsider-oriented 
economic policies because of a) Estonia’s historical and cultural ties with Germany, 
Sweden and Finland and b) the structure of the Estonian economy under Communism.  
The Teutonic Order conquered Estonia in one of Western Europe‘s last crusades in the 
thirteenth century.
98
  The various Estonian tribes put up a good fight—the war lasted for 
nineteen years—but failed to defeat the Germans because they lacked a unified state.  For 
the next seven hundred years, the Germans constituted the land-owning ruling class in 
Estonia regardless of which power—the Order, Sweden or Russia—ruled the country.  
Estonians tilled the land as serfs or—after the Russian crown abolished serfdom in the 
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nineteenth century—as tenant farmers and landless laborers.99    
Things changed in 1918-1920, when the newly-established Estonian state fought a 
war of independence against Bolshevik Russia and the Baltic-German Landeswehr.  
During the war, the Estonian government confiscated German landed property and 
distributed it to Estonian peasants.  The land reform issue soured political relations 
between Estonia and Germany in the inter-war years: Germany demanded that the 
nobility be compensated; Estonia refused.  However, Germany remained Estonia‘s largest 
foreign investor and second-largest trading partner after Britain.
100
  In 1941-44, Estonia 
was under German military occupation.  The Germans murdered Estonian Jews (about 
1% of the population), Communists, and left-wing intellectuals.  However, except for 
heavy economic requisitions, they left the rest of the population largely unmolested.  As a 
result, no significant anti-German guerrilla movement developed in Estonia.  Indeed, 
many Estonians volunteered to serve in the German army, especially when the Soviet 
troops approached the Estonian border in 1944.
101
   
Sweden conquered Estonia after the disintegration of the Teutonic order in the 
sixteenth century under the twin blows of the Protestant Reformation and the military 
successes of the Polish-Lithuanian state.
102
  The Swedish crown imposed heavy taxes on 
Estonian peasants.  However, it limited statute labor and allowed peasants to sue abusive  
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landlords in royal courts.  It also set up the first Estonian-language schools.  Sweden lost 
Estonia to Russia in the Great Northern War in the eighteenth century.  However, it 
reestablished relations with its former colony after the breakup of the Russian empire.  In 
the 1920s and 1930s, Sweden became Estonia‘s third-largest foreign investor and trading 
partner after Britain and Germany.  The Estonian currency (kroon) was pegged to the 
Swedish krona and Estonian gold reserves were deposited in the Swedish Riksbank.  In 
1940, Sweden was the only Western country besides Nazi Germany that recognized the 
Soviet occupation of Estonia and turned over Estonian assets to the Soviet government.  
However, in 1944, it gave refuge to tens of thousands of Estonians fleeing from the 
Soviet army and became the center of Estonian émigré life in Europe.
103
       
Finland is related to Estonia by geography—Tallinn is located eighty kilometers 
from Helsinki across the Gulf of Finland—and language—Finnish and Estonian are 
mutually intelligible.  As a result, Finland became Estonia‘s ―window to the West‖ 
during the Soviet era.  In 1965, Tallinn and Helsinki established a regular ferry 
connection, which brought thousands of Finnish tourists to Estonia.  In the 1970s, 
Estonians developed a taste for blue jeans and American soap operas by watching Finnish 
television.  In the 1980s, Finnish and Estonian firms established several joint ventures 
(e.g., in gasoline distribution and tourism).  As with Germany and Sweden, Estonia‘s 
relationship with Finland need not be idealized.  Many Finnish tourists came (and come) 
to Estonia to purchase liquor and to visit prostitutes.  The joint ventures often allowed 
Finnish firms to get hold of Estonian state assets at bargain-basement prices.  However, 
thanks to Estonia‘s prior ties with Finland, Estonian policy-makers could expect that 
Western capitalists would know where Estonia was on the map.
104
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Finally, the economic structure of Estonia under Communism favored the 
adoption of outsider-oriented economic reforms.  As Table 6.1 makes clear, Estonia had a 
larger service sector (36% of output and 16% of employment) than Lithuania (28% and 
14%, respectively).  Services were likely to receive more foreign investment than other 
sectors because they promised investors quick profits and/or large rents.  For example, 
Estonia was likely to attract tourists from the Nordic countries and Germany.  This made 
it profitable for investors to buy Estonian hotels and spas and to open casinos and night 
clubs.  In the same vein, Estonia inherited from the Soviet Union a well-developed 
transportation infrastructure, such as railways and ports.  A private owner of these 
facilities could earn monopoly rents from the transit of Russian raw materials to Europe.     
While industry made a similar share of the GDP and employment in Lithuania 
and Estonia in 1989, the structure of industry differed in the two countries.  As Table 6.2 
shows, Estonia had a larger wood-processing industry than Lithuania (9% v. 5% of 
industrial output), producing furniture, pulp, and paper for the Soviet market.
105
  This 
reflected, in part, Estonia‘s earlier history of industrialization: many Estonian wood-
processing plants had been established in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
with Russian, German, and British capital.
106
  However, it also facilitated Estonia‘s 
transition from socialism back to capitalism.  Unlike many other sectors of industry, 
wood-processing used cheap local raw materials and energy (timber and electricity) and  
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could export its goods to the EU duty-free.  This made it attractive for foreign investors,  
especially Nordic forestry firms looking for cheap production sites close to home.
107
  
Estonia also controlled a larger share of its industry than Lithuania.  Enterprises 
controlled by a) the republican government alone or b) jointly by the republican and 
central government accounted for 41% of Estonian fixed industrial capital, 66% of its 
industrial workforce, and 72% of its industrial output, compared to 38%, 58% and 61%, 
respectively, in Lithuania.
108
  Finally, Estonian plants were somewhat smaller than 
Lithuanian factories, employing 790 workers on average (840 in Lithuania).
109
  This 
made Estonia‘s transition to capitalism easier in two ways.  First, firms controlled by  
republican authorities had some experience in seeking out their own suppliers and 
customers and deciding how to combine labor and capital to reach plan targets.  This 
increased the likelihood that they would survive without government guidance and 
subsidies.  Moreover, if the worst came to worst and the enterprises went bankrupt, fewer  
people would be hurt because they employed fewer workers in the first place.
110
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II Does It Travel?   
Slovakia: Inside-Out 
Does the argument I have developed in this dissertation—that Lithuania and 
Estonia pursued different strategies of economic reforms, which, in turn, shaped their 
attitudes toward European integration—―travel‖ to other East European countries?   
A preliminary analysis of the economic and political development of the former  
Czechoslovakia suggests that it does.  Like Lithuania, Slovakia was a largely agrarian 
economy in the inter-war years, producing foodstuffs for the Czech as well as German 
and Austrian markets.  After 1948, the Communist government of Czechoslovakia 
invested heavily in developing Slovak industry, especially steel, metal-working, and 
machine-building, including weapons.  At the same time, it provided large subsidies to 
Slovak agriculture, which remained the main producer of foodstuffs for the country.  As a 
result, Slovakia—like Lithuania—developed a dualistic economic structure, dominated by 
heavy industry on the one hand and agriculture on the other.
111
         
The structure of its economy posed a problem for Slovakia when Communism 
collapsed.  In 1990-1992, the new, conservative-led federal government liberalized prices 
and trade.  This hurt Slovaks more than Czechs.  Heavy-industrial goods products had 
been overpriced under Communism.  Now their price declined relative to the price of 
light-industrial goods and services.  Agriculture had been heavily subsidized and 
protected.  Now it had to compete with EU-subsdized European agribusinesses.  The 
government also launched a ―peace offensive‖ to cut weapons production and exports.112  
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It joined the US- and EU-led arms embargoes on the former Yugoslavia and Arab 
countries (e.g., Iraq, Libya, and Syria), which had been the best customers for Slovak 
arms.  It also ―converted‖ military plants to civilian use, which in practice meant that 
factories that had produced tanks and explosives started making tractors and detergent.  
These policies put much of the Slovak arms industry out of business.
113
     
In the 1992 general election, unhappy Slovaks voted into power a center-left 
coalition led by the populist Movement for Democratic Slovakia.  The populist 
government is most remembered for negotiating a ―velvet divorce‖ from the Czech 
Republic.  Equally important, however, it adopted an insider-oriented strategy of 
transition to capitalism to protect Slovak economic sovereignty.  It maintained public 
ownership of ―strategic‖ enterprises, such as mines, oil and gas pipelines, electric power 
plants, railways, banks, and telecommunications.  It sold the remaining enterprises—first 
for vouchers, then for cash, but actually on credit—to  ―employee corporations‖ 
dominated by enterprise managers.  It provided subsidies (e.g., cheap loans through state-
owned banks) to both SOEs and to firms undergoing privatization.  It imposed double-
digit tariffs on Western imports, especially agricultural goods, but also steel and some 
machinery.  At the same time, it concluded various trade agreements with Russia, the 
Czech Republic and other East European countries.
114
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The insider-oriented policies helped to slow down the decline of output and 
employment in agriculture, food-processing, steel, and some sectors of metal-working  
(e.g., metal sheets).  In these sectors, government subsidies and tariffs helped struggling  
firms to overcome their—small—quality gap with the West and to export their goods to 
Russia and Eastern Europe.  By contrast, machine-building, the leading sector of the 
Slovak economy under Communism, largely collapsed because its goods were of such 
poor quality relative to Western products that even East European consumers did not 
want them.  Slovak service sector presents a similar pattern.  Relatively simple services—
e.g., commerce and tourism—grew fast since they allowed local entrepreneurs to earn 
quick profits.  However, more sophisticated services—e.g., finance and 
telecommunications—remained underdeveloped for lack of capital and technology.115   
The failure of the insider-oriented policies to modernize the Slovak economy led 
to the defeat of the left-populists by a conservative-led coalition in the 1998 general 
election.  The new government gradually opened the Slovak economy to Western 
investment and trade.  It sold several large SOEs—e.g., telecommunications and banks—
to Western investors.  It allowed foreigners to buy non-agricultural land and provided 
subsidies (e.g., tax holidays) to foreign ―greenfield‖ investors.  It cut tariffs on Western 
imports and encouraged Slovak firms to export their goods to the EU.  However, until the  
EU referendum, relatively few foreign companies invested in Slovakia because they 
feared the revival of nationalism and populism (see Table 6.3).
 116 
  Moreover, some of  
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the biggest foreign investors in the Slovak economy were Russian companies.  For 
example, Yukos purchased the Transpetrol oil pipeline, while Gazprom bought the 
Slovrusgaz gas distribution network.  As Table 6.3 shows, Slovakia also continued to 
trade heavily with Russia and Eastern Europe.
117
 
Table 6.3: Similar Speed, Different Direction: Foreign Investment and Trade in 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 2003 
 Slovakia Czech 
Republic 
Private sector share in GDP (%) 80 80 
Foreign direct investment per capita, 1989-2003 ($) 1894 3710 
Share of trade in GDP (%) 136 111 
Share of trade with non-transition countries (%) 66 81 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 2004 (London: EBRD, 2004), 45, 120-121, 176-77. 
Like in Lithuania, the weak economic presence of the West in Slovakia and the 
primitive structure of the Slovak economy created a pro-EU consensus among the Slovak 
political parties at the time of the EU referendum.  The governing conservative and 
liberal parties argued that Slovakia needed to join the EU to catch up with the West 
economically.  EU accession would promote foreign investment in industries where 
Slovakia had a comparative advantage because of its geographical location and skilled 
labor force (e.g., cars and electronics).  Free trade would give Slovakia access to the rich 
and large EU market and stimulate competition at home.  More interestingly, the 
national-populists also supported EU accession, even though they were now in 
opposition.  They argued that joining the EU would allow Slovak producers to compete 
on equal footing with West European firms.  Slovak steel and metalworking firms would 
be able to export their goods to the EU duty-free.  Slovak farmers would begin to receive 
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EU subsidies.  As a result, 94% of Slovaks voted for EU membership in the 2003 
accession referendum, more than in any other Central European candidate country.
118
    
The Czech Republic: Outside-In 
The Czech Republic presents a rather different picture from its Slovak counterpart 
in terms of the structure of its economy under Communism, the strategy of transition, and 
the economic and political consequences of that strategy.  Bohemia and Moravia began to 
industrialize already in the second half of the nineteenth century, producing glass, 
textiles, coal, steel, and weapons for the Austria-Hungarian empire.  During and after 
World War I, the Czech lands developed a large machine-building industry, including 
electric motors and motor vehicles (cars, buses and trams).  Many of these ventures were 
financed by German bankers and industrialists.
119
  After 1948, the Communist 
government nationalized the bulk of Czech industry.  However, Czech plants continued 
to export some of their products (especially cars) to Western Europe.  The Communists 
also built a strong petro-chemical industry, including fuels, rubber, fertilizers, and paints.  
By contrast, some older industries—e.g., steel and weapons—moved to Slovakia.120   
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 In the 1992 election, a plurality of Czech voted for the conservative Civic 
Democratic Party and its liberal allies.  The conservative-led government of 1992-1998 
pursued outsider-oriented economic policies similar to Estonia‘s.  Large, export-oriented 
SOEs were sold to foreign (mostly German) investors for cash.  For example, Škoda Auto 
was sold to Volkswagen and the engineering concerns Škoda Energo and ZPA to 
Siemens.
121
  The government also welcomed foreign ―greenfield‖ investment.  Foreigners 
were allowed to invest in all sectors of the economy and to buy non-agricultural land.  
They also received generous start-up subsidies and tax breaks.  Finally, the government 
quickly liberalized foreign trade.  Except for agricultural products, tariffs on EU goods 
were abolished.  Tariffs on non-EU imports were set at single digits.  As a result, as 
Table 6.3 illustrates, the Czech Republic received more FDI per capita—and reoriented 
its trade more rapidly from Eastern to Western Europe—than Slovakia.122      
Like in Estonia, however, outsider-oriented policies worked better for some 
sectors of the economy than others.  Output and employment increased in services, 
particularly finance and telecommunications, and the machine-building industry, 
especially motor vehicles and electronics.  These sectors received the bulk of the FDI in  
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the Czech republic because they offered foreign investors the opportunity to extract  
quasi-monopoly rents (services) or to cut labor costs (machine-building).  Under the 
Czech Republic‘s association agreement with the EU, they could also export their goods 
(services) to Western Europe duty-free.  By contrast, output and employment declined in 
agriculture and food processing, fuel, chemicals, steel, and mining.  These sectors 
received little FDI because of their competitive structure or capital-intensive nature.  
Because of EU export subsidies and import tariffs, they also faced tough EU competition  
at home without being able to export their products to the EU.
123
    
The economic problems created by Western investment and trade created a 
political opening for anti-EU parties.  Like in Estonia, much of the opposition to the EU 
came from the political left—in this case, the hard-left Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia.  The Czech Communists are unusual among the former regime parties in 
Eastern Europe in that they have both kept the Communist name and ideology and 
achieved considerable electoral success (19% of the vote in the 2002 election).  They 
called on their supporters to vote against EU accession because it would impoverish 
ordinary people and undermine Czech economic independence.  European competition 
would drive Czech agriculture and traditional industry bankrupt and increase 
unemployment.  EU-mandated indirect taxes would increase the price of food, gasoline, 
electricity, and other basic goods.  German and Austrian companies would take control of 
Czech infrastructure like railways and power plants.  Germans expelled from the Sudeten 
region after World War II would come and reclaim their property.
124
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Unlike in Estonia, however, the Czech conservatives, who were left out of 
government after the 2002 election, also criticized certain aspects of European 
integration.  They argued that the EU was moving from free market liberalism towards 
―socialism‖ (centralization and regulation).  The Czech Republic‘s accession treaty with 
the EU was a case in point.  EU-imposed environmental, health and safety regulations 
would increase the cost of doing business in the Czech Republic and make Czech goods 
less competitive.  EU-imposed tariffs would increase the prices of consumer goods.  Visa 
regulations would bar Czechs workers from working in most EU countries—including 
neighboring Germany and Austria—for several years, while foreigners would be allowed 
to buy land in the Czech republic from the date for the accession.
125
  The conservative 
criticisms reinforced the impression cultivated by the Communists that the Czechs were 
getting a raw deal from the EU.  As a result, only 77% of Czechs voted for EU accession 
in the 2003 referendum, less than in any other Central European candidate country.
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Conclusion 
This dissertation began with a puzzle: why did most Lithuanians support EU 
membership, while many Estonians did not?  The existing literature on cross-national 
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differences in EU support in Eastern Europe has focused on political and cultural 
variables, such as the history of independent statehood and the presence or absence of 
significant Euroskeptic parties.  I have shown that there is some support for these 
hypotheses.  Lithuanians were less worried about losing their political independence and 
cultural identity in the EU than Estonians.  Europskeptic parties were stronger in Estonia 
than in Lithuania.  I have also shown, however, that Lithuanian and Estonian voters had 
different economic expectations about the EU.  Most Lithuanians hoped that joining the 
EU would help their country develop economically by making it eligible for EU aid and 
increasing foreign investment and trade.  Many Estonians, by contrast, worried that the 
accession would impoverish their country and make it dependent on the West by driving 
domestic producers out of business and allowing foreigners to buy up local resources.   
I have argued that these expectations reflected the strategies of economic reform 
adopted by Lithuania and Estonia.  Lithuania pursued an insider-oriented strategy.  It 
maintained state ownership of basic infrastructure (e.g., railways) and sold other SOEs to 
their managers.  It imposed moderate tariffs on imports and continued to trade heavily 
with Russia.  By contrast, Estonia followed an outsider-oriented strategy.  It sold large 
SOEs, including infrastructure enterprises, to foreign investors.  It abolished all import 
tariffs and reoriented its trade rapidly from Russia to the West.  Neither strategy worked 
particularly well, however.  The Lithuanian strategy slowed down the development of 
services and ―new‖ industries (e.g., electronics).  The Estonian strategy undermined 
agriculture, ―old‖ industries (e.g., food processing) and infrastructure (e.g., railways).   
As a result, both Lithuanians and Estonians were unhappy with their (country‘s) 
economic situation.  However, Lithuanians saw the European integration as a solution to 
their (country‘s) economic problems, while Estonians considered it a cause of theirs.        
This, of course, raises the question of why Lithuania and Estonia pursued 
different strategies of economic reform in the first place.  Party politics played a role in 
this.  For most of the 1990s and early 2000s, Lithuania was governed by the post-
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Communists, whereas Estonia was ruled by the conservatives.  I have also argued, 
however, that Lithuania and Estonia would have probably pursued different economic 
policies regardless of which party was in power.  For historical and cultural reasons, 
Lithuania lacked an obvious patron in Western Europe, while Estonia had several 
(Finland, Sweden and Germany).  Moreover, under Communism, the Lithuanian economy 
was dominated by agriculture on the one hand and heavy industry on the other.  These 
sectors were unattractive to foreign investors because they required large investment in 
plant and technology or were subject to EU tariffs and quotas.  By contrast, Estonia had a 
large light industry and service sector.  These sectors were attractive to foreign investors 
because they required small capital investments or allowed investors to earn monopoly 
rents.  They could export their products to the EU duty-free.   
Finally, I have argued that my argument ―travels‖ to the former Czechoslovakia.  
Like Lithuania, Slovakia inherited from the Communist system an economy dominated 
by agriculture and heavy industry.  To protect these sectors, the left-populist government 
of Slovakia sold SOEs to their managers, imposed high tariffs on EU imports, and 
continued to trade with Russia and Eastern Europe.  These policies slowed down the 
development of ―new‖ industry (e.g., cars) and skill-intensive services.  As a result, most 
Slovaks supported joining the EU as a way of modernizing their country‘s economy.  
Like Estonia, the Czech lands had a relatively large service sector and light industry.  To 
help these sectors develop, the conservative Czech government sold large SOEs to 
foreign investors, abolished tariffs on most EU imports, and reoriented the country‘s 
exports to Western Europe.  These policies led to the decline of Czech agriculture and 
―old‖ industry (e.g., steel and mining).  As a result, many Czechs opposed EU accession 
as threat to their traditional economy.  Across Eastern Europe, it seems, familiarity with 
the West (through investment and trade) breeds contempt (opposition to the EU). 
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